

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT

By

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by

Daggy Narveson

Be my wife, Angel.

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INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT

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I sought to understand what happens to social movements as they go from outside to insider status. I did this by conducting a case study of *new* groups that represent the Christian Right social movement. Such a case study will aid an understanding of how social movements institutionalize and how institutionalization changes them. Data were collected by interviewing interest group representatives and through observation of interest group activities (such as press conferences, symposiums, policy, and coalitions). By examining their rising social movement ties, Christian Right interest groups have been able to overcome some of the weaknesses of institutionalization and more effectively deal with the free-rider problem. As a result, I found that social movement theory provides a better mechanism for explaining the behavior of these groups than interest group theory or institutionalization theory.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

My aim is to understand how social movements change over time. A common challenge faced by social movements is how to sustain the energy and enthusiasm of the movement long enough to cause desired change in society. To sustain them long enough, opposing structures must be built. However, there are also dangers involved in institutionalizing a social movement.

- Original goals of the movement may change to accommodate the needs of the organizing structure.
- Organizing structures may undermine the goals of the social movement.
- Movement leaders may become oligarchically, ignoring the norms of movement members after gaining power in the movement.
- The movement can become "captured" to serve the electoral interests of political or political parties.

These changes may diminish the substance of movement actions. How social movements deal with these challenges, therefore, is an important area of research.

As social movements institutionalize, they form organizations, or interest groups, to further their goals. Therefore, the study of social movement institutionalization finds a confluence of three different theoretical approaches: institutionalization theory, interest group theory, and social movement theory. Understanding how these three theoretical approaches relate to each other will necessarily constitute part of this project.

Historically, social movement scholars and interest group scholars have developed separate theoretical paths, with the few efforts to bridge these theories. In one effort to bridge these differences, Dene et al. (2005, 10) used two-way representation theory and social

movement theory can inform each other—a unified theory can be developed to understand the behavior of organizations and social movements. In theories developed in one field can be used to inform the other. While Davis et al. (2007) and the rest of the authors in their edited volume do not attempt the first option, they provide several examples of the latter. This study also follows this pattern. More specifically, it shows how social movement theories can be used to understand the behavior of certain types of interest groups.

Language that by conducting a case study of the Christian Right, I find that institutionalization and interest group theories did not necessarily predict the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. Social movement theories, on the other hand, provide a useful tool for understanding them.

Institutionalization of a social movement is an area of study that has been poorly developed using social movement theories. While institutionalization of social movement organizations (Troll and Ash 1990) and corporatization of power within society (Bullock 1998; McCarthy and McPhail 1994) have been studied, no scholar has attempted to theorized how the institutionalization of a social movement. This is curious considering that the Christian Right social movement was described to have become institutionalized (Jhon 1996; Wilson 1996). In other words, while the term “institutionalization” has been used to describe the change that occurred with the Christian Right, institutionalization has been poorly defined in relation to social movements.

Therefore, after giving some historical context and defining my terms, I discuss theories of institutionalization, interest groups, and social movements. Then I discuss

why social movement theory is a necessary component for understanding the institutionalization of the Christian Right and the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the methods and data used for this research.

Historical Background

The Christian Right social movement began in the late 1970s mobilized social conservatives across the country. This movement brought these conservatives into the Republican Party and helped the Party to gain power at the national level and in many state and local governments (Dunn, Koord and Wilson 2008; Oldfield 1996; Wilson 1994). The Christian Right social movement remains a powerful force in the Republican Party today. At the national level, the Republican Party also reflects the goals of the Christian Right social movement. Currently, the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader of the Senate, and the President of the United States are evangelical social conservatives and commonly portrayed as sympathizers, if not members, of the movement.

At first, the movement's core constituency was drawn from fundamentalist¹ evangelical Protestants. Gradually, however, the movement began to draw from other wings of evangelical Christianity. Recently, a large drawing from many varieties of conservative religious adherents. One study shows evangelical Protestants to be most influenced by the Christian Right, followed by fundamentalists, mainline Protestants and

¹ As we will see in the next chapter, the term "fundamentalist" is used here to refer to evangelical who are most socially zealous. They probably would not even consider our their engagement with the world as they are normally construed in sociology. Both evangelicals, non-evangelicals and cultists are usually excluded from this group.

other Catholics (Begone, Bikkink, and Smith 1999). Christian Right supporters among religious adherents should not be overestimated, however. Slightly more than half of evangelicals, the strongest supporters, had not heard of the Christian Right or did not rely on its advice for voting decisions (Begone, Bikkink, and Smith 1999).

To support, sustain, and expand the movement, social movement organizations, or Christian Right interest groups were created. Some of these Christian Right interest groups remain as important parts of the Christian Right social movement today. Others have been disbanded and other groups have been created since the beginning of the movement. Christian Right interest groups were created to bring a structure to the social movement that could organize and give focus and discipline for the beliefs, energy, and activities of the Christian Right social movement. The creation of interest groups was a way to institutionalize the Christian Right social movement. Institutionalization of the Christian Right social movement (as represented by Christian Right interest groups) is the focus of this study.

Today's Christian Right is also characterized by its close relationship with the Republican Party. The Christian Right has devoted much effort to gaining influence within the Republican Party (Bauer and Wilson 1998). This relationship has been described as "opposite", where the Christian Right provides loyal voters in exchange for political power (Dessouss 1993). An important question then becomes, how does this affect change the Christian Right? Who or what makes changes the movement? I argue that the Christian Right has reached the benefits of a social movement—a permanent, energetic focus on a cause—while also softening some of the benefits of

institutionalization, such as increased representation and financial stability. Thus, institutionalization, to a large degree, for the interests of the Christian Right.

Interest Group Theory

Since this is a study of interest group behavior, we should first look at what studies of interest group behavior tell us to expect. Interest group theory attempts to describe the behavior of organizations that seek to influence public policy, and so much, should describe the behavior of the groups that represent the focus of this study.

The observable behavior of interest groups will be described as "actions." The actions of interest groups include (but are not limited to) press releases, letters to members, lobbying, smear trials, protests, conventions, and publications. Actions are what interest groups do.

An "issue domain" of an interest group is composed of the types of issues in which the interest group engages. A wide issue domain means that the interest group engages in a wide variety of issues. A narrow issue domain means that the interest group engages in few types of issues. Interest groups also have "issue domains." An issue domain of an interest group is the number of issues for which an interest group engages in actions. An issue domain can also be wide or narrow. A wide issue domain means that there are a large number of issues for which an interest group engages in actions. A narrow issue domain means there are few issues for which an interest group engages in actions. The number of issues for which each interest group engages in an action is considered its issue domain width. The number of types of actions used by an interest group will be considered its actions domain width.

The free-rider problem suggests that groups will have difficulty maintaining the participation of its members. According to this theory, potential members will only participate in current group activities if the benefits of participation outweigh the costs of participation. Interest group theory has tended to focus on how interest groups overcome the free-rider problem. They do so, interest group theory suggests, by offering incentives for participation to overcome the gap between costs and benefits. These incentives can usually be described as an exchange hypothesis, whereby the interest group offers benefits to its members in exchange for participation in the group. Interest group scholars have identified three types of benefits—material (goods and services that groups provide to members), intangible (the socializing aspect of group membership) and purposive (the expression of personal goals or values for the group members) (Oliver 1993; Salterbury 1999; May 1981). These theories help us understand how interest groups prevent or solve of the free-rider problem.

Some interest groups have greater financial resources than others. It is hypothesized that the behavior of these groups will vary based upon their financial resources. Those with greater financial resources will have wider scope and more durability than those with lesser financial resources. Also, interest groups with greater financial resources are more likely to place greater emphasis on material and collective action/benefits, and less likely to place greater emphasis on intangible benefits than groups with lesser financial resources (King and Walker 1991).

Interest groups that represent individuals have important differences than interest groups that represent organizations (Salterbury 1999). Institutional groups tend to have wider scope than non-membership groups (Salterbury 1999, 64). Also, institutional groups

are more likely to provide advocacy as a collective action benefit than membership groups (King and Walker 1992). This means that groups that represent institutions will use more of their resources for issue advocacy than groups that represent individuals.

The size of an interest group also is expected to influence its behavior. As interest groups enter the political arena, they find they must compromise and begin to work to accomplish some of their goals. As they carry out only part of what they want, portions of the movement become disenchanted and withdraw support. At the same time, as interest groups grow, they put resources and efficiency in their activities become redundant. Therefore, their grassroots support becomes diminished as they become more skilled in using lobbying tactics. So, older interest groups will rely more on media tactics than younger interest groups.

Since the objects of analysis for this project are Christian Right interest groups, these interest group theories are expected to accurately describe the behavior of these groups. As we will see, however, they do not. They do not because Christian Right interest groups behave differently than other types of interest groups. Understanding why this is the case is a focus of this study. I will argue that these groups status as part of a social movement enables them to overcome the free-rider problem in ways not available to other types of interest groups.

Social Movements

Social movement scholars have difficulty solving clear distinctions between social movements, social movement organizations and interest groups (McCarthy and Zald 1971, Berney 1999). This poses some challenges for drawing clear distinctions among the many types of social movements for this study. The definitions set forth here are not

an attempt to resolve this debate. Rather, these definitions are chosen to limit themselves to an understanding of the subject matter while paying some respect, in a general way, to how these terms have been used by previous scholars.

Social movements are “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity to sustained interaction with others, opponents and institutions” (Tarrow 1994, 1-2). Tarrow (1999) also emphasizes the use of contentious collective action by political outsiders.

The irreducible act that lies at the base of all social movements and revolutions is contentious collective action ... It becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, and to the name of new or unrepresented claims and beliefs to ways that fundamentally challenge others. (Tarrow 1994, 2)

Unlike Tarrow, I propose that social movements do not have to be composed solely of political outsiders. Rather, social movements can have a dual nature—simultaneously outside and inside the political system.

Kasten and McDermott (1997), for instance, note the importance of “institutional activists,” social movement activists who have achieved a position inside government. By comparing the Civil Rights and Women’s Movements, they conclude that institutional activists will be more important in movements that have “substantial access” to government, strong opponents to government, and when the policy in question is complicated or highly technical (Kasten and McDermott 1997, 314). The first two conditions describe the Civil Rights well. As we will see, it has gained much access, while facing stiff competition in government. Many of the policies that the Civil Rights grappled with are also highly technical. Later, we will take a closer look at some of these, such as patent confirmation and birth-based activism. These findings also

suggested that the Christian Right implies an insider status to form any movement on the substantive agenda.

Therefore, the Christian Right social movement can accurately be described as forming a dual status. It challenges the political system using conservative and contentious collective action strategies, and it has sympathies for holding onto power to further its goals inside government. The movement's ability to maintain the advantages of a social movement while retaining a degree of political power accounts for much of its success.

Social movements can have a potential constituency, core constituency, members, activists, leaders, and organizations. These elements of a social movement can be thought of as concentric circles nested within each other² (Figure 1-1). The outermost circle is the potential constituency, which represents all those in society who there are potentially receptive to the beliefs of the social movement. The core constituency is those among the potential constituency that are most likely to become mobilized. Within the core constituency lies the members of the social movement. The members divide into two (non) movement organizations. Social movement organizations (SMOs) are formally organized groups designed to further the goals of the social movement. If they attempt to influence public policy they will also be an interest group. Members can be distinguished between small donors and large donors. Among the members there are the activists. The activists are those who are vigorously involved and closely linked with the goals of the social movement. Some of these activists will be involved with SMOs

²This idea was suggested by Peter A. Hall (1993) and regarding how these variables can be shown.

The leaders of these organizations as well as those who are looked to for guidance among the activists are the *social movement leaders*. These leaders represent the movement units of the social movement (McCally and Zald 1977; Oberholz 1973; Tarrow 1998).

This research project argues that social movements may become institutionalized. Further, it argues that SMIDs may be one manifestation of this institutionalization. But what does it mean to say that a social movement has become "institutionalized"? For a social movement its leaders is having part of the political process it must become organized. For all these collective of behavior structures and specific policy goals with plans for implementing them, structures must be built for these purposes. The building and maintenance of these structures represent one aspect of the institutionalization of a social movement. Indeed, most often when specific social movements are discussed in the media or academic, they have already become institutionalized because they are often recognized by their institutional structure and the exploits of these structures. But, can the Christian Right legitimately be characterized as a social movement?

The Christian Right as a Social Movement

There are objections to the idea of the Christian Right as a social movement for two reasons. First, the Christian Right is conservative and most studies of social movements have focused on leftist movements.¹ Second, the Christian Right has more grassroots measures of power in government and focuses on "values" rather than on "issues". As with Tarrow (1998) social movements are often categorized as composed of *coalitions*

¹ For an exception, see Lo's (1996) study of the California property tax revolt.

advocacy-based principles in favor of more across-the-board demonstrations and policies.

However, the Christian Right has much in common with liberal social movements. For instance, both need a common identity, resources, and an opposing movement in order to develop, and, they both must deal with the "progressive versus pure" split that often occurs in movement history. Therefore, the theories developed by studying liberal social movements will prove useful for understanding rightist movements as well.

Some may also argue that an "outside" status is a requirement of a social movement. While the Christian Right has made great gains in government institutions, it would be reflected to say that it "controls" the government. Therefore, it will need to have some combination of insider and outsider status. It will continue to pressure the government through lobbyists and grassroots organizers, and it will continue to have sympathizers in government that push its agenda. This is not unusual among social movements. This could describe the Women's Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Gay Rights Movement as well. Indeed, the reasons at the core of the problem are parallel.

If the Christian Right fits the social movement model, we need to determine just if social movement theory helps us understand the Christian Right. An affirmative answer is sufficient justification for using social movement theory to study the Christian Right. From this perspective, therefore, the judgment of whether or not I appropriately categorized the Christian Right as a social movement should be answered for the conclusion of this dissertation.

4. Theory of Institutionalization

To understand Christian Right actors' groups we have looked at interest group theory and social movement theory. Since these groups represent an institutionalized form of a social movement, there is one additional theoretical tradition that is important for our analysis – institutionalization theory.

Institutionalization According to Weber and Michels

Max Weber argues that as charismatic leadership becomes weakened, or replaced by bureaucratic structures, it loses its authority and is abandoned by its followers (Dahl and Michels (1948) 1973). Similarly, Michels (1911) argues on "Principle of oligarchy" within voluntary organizations. Over time leaders will self-concentrate the decision making process at the expense of supporters, thus making voluntary organizations unrepresentative of their supporters. These leaders will, seeking to preserve their positions, move the organization in a more conservative, or less radical, direction if that is deemed necessary to preserve the organization and enhance its influence. When consistency and predictability are preferred, leaders will not make bold moves that may upset the status quo. Weber and Michels lead to the expectation that as social movements institutionalize their leaders will pursue more attainable goals, will become more concerned with institutional maintenance, and will become more oligarchic (Dahl and Michels 1973). More (1980) has made a similar case with respect to the Christian Right of the USA (1980).

They [the Christian Right] institutionalize as they reshape and transform the social movement. In a typical way, charismatics, including points on bureaucratic leadership, attainable goals are replaced by diffuse goals; organizational transparency becomes its objective in itself" (1981).

The institutionalization of the Christian Right social movement, Hobson argues, fits the Weber-Mills model of institutionalization. But as we will see, there are other reasons to expect the Weber-Mills model to be insufficient to understand the institutionalization of the Christian Right social movement.

Institutionalization According to Huntington

Huntington (1967) also proposes a model for evaluating the level of institutionalization of a political system. This framework was found useful for understanding the institutionalization of the US House of Representatives (Polsby 1960), and the model is broad enough to apply to many types of institutionalization.

Hobson's theory also shares some similarities with the Weber-Mills model.

Institutionalization, according to Huntington, is an important measure of the strength of a political organization. The size is the "scope of support" (Huntington 1960, 1961). The level of institutionalization can be defined by four variables: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. The higher the degree of these four characteristics, the higher the level of institutionalization there is.

The adaptability of an organization is dependent on its age and the amount of challenges it has endured. Age can be measured in three ways. First, chronologically, the older an organization is the higher the level of institutionalization. Second, generationally, the more an organization has successfully replaced its leadership, the higher the level of institutionalization. And third, functionally, the more an organization has adapted its functions to changes in the environment, the higher the level of institutionalization.

The number, variety and formality of interests can measure the complexity of an organization. The more complex a political system is, the more stable it is. Thus, complexity is a characteristic of high institutionalization.

Autonomy means that a political system is "isolated from the impact of non-political groups and procedures" (Huntington 1963, 48). There are many types of social groups that may try to influence a political system. An autonomous political system will be able to shield itself from the influence of these forces. A polycentric political system will be the expression of some social group.

A highly institutionalized system is also coherent and unified. There is consensus on the boundaries of the system and the procedures for resolving disputes within these boundaries (Huntington 1963).

Huntington's theory of institutionalization predicts that as social movements institutionalize, they will supposedly replace their leaders and change to adapt to new environments. The number of interests serving the needs of the social environment will increase, with some becoming highly specialized. There will be a consensus within the movement about whom and what ideas are a part of the movement and disputes will be decided internally. And, those outside the movement will find influencing the movement to be difficult.

There are some similarities between Huntington's theory of institutionalization and the expectations created by Weber and Michels. When Huntington describes institutionalization as increasing stability, the change might be the pursuit of more attainable goals, as expected from Weber-Michels. Also, an increase in autonomy might be associated with an oligarchical leadership. And, an increase in coherence or clarity is

the movement away from radicalism and towards moderation. Therefore, the variable that Huntington adds to the Weber-Melsztain model of institutionalization is complexity.

Additionally, Huntington's theory is less normative. He does not assume that additional moves radicalization, only that conditions change. This approach is more congruous with the research. I found that, while the Christian Right has definitely changed while becoming institutionalized, it has not hidden some of the negative aspects that Weber-Melsztain expects.

According to institutionalization theory as set forth by Weber, Melsztain, and Huntington, social movement change can be understood by observing how the goals and structure of the movement change. Bureaucratized leadership will replace charismatic leadership. The leadership will seek goals that are more measurable, more concerned with institutional maintenance, more concerned with enclosures than mobilization, and less concerned with the goals of the members. And, the structure of the movement will become more complex, meaning the number and variety of entities will increase.

Challenging Institutionalization Theory: The Institutionalization of SHiCo

Zald and Ash (1987) believe that the Weber-Melsztain model is insufficient for understanding the institutionalization of SHiCo.⁴ They hypothesized that, under some circumstances, institutionalization does not lead to goal bureaucratization, can lead to more radical goals, and may enhance linkages between leaders and members. Unlike this present study, they looked only at SHiCo rather than the social movement as a whole. Yet, by taking the characteristics of social movements into consideration, Zald and Ash

⁴See Table 1 for a summary of the main points of the Weber-Melsztain-Huntington model and Zald and Ash (1987).

(1986) provide other important considerations that can be applied to an understanding of social movement organizations.

While the Weber-McCarthy-Huntington model may be well suited for other bureaucratic organizations, it fails to characterize SMs because of the unique nature of these organizations. SMs are different in two ways. Their goals are aimed at changing society as a whole and individual behavior, and, progressive members are more important than material or voluntary members in maintaining their membership (Child and Ash 1986, 329). Based upon the behavior of SMs, Child and Ash (1986) derive several proposals regarding how social movement organizations change.

Some SMs, especially those affiliated with a religion, have as part of their goals the changing of individual roles rather than simply changing public policy. The Temperance Movement, for instance, sought to end drunkenness and to make the selling of alcohol beverages illegal. The commitment of members to this type of group is less dependent on the success of the group. These groups also are more likely to associate their religious goals (Child and Ash 1986, 331-2).

Goal transformation also can occur depending on whether an SM has achieved its goals, a goals become irrelevant if a change of members are unlikely, or society has decisively rejected its goals. All three of these cases offer particular challenges to an SM.

A failed SM is one in which the goals of the SM have been thoroughly repudiated by society and there is no longer any hope that these goals will be achieved by the SMs, until the SMs has been discredited and is viewed as illegitimate by its supporters (Child and Ash 1986, 334-5). Members of these organizations will either seek "new

reduced means to achieve their goals within the movement, decrease the importance of these goals, or change the focus of discourse" (Zald and Ash 1994, 102). Bates (2000) offers a case study of a Christian Right organization, the Oregon Citizens Alliance (OCA), in decline. He notes that a multidimensional approach, that takes account of the political opportunity structure, the OCA's relationship to the Republican Party, and weaknesses in the structure of the OCA, best explains its decline.

There are two ways an NGO can be successful. Its goals can be achieved or it can gain the power necessary to achieve those goals. When an NGO "arrives in power," Zald and Ash's analytical techniques no longer apply (Zald, 2001). Instead, "analytic concepts applicable to party structure and governmental bureaucracy become more relevant" (Zald and Ash 1994, 100). However, Zald and Ash never define what it means to "arrive in power." Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any NGO according to power in the United States because the US system of government was designed to deliver power and ensure that no single group or leader is able to gain hegemonic control over the government.⁷

There are two types of NGOs that represent earlier total movements are local (below), the translocal NGO and the global NGO. The localised NGO has had some successes in the past and gained some portions of power, but the sustained intensity of the overall movement has subsided, the NGOs growth has slowed or ended, and there is no innovative expression of future norms (Zald and Ash 1994, 114). The translocal NGO is most likely to follow according to the Wilson-Myrdal model, because, the lack of innovative products, equality and division among members, leaders depend more on

material resources, and leaders pursue conservative goals to avoid disrupting their members (Zald and Ash 1994, 124).

The most stable scenario for an NGO is to have a steady stream of resources while never fully adhering to primary goal.

In a sense the perfectly stable NGO which avoided problems of organisational transformation, goal-displacement and the like, would be one which over time always seemed to be getting closer to its goal without quite reaching it (Zald and Ash 1994, 111).

The stable NGO is more likely to survive than the turbulent, fractured or failed NGO, however it is often faced with the challenge of complete members' decline. While total members is the best measure for implementing the goals of a social movement, "stability" is the best predictor for the long term survival of a movement's representation mechanism. Stability, I will later argue, best describes the Christian Right.

A social movement may be represented by many NGOs. The relationships between these NGOs can have important effects. These relationships can be characterized as either a competition or an alliance.

Some NGOs must compete amongst themselves for the same resources provided by the social movement's regular donors and other constituency. For this reason, NGOs must be responsive to changes in attitudes about the goals and tactics of the social movement among the constituency, which can lead to goal transformation. Zald and Ash contend that these changes "are a major determinant of the transformation of organisational goals" (1994, 112). While the Weber-Merton model predicts that organisational leaders will become more instrumentalizing in order to maintain

¹¹See James McGuire's "The Political Life of Organizations, Networks and Ideals" (1997) 2004.

these positions, Zald and Ash point out that, because of inter-organizational competition, the goals of an SMO may become more extreme, advancing maximalist (1996, 102). This might be the case, for instance, if part of the core constituency has become alienated by more moderate SMOs.

Changes in the goals or beliefs of an SMO can also result from cooperation among parts of a common social movement. Zald and Ash note three types of interaction—cooperation, coalition and merger (Zald and Ash 1996, 115). Cooperation among SMOs is thought to be unusual:

Except during full scale revolutions or total movement activities, (SMOs) do not engage in a complete division of labor. It is more common to situations where special responsibilities are required (for legislative lobbying or legal work), and a simple procedure of coordination may develop that does not lead to transformations in either organization. (Zald and Ash 1996, 115)

When cooperation involves coordination, a coalition "pools resources and coordinates plans" (Zald and Ash 1996, 117). Coalitions are more likely when a social movement appears close to achieving a goal because "the costs of breaching or the coalition seem small in comparison with the potential benefits" (Zald and Ash 1996, 117). With cooperation and coalition, SMOs will keep their distinct identity. With a merger two or more SMOs will become a single-blended identity. In this study, cooperation and coalition were both found among Christian Right aligned groups.

Parties and alliances are also common within an SMO. As SMOs are more likely to right initiatives on issue groups when the core constituency of the social movement is heterogeneous, the SMO is "concerned with questions of shared ideological goals and with theoretical matters," and when the goals of the SMO are unlikely to be achieved (Zald and Ash 1996, 117).

Zald and Ash make two types of leadership functions—articulation and mobilization (1996, 139). Articulation seeks to link the goals of the KMO to other groups or the larger society in order to expand its support base. Mobilization seeks to realize the goals and vision of the mobilization movement in order to strengthen the commitment of the support base. These functions are similar to Ifeanyi's (1979) two stages in the course of a congressional—representation and protagonism. During the representation stage, members of Congress are seeking to expand their election constituency by reaching out to more groups. Later, during the protagonism stage, members of Congress become satisfied with their election constituency. They no longer reach out to try to include new groups. Rather, they seek to keep the groups they already have on their side. Like the three stages of a congressional, Weber-Millett predicts that articulating leadership will be followed by mobilizing leadership. Early leaders, who reach out to expand their base, will be replaced by leaders who no longer seek out but seek to satisfy the support of their base. However, this is not necessarily the case. KMOs that focus on changing the individual are more likely to have mobilizing leadership, and, those that focus on changing society are more likely to expand articulating leadership (Zald and Ash 1996, 139).

The Weber-Millett model predicts that as bureaucrat leadership replaces democratic leadership, leadership will become more oligarchical and pursue more conservative goals. However, group leaders may be more radical in their goals than the core constituency. In this case, the movement towards oligarchy would lead to the opposite direction, to more radical rather than conservative goals (Zald and Ash 1996, 139).

Revitalization theory must be adapted to take into account the characteristics of social movements in order to effectively describe social movement change. Zald and Ash's hypotheses will prove useful as I attempt to better understand the institutionalization of the Christian Right political movement.

Determinants of Social Movement Change

Social movements will be characterized along the three dimensions of identity, resource mobilization and opportunity structure. These dimensions have been described as similar to the requirements for a social movement—MOMO, or identity, resources and opportunity (Wahl, Silberman and Frits 2000). The success of a social movement is thought to rely on whether it has an identity, or motive, to mobilize around, whether it has the resources, or means, to mobilize, and whether there is an opportunity to mobilize. All three dimensions are considered necessary for the movement to have some degree of success.

Social movements have several dimensions of identity. Identity is a term used to cover a broad range of concepts. In other terms it has been called beliefs, worldviews, culture (or subculture), incentives, and grievances (Crouch 1997, Chenev and Thorne 1982, Opp 1994, Sartori 1980). The identity of a social movement provides the impetus for social movements to become involved in the public sphere. Identity provides a view of how the world is and how it should be. It provides social movements with the vision or direction for the changes it seeks in society. It also can be a source of positive energy for those involved in the social movement.

Identity alone is not enough to explain the emergence of a social movement, because it does not explain why some movements become politicized while others do not.

There are many types of activism in society, but not all of them have the same movements. Resource mobilization theory understands that the groups that become mobilized are the ones with the resources necessary for activism. These resources often include communication networks, leaders, and political entrepreneurs (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

While resource mobilization pays attention to factors within the movement, the opportunity model pays attention to factors outside the movement. It argues that the circumstances within which a potential movement lives is an important factor in the emergence and success of a social movement. The emergence of a social movement, then, represents a change in the political status quo (McAdam 1992, 176). Opportunity can also represent non-political factors that are expressive to a social movement. For instance, changes in technological advancements can increase opportunities for political action. Therefore, social movement theory tells us that, when there are changes in society that create a greater opportunity for political action, any group that is ready (resource) and willing (identity) may move into collective action.

This paper will utilize these social movement theories to explain the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. While social movement theory tends to focus on explaining the beginning of social movements, I will use them to understand the behavior of a social movement as a more mature institutionalized form. Additionally, interest group theories and entrepreneurship theories will prove inadequate for explaining the behavior the more institutionalized form of the Christian Right social movement, namely modern Christian Right interest groups.

These studies have looked at the Christian Right at the state level and note to slightly different conclusions about the movement's implementation and moderation. Wild, Becker and Minney (2002) studied the Christian Right's efforts to pass a no-fault marriage law in Louisiana. This law gave couples the option of entering into a no-fault marriage, a status that required they undergo marriage counseling before getting married and have alternative arrangements for getting a divorce, such as additional counseling. The effort succeeded when other failed (because the Christian Right focused on getting the support of the bill that expanded personal choice when being married is not always an anti-corporate marriage as before). Since the Christian Right's preferences would have been to abolish no-fault divorce altogether, this study shows a Christian Right that is willing to accept achievable goals given its ability to achieve what they really want. It also shows the movement having to moderate its laws in order to effectively pass legislation.

Wild and Conig (2002), on the other hand, show a Christian Right that is intransigent because of its unwillingness to compromise. They monitored members of the 1999-2001 House Constitutional Review Committee, a body charged with reviewing the state's own document and offering changes to the document. The Committee included a group of members appointed by the Speaker of the House, a Christian Right member, who had strong credibilities in accommodations for same-sex marriage, an anti-abortion efforts and other socially conservative issues. The Christian Right members of the committee held a polar position, unwilling to compromise with the other members, even with fellow Republicans who were from the party's business wing. As a result, they were less successful in achieving their objectives. They preferred no-loss to half-a-loss

With the Virginia Christian Right, Rovell and Wilson (1996) show more mixed results. They find conservatism that has become an important factor within the Virginia Republican Party and strong interest groups that display progressivism along with more conservative interests that display a pure position. This coalition worked with moderate Republicans to elect George Allen as governor, a progressive compromise. Yet, it helped nominate the less electable Michael Perri for Lieutenant Governor and Oliver North for Senator—a pure position that led to defeat for both candidates. Part of the difficulty is identifying the Christian Right in Virginia. Rovell and Wilson (1996, 221) conclude, in because there is "no single Christian Right in Virginia, but rather cleavages that have institutionalized into interest groups and factions and elements of an ongoing social movement."¹² The institutionalized elements display progressivism whereas the social movement elements show more pure positions.

As is true with other social movements, the Christian Right is decentralized. State level Christian Right organizations do not take their orders from a central organization. In some states, the local organizations even act independently (Rovell and Wilson 1996). Therefore, it should not be surprising to find differences in the Christian Right in three separate states. Also, as Rovell and Wilson (1996) point out, most groups may behave differently based upon the incentives provided by the elected ruler of a state. How are party nominees chosen? How does one become a party delegate? How are party leaders chosen? The answers to questions such as these can also explain differences in the behavior of Christian Right activists at the state level. A political party that is easy to infiltrate would encourage involvement in party activities. Alternatively, a system that finds political party officials to infiltrate would discourage these activities.

Unlike these three studies, my work looks at the Christian Right at the national level rather than the state level. A study of this type has not been done since More (1992, 1994, 1996). By looking at the movement from 2002 to 2004, I can observe how the movement has changed since More's earliest data (the late 1980s and early 1990s). More (1992, 1994, 1996) described a Christian Right that had transformed itself from a pentecostal, but naive and unorganized social movement to an institutionalized set of interest groups that have learned how to play the political game, and play it well, but have become more concerned with maintaining their institutions than advancing the original goals of the movement. The movement had lost some of its soul and become estranged from the political cause. The updated study, on the other hand, finds that while the Christian Right has maintained the fiscal stability, sophistication, and pragmatism that More (1992, 1994, 1996) found, it has lost sight of its original goals and purpose. Explaining why this is the case is the task of this study.

The Christian Right also fits the characteristics of a "new social movement." New social movements are distinctive from "old" social movements in several ways. They are based on ideologies older than their own or movements that had not previously been mobilized. They have a broader issue agenda, making their focus less concerned with politically left or right. They focus on more personal issues of human life, such as health and sex. Their issues are less visible. And, they are structurally more decentralized (Johnston, Lanzola, and Gashford 1994).

Data

Before discussing my findings, I will discuss how my data was chosen. How did I know what to study and what not to study for a project about Christian Right issues?

group? I began to answer this question by looking at the groups that previous scholars of the Christian Right had identified. Meier (1990) identified ten groups founded between 1970 and 1989: National Christian Action Coalition, Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, Moral Majority, Concerned Women for America, Freedom Council, American Coalition for Traditional Values, Liberty Federation, American Freedom Coalition, and Family Research Council. Wilson (1996), looking at the movement in the mid 1990s, focused on three organizations that he identified as the largest and best organized of the Christian Right organizations: Christian Coalition, Concerned Women for America, and Family Research Council.

Some of these organizations had died off while others had been formed by the time I began my research. To get a better sense of which groups I should be looking at before I entered the field, I also used a content analysis to further hone my list of identifiable Christian Right organizations. This content analysis used LexisNexis to search the Washington Post in all of 1999 and 2000 for keywords related to the Christian Right.² I got 142 hits. From those news accounts, I determined the main Christian Right interest groups and the issues they were involved with. This became a starting point for conducting my participant observations and interviews.

The groups selected for this study were confined to those that have a permanent presence in Washington, DC. This limitation was necessitated, in part, due to limited resources and the location of the Washington, DC area as my field research location. Nevertheless, the groups that are most active in direct lobbying of the executives of central government represent the important part of the overall movement that is worthy

of the notorious abortion. Due to this recognition, however, two groups as partners that are important players in the movement have been left out—Focus on the Family and American Family Association. Neither of these had an office or lobbyist in DC during my fieldwork. American Family Association previously had a full-time Washington lobbyist on their payroll, but the position had been cut before I had arrived. I did, however, monitor its website and its mail communications. While it would often address the major political issues that other Christian Right activist groups addressed, it tended to focus more on lobbying non-governmental organizations, especially media organizations, over issues of obscenity.

The primary mission of Focus on the Family is to counsel families on moral issues and child rearing, mostly through its daily radio program. Nevertheless, Focus on the Family has also been involved in political issues during most of its existence and even more so in recent years. James Dobson, its founder and radio host, is apparently considered a leader within the Christian Right. Additionally, Family Research Council, which I did study, is sometimes referred to as the political arm of Focus on the Family. While they are independent (they are technically two separate organizations), Focus on the Family has a close working relationship with Family Research Council, with Dobson as Chairman of its Board of Directors. By leaving Focus on the Family out of the analysis, I do not intend to minimize its importance as a Christian Right organization.⁷ It simply fell outside the boundaries of the group I intended to study. You will notice that Dobson is cited often, however, acknowledging his importance as a major player within

⁷ See Table 1.2 for a list of these keywords.

⁸ See Appendix 1 (2000) for a analysis that focuses only on Focus on the Family.

the Christian Right. Also to narrow the focus of my research, I excluded groups who focus now on the legal arena, such as the Christian Legal Society, the Rutherford Institute and the American Center for Law and Justice.¹¹

In addition to an president DC presence, the groups were required to have a strong focus on changing public policy and policy goals based upon the following beliefs:

- The US was founded upon Christian principles.
- God is sacred and begins at conception.
- Sex is only morally acceptable in a monogamous married relationship.
- Religious beliefs should be able to compete equally with secular beliefs in the public square.

The beliefs mentioned to be the most common Christian Right beliefs in previous research (Lennihan 1993, Wilson 1994). There are groups that share these beliefs but are not engaged in political activism. Since this is a study of the political motivations of these beliefs, those groups are not included.

Most of the time, this information was easily gathered from the group's website. Generally, these groups would advertise their beliefs and purpose through a mission statement, statement of beliefs, or something similar. When these were not available, I relied upon my participant observation and interviews to gather this data. The groups share all of the characteristics and are considered the core groups on Christian Right interest groups. The rest of the groups will be considered peripheral groups (Chen 2-3).

Methods

To understand the behavior of Christian Right interest groups, this study attempts to understand the behavior of elites, more specifically, the elites who make programmatic decisions within Christian Right interest groups. To understand this behavior requires an

understanding of these individuals. It also requires a depth of understanding that is collective to particular types of research methods. Therefore, for this study, I selected methods that would lead to a voluminous understanding of a small group of people. In other words, sample size was sacrificed for more descriptive variables. While this type of research, sometimes called "thick description" (Geertz 1973) or "reading and writing" (Foucault 1979/2007), is more often associated with anthropology than political science, it is the most appropriate for my research questions.

Participant observation and depth interviews were used to collect data for this study. I conducted depth interviews with representatives of Christian Right interest groups and engaged in participant observation of these interest groups' activities. I attended press conferences, rallies, strategy meetings, conferences, and marches, viewed websites, and participated in E-mail and mailing lists. In other words, anything a Christian Right interest might do. This research took place between September, 2002 and January 2004. Occasionally, I will make reference to events that occurred after this period, but the bulk of my data collection is contained in this time frame.

Many of the groups I studied conducted press conferences, rallies, or meetings. I often spent at least one or two days a week attending these types of presentations. Occasionally, there were more than one of these scheduled at the same time and I had to choose which one to attend. At these presentations I was often linked to the point of view being presented by these organizations and I often asked questions during the "Q & A" at the end of the presentation. These events were also important for the mailing lists before and afterwards. It was common for these organizations to

¹ See www.cbsi.com for a study related to these groups.

provide some snacks and beverages afterward. This encouraged attendees to talk around and discuss the presentation with each other or to talk more directly with the speaker. I used this time to meet other people or to build relationships with those I had never before known from previous meetings. Occasionally, I would use this time to request an interview as well. I took notes during the presentations and added additional thoughts while riding home on the Metro, and then typed them into the computer when I got home.

I attended three large conferences with Concerned Women for America, Christian Coalition, and the American Conservatism Union while in the field. I also attended several smaller conferences. The conferences were helpful because they were some of the few opportunities I had to observe some of the members and activists who traveled to Washington, DC to attend these gatherings. It was also interesting to see the many vendors that attended some of these conferences.

I also had the good fortune to attend the Tuesday morning "Family Forum" meetings, held every other week while Congress is in session. They were located in a small conference room in an office building that is also occupied by Free Congress Foundation. Anywhere from 10 to 20 people were in attendance. Coffees and doughnuts were served and time was spent networking before the meeting. The meeting began with a prayer.

In these mornings, representatives from different Christian Right, and other conservative interest groups would gather to listen to speakers who were invited to discuss issues of importance. The speakers were often also representatives from Christian Right interest groups. Other speakers included congressional staffers or officials from conservative think tanks. Occasionally, speakers from outside DC addressed

the meeting. For someone who would only be in town for a day or two, an opportunity to address several groups at once is an effective use of their time. Among those attending, the smaller Christian Right, women groups seemed to be better represented than the larger ones. Many of the groups also seemed to prefer to meet their younger staffers in the meeting. Often, the median age in the room appeared to be less than 30.

These meetings were important for both gathering and disseminating information. Additional information was often provided in the form of paper handouts or published websites. It was rare, but not unheard of, for actual debates to take place. I was required to pledge not to divulge anything that was said in these meetings—a pledge that was not unique to me, everyone who attends must make the same pledge. Nonetheless, if I wanted some information from the meeting “on the record,” I could call back for the information outside of the meeting. Plus, the meetings kept me up-to-date on the topics that those organizations were dealing with and it provided additional time for me to meet people and build relationships.

Bernard (1995) notes several reasons that participant observation will improve the validity, or accuracy, of research on cultural groups: (1) there are certain types of data that can only be collected through participant observation, (2) subjects being studied are less likely to change their behavior as a result of the presence of the researcher, (3) it helps the researcher formulate possible questions for the interviewee, (4) it gives you an accurate understanding of the culture you are studying, and (5) only participant observation can address certain research problems (140-5). I found Bernard’s observations present when applying this method to my own research. Developing myself for the culture of the Christian Right through participant observation helped me to gain types of understandings

the no other research method could have provided. The depth interviews alone would answer many questions about the Christian Right but they would do a poor job of helping me to understand these issues.

How much of what I learned about the Christian Right was learned through participant observation, however, you will find out providing specific information about the interview without a reference. (These instances, the information came from my participant observation, but I could not pinpoint a particular conversation or interview that provided the information. For the most part, however, I have tried to reference as extensively as possible.)

Some of the ten Christian Right related groups agreed to interview requests and I also interviewed eight peripheral groups.⁷ Only three organizations, Christian Legal Society,⁸ Traditional Values Coalition and Tradition, Family and Property, denied my interview requests and there were several who agreed to an interview but were unable to fit me into their schedules. American Values, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, and Pro-Choice Right to Life Commission. The interviews took between 45 to 90 minutes and were conducted in an open-ended style. I had a several questions that I planned to ask, but left time to ask follow-up questions based upon the interviewee's group. The longest part of the interview was usually when I asked each of the other groups I was studying, and asked them to describe their group's relationship to this group. Other questions included:

- Who is the AACS' special constituency?
- How do you prioritize your resource allocation?

⁷See Table 1 for a list of these interviewees.

⁸Even though it is one of the legal groups, it was not included in my final research.

- How do you most often go about addressing these issues? What methods do you use?
- Where does your financial support come from individuals or institutions?
- Among the individual supporters, does your support come from many small donations or a few large donations?
- What is your budget?
- What is your staff level?
- How many members do you have?
- What are the requirements the membership?
- The scholarly literature notes that, interest groups often struggle with deciding how much they are willing to compromise the ideals of their organization in order to pursue their policy objectives. How do you deal with this dilemma? Can you provide some specific examples?

I also duplicated a study by King and Walker (1992) in which I asked them to rank on a scale of one to ten the importance of various benefits for retaining their members, with six indicating one of the most important benefit and one indicating that the benefit is not provided by their group. A copy of this survey is found in Appendix B and the results are discussed in chapter four.

Pen and paper were my only recording devices. While a tape recorder may have captured more information, I was concerned that its presence would discourage openness or change an interviewee's answers in some other way. At the time I was asked whether the interview was being recorded and was I was told something in confidence after I confirmed that I was not tape recording the conversation. These incidents confirmed my concern that the presence of a tape recorder was taken into consideration by at least some of my respondents and would have affected their forthrightness in answering my questions.

The interviewees were generally very friendly and seemed to appreciate the opportunity to talk about their organization and help me with my research. One man

brought me books, one brought me cookies and another brought me coffee. Only one, The Conservative Caucus, seemed genuinely concerned that I might misrepresent them. The interviewer asked for a copy of the informed consent form that we both signed. This form was required of all those I interviewed by the University of Florida and contained his rights as a research subject. This gave me the impression that previous interviewers had misrepresented him. Nonetheless, he seemed to give more comfortable answers in the interview with me. Some interviewees seemed pressed for time in the interview and seemed I tried to finish speedily. It was more often the case, however, that the interview was longer than an hour due to a follow-up interview. My interview with Paula Kellerman lasted nearly three hours. One of my interviewees expressed appreciation for the interview because it helped her to think about the nature of her work (Anonymous Associate of Christian Schools, present interview, June 11, 2009). Much of what these groups do entails getting people to hear to what they have to say. Therefore, they may appreciate the opportunity when someone is willing to sit and do nothing but listen to what they have to say.

Objectivity and empathy are important disciplines that I worked to achieve during the study. I tried neither to tear down nor build up the Christian Right with the information provided here. My primary goal is to help my reader understand the Christian Right. Objectivity and empathy are means to this end.

Objectivity helps me to achieve my goal because if I let my preexisting ideas or judgments about the Christian Right cloud my research, then the research is only sharing my biased view of the Christian Right rather than a true understanding of the Christian Right. I tried not to justify my opinions about the Christian Right through

my research, then the research itself has been problem. If I do not approach my subject with a willingness to listen, I will not gain the understanding I desire. To achieve greater objectivity I had to become more consciously aware of my biases. Without this awareness, I would be unable to detect when these biases influenced my observations. Secondly, I had to maintain a critical eye on what I was writing. I would continuously ask myself, "Is this how I really mean how I want to see it?"

Empathy is necessary to achieve my goal, however, I cannot truly understand my subject without seeing the world through its eyes. Many times throughout the work you will find me expressing a viewpoint of the Christian Right. This is not meant as an endorsement of the movement; it is only meant to help the reader understand how the Christian Right views the world, as I have tried to do.

My own judgments about the Christian Right are simple. I am an evangelical Christian, part of the "political constituency" discussed earlier. I share some policy goals which aligning others. Therefore, my measured conclusion is the movement can range from opposition to support.

One dilemma I dealt with when conducting the interviews was how much of the interviewer to reveal I should. On one hand, revealing information about myself could influence the how the interviewee answered my questions. Would this, in effect, corrupt my data? On the other hand, if I refuse to answer their questions, would I be considered untrustworthy? Why should they answer my questions when I refuse to answer theirs? In this instance, I would still be influencing how the interviewee answered my questions, thus corrupting my data. I had not decided how I would deal with this dilemma before I began my research. As a result, I was inconsistent in how I responded when the dilemma

presented itself. In one early interview I was asked what my views were in regards to the Christian Right. I answered that I was an "independent observer" with a knowing smile on my face. He responded with a snarl, "you right," but did not press my further. This happened toward the end of the interview and I ended up not including this organization in the final dataset for several reasons. In a couple of other interviews, I was asked about my religion, but not my views on the Christian Right. After revealing that I was an evangelical Christian, the interviewees seemed more comfortable and open to talking to me. Therefore, revealing this information may have provided an additional reason that I would not have had otherwise.

In the vast majority of interviews I did not have to deal with the question of how much to reveal about myself, because I was not asked. Briefly, those I interviewed were very open to answering my questions. They only rarely referred to counter questions and those which were generally related to the finances of the organization, though the majority was open about these finances as well. It was also rare to be treated with suspicion. In those rare cases I took extra time to elaborate on what my research was about, which seemed to help the interview. The informed Consent forms probably helped strengthen the legitimacy of the interview in the minds of the interviewees.

These interviewees should be recognized as elite interviewees. And, for the most part, this is a study of elite behavior. Any attempt to apply the findings here to mass behavior would be misguided. If one wishes to understand the potential constituency, core constituency, or membership of the Christian Right, they should look elsewhere (Menzel 1991; Smith 1994; Smith 2000, and Brackney and Smith 1998, for example). The only time this study reaches beyond elite behavior is when I interviewed with the activists during

My photo-qualitative observations. These observations brought insights into the focus of the study, or what I was attempting to explore, *in-situ behavior*, namely Christian Right interest groups.

Summary

Based movement theory better explains the behavior of Christian Right interest groups than interest group and institutionalization theories. This is my thesis. To build this argument attention will be paid to three Christian Right interest groups and groups related to them, and how they address their chief concerns. Chapter two will discuss the history of the movement. Chapter three will examine what I expected to find according to institutionalization and interest group theories. Chapter four will discuss in further detail how, respectively, the identity, resources and opportunities of the Christian Right movement help us understand the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. And chapter five will summarize my findings and conclude with some thoughts on the future of the Christian Right.



Figure 2-1 The Components of a Social Movement

Table 1-2
Theories of Institutionalization

Major Anticipated Changes	Poly and Poly+
<p>Classmate leadership will be replaced by heterosexual leadership</p> <p>Leaders will pursue transitive goals.</p> <p>Leaders will pursue less reduced goals.</p> <p>Leaders will be more concerned with institutional maintenance</p> <p>Authoritarian leadership will be replaced with mobilizing leadership</p> <p>Complexity will increase.</p>	<p>Goals utilized with religion are more likely to maximize their original goals.</p> <p>A "mild" SIMD is more likely to maximize its original goals</p> <p>Goals may become more reduced because of competition with other groups</p> <p>Goals may become more reduced because leaders are oligopaternal and more rational than their members</p> <p>Cooperation, or a division of labor, where special competencies are assigned</p> <p>Conditions are more likely when the SIMD appears close to achieving its goals.</p> <p>Leadership can be rationalizing, based upon organizational needs</p>

Table 1-2

Keywords Used for Content Analysis of the Washington Post, 1989-2000

Jerry Falwell
Pat Robertson
Ralph Reed
Extreme Conservatives
Tim LaHaye
Beverly LaHaye
Phyllis Schlafly
James Dobson
Gary Bauer
Christian Coalition
Family Research Council
American Life League
American Family Association
The American Society for Business, Family and Property
The Barberlaid Institute
Religious Freedom Coalition
Right Forum
Concerned Women for America
National Right to Life Committee
Religious Right
Christian Right
Christian Conservative
Conservative Christian

Table 1-1
Identifying Christian Right Interest Groups^a

	Conservative Christian	Policy Focus	Policy Preference
American Association of Christian Schools	X	X	
American Enterprise Institute		X	
Anglican Church	X	X	X
Association of Christian Schools International	X		
Center for Policy Justice	X	X	
Center for Religious Freedom			
Christian Coalition	X	X	X
Concerned Women for America	X	X	X
Conservative Caucus	X	X	
Council for National Policy			
Eagle Forum	X	X	X
Left and Right Policy Center	X	X	
Liberty and Religious Liberty Commission	X	X	
Family Research Council	X	X	X
Free Congress Foundation	X	X	X
Huntington Foundation		X	
Home School Legal Defense Association	X		X
Hosanna Institute		X	
Institute on Religion and Democracy	X		X
National Association of Evangelicals	X		
National Law Center for Children and Families		X	
Network Religious Life Commission	X	X	
Prison Fellowship	X	X	X
Traditional Family Project	X	X	
Traditional Values Coalition	X	X	X

^aPercent meeting all three categories of definition

Table 1-4
List of Interlocutors

Organization	Date
Concerned Women for America	October 2, 2002
Call to Renewal	October 3, 2002
Family Research Council	October 15, 2002
People for the American Way	October 18, 2002
National Association of Evangelicals	January 8, 2003
National Law Center for Children and Families	January 18, 2003
Free Congress Foundation	February 1, 2003
Center for Public Justice	February 11, 2003
Institute for Religion and Democracy	March 6, 2003
The Conservative Caucus	March 13, 2003
The Rutherford Institute	March 14, 2003
Christian Coalition	April 16, 2003
Prison Fellowship/Wilberforce Forum	April 16, 2003
Religious Freedom Coalition	May 6, 2003
Association of Christian Schools International	June 2, 2003
American Association of Christian Schools	June 11, 2003

CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT

The three dimensions of moral conservatism—identity, morality and opportunity, will be used to better understand the emergence of the Christian Right in the late 1970s, but political activism among American evangelicals has a rich history. The main source of support for the Christian Right is evangelicals. As a result, the Christian Right is able to draw upon the identity and the many resources within the evangelical community to serve its interests. Understanding the source of that identity and these resources will help us understand the Christian Right.

Evangelical emergence of the several movements commonly referred to as the First and Second Great Awakenings in the middle parts of the 18th and 19th centuries. Evangelicals were defined by their revivitalist style, emphasis on personal conversion and personal salvation, and a set of Protestant beliefs (Moberly 1991). Evangelicals first worked to reform the established Protestant denominations, such as the Presbyterians, Anglicans, and Baptists, but eventually created some of their own denominations, which eventually became the most dominant ones. The Methodist Church is a good example. John Wesley first tried to reform the Anglican Church with his evangelical ideas in the 1730s. Later, his followers formed the Methodist Church, which became the largest denomination in the US by the 1920s (Moberly 1991, Ch. 2). Evangelicals became an important cultural influence as well.

By the mid-nineteenth century evangelical religion was a major force shaping dominant American values. Rather than conflict with democratic and republican ideals advanced from the revolutionary era, evangelicals endorsed such values, reflected them, and reinforced them. (Moseley 1998, 53)

Evangelicals of the 1800s have become politically active on the issues of prohibition, Civil War/immigration, and women's suffrage. With the issue of slavery, however, North/South split was created with many evangelical denominations.

The Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist churches, the three largest denominations in the mid-1800s, all had sectional splits over the issue of slavery. The abolitionists of the North argued that the Bible condoned slavery while their Southern counterparts argued that the Bible tolerates the existence of slavery. The majority of these debates contributed to the secession that led to the Civil War (Johnson 1996, 416). Eventually, the evangelicals that migrated South would have an profound characteristic of the South and become what we know as the "Bible Belt" today (Heyman 1997).

The Fundamentalist Movement

The early decades of the 1900s saw a split in evangelicism between the modernists and the fundamentalists. The modernists began to doubt or deny many beliefs, or commonly held, Christian beliefs, such as biblical inerrancy, the resurrection of Christ, the authority of scripture and salvation through Christ alone. Their new approach to understanding their faith was dubbed "higher Biblical criticism". The modernists also tended to emphasize the differences they found in their faith and new scientific research. This led to the most visible battle between the modernists and

Fundamentalists—the teaching of evolution in public schools. This battle, though on a different front, remains controversial today (Johnson 1982; Woodberry and Smith 1993).

The Fundamentalist movement grew after the publication of *The Fundamentals*, a compilation of 90 articles published over a six year period starting in 1910. These articles were eventually published as a three volume set in 1919 (Turley and Dixon 1917). The Fundamentalists sought to defend orthodox Christian belief from the many challenges of doubt from the modernists (Johnson 1982, Ch. 14).

Fundamentalists of this era focused their political agenda on opposing the teaching of evolution in schools, promoting Prohibition, and supporting the war against Germany. This political activism of the 1920s was not without internal controversy, however. A persistent struggle within the evangelical tradition has been, and continues to be, over the question of how much energy should be placed in proselytization versus social reform. Time spent in political activism, evangelists have argued, is time taken away from the important task of "saving souls." Additionally, the diversification of political involvement may turn people away from hearing their message of salvation. The proselytizing and social reform efforts within evangelization have tended to be more zealous. These evangelicals prefer to focus on personal piety and are less concerned about the world outside their own institutions, except for the purpose of converting others. On the opposite side of the popular spectrum, popular evangelists are more interested in social reform and work in becoming engaged with the world around them, including, but not limited to, influencing government.

After Prohibition was repealed and the anti-evolution crusade won, as the winds of religious leaders, issued a decree in the Ku Klux Klan, fundamentalists went into politics

political obscurity at the second level. Thus, the reported tendencies of evangelization became discussed for a while among the fundamentalists. While fundamentalists remained largely out of site from public controversy, their energy and enthusiasm did not dampen but was directed inward. Fundamentalists went to work building their own institutions—Bible colleges, radio shows, conference centers, periodicals, and family member agencies and their members enrolled. These actions would set the stage for the convergence of fundamentalists (Linstead 1982).

Carpenter (1997) argues that the institution building of fundamentalists was motivated by three goals: training leaders, spreading religious knowledge and evangelism (18). The motivation to train leaders is reflected in the movement's 1926 calendar, which Carpenter refers to as "the most important calendar in the fundamentalist world" (1997, 16). There were at least 30 of these institutions by 1940 and besides training future pastors, they held weekend conferences, established radio stations, and produced and edited publications.

To find the doors for popular religious knowledge, fundamentalists established summer Bible conferences. Bible conferences offered a combination of "camp-style recreation, the old-fashioned camp meeting, and Biblical teaching from leading fundamentalist preachers" (Carpenter 1997, 22). These conferences became important for establishing social networks and confirming the sense of community among fundamentalists. The 27 conferences with 101 sessions in 1920 grew to 36 conferences (not more than one historical session) by 1940 (Carpenter 1997, 22).

Fundamentalists promised to support old institutions and established new ministries for evangelism (Carpenter 1997, 23). The most important of these were

devoted to foreign missionary work. The growing fundamentalist movement put an expanding resource into foreign missions at a time when anti-slave Protestant movement waned. The proportion of fundamentalist missionaries, therefore, grew at this time. Missionary work was central to the work of fundamentalists and they devoted much of their resources to this task.

During the period between the Scopes trial and the fundamentalist/evangelical split in the 1920s, the popular mass respect conflict was reflected in the battles over forming new congregations (Casperer 1971). Some fundamentalists argued that there was no hope for established congregations and they needed to leave these congregations to form new ones. Others argued that they should remain loyal to their established congregations and convert back to where there.

Both the separated and popular response, however, reflected a yearning for public respect (Casperer 1963, 198). Among the respects they are visible in their effectiveness of media communication. They adopted the style of Hollywood and Radio City and created immensely popular media programs. This growing came because of the lack of respect from a public that considered them strange and unusual. Casperer has this statement to their audience-building actions: "[T]heir success vital for their survival to build what sociologist Peter Berger has called [plausibility structures—relationships, relationships, and an ethic that could shelter them from opposing views and practices and reinforce their own way of living" (Casperer 1997, 86). After building "plausibility structures" to protect their way of life, fundamentalists' desire for public respect and acceptance influenced them to use these structures to recruit devotees into the public

spotlight in the post-World War II period (Caughey 1991, 129). Thus, the period of separated dominion was followed by a period of popular dominion.

The New Evangelicals

Fundamentalism emerged out of evangelicism. However, fundamentalism had a strong influence over evangelicism such that all evangelicals were influenced to some extent by fundamentalism. During the 1950s, there was a split in the fundamentalist movement. One side sought the more popular appeal, while others insisted on maintaining separation. The popular, seeking to distance themselves from the purism of fundamentalists, ditched the label and referred to themselves as neo-evangelical, and later, simply evangelical. Most modern evangelicals can trace their roots to these popular fundamentalists (Caughey 1991, Ch. 1).

These evangelicals formed the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The NAE became influential because it was able to tie into the national structures built by the fundamentalist movement. "Fundamentalism's web-like organizational network, linked by preaching ministries, evolved, expanded, and repositioned itself in other evangelicals" (Caughey 1991, 136). The infrastructures built by fundamentalists during the 1950s and 1960s became important resources for later evangelicals. The emergence of evangelicism during the 1950s made use of it. And, the emergence of the Christian Right in the 1970s made use of it.

The New Christian Right

The Christian Right emerged in response to the social upheavals of the 1960s and 70s. To understand this emergence, I will use the three dimensions of social movement theory explained in the previous chapter. For those who believe in traditional values,

numerous societal changes that occurred during this time were shocking. These changes provided the rationale for the movements. The anti-war movement, Black civil rights movement, gay rights movement, liberalizing sexual norms, and the drug culture were audiences to evangelicals' belief about patriotism, the family, sexual norms, and for some, an aversion to alcohol and dancing.

Evangelicals have a strong sense of patriotism. This rationale is perhaps the strongest portion of the Puritan nature of a "Protestant." The belief that the United States has a God-chosen destiny, though influential in many segments of society, was particularly strong among evangelicals. The belief along with their anti-communist sentiments, encouraged support for the Vietnam War. The anti-war protests, though these evangelicals participated, were an affront to the patriotic of evangelicals.

Dominant beliefs about the ideal family exclude a two parent household, a husband, who is the primary bread-winner, and wife, who is the primary housewife; and, sexual intercourse is reserved for this type of relationship. This framework is considered the most ideal for raising children and its primary purpose is for raising children. This belief was challenged recently during the 1990s. The Women's Movement encouraged more women to work outside the home. Birth control became more readily available with the introduction of the "pill." And, divorce, pre-marital sex, and homosexuality became more widely accepted.

In addition to these changes in the evangelical system of beliefs, the expanding role of the federal government during this time began to greatly alter the nature of evangelical culture. The federal government began to encroach upon state and local government jurisdictions, where evangelicals had found refuge. Through the creation

would come much later: the Supreme Court's *Everson v. Board of Education* (1947) decision to allow sectarian aid (i.e. 1947 decisions to ban aid to sectarian parochial schools as a affront to the values of state neutrality). Also, evangelical ministries, particularly their private schools, and telecommunications networks came under scrutiny by the federal government. In 1977, the Internal Revenue Service, under a 1976 civil rights law, began to deny tax-exempt status to private schools that were morally discriminatory. Many ministries felt threatened by this because the Internal Revenue Service argued that a ban on interracial dating, which some fundamentalist schools had, was moral discrimination (Moore 1989: 28-27). And, in 1979, following the Justice Department's regular inspection was imposed in order to comply with the Federal Communications Commission's "equal time" provision (Moore 1989: 23). The action would have had to air a pro-homosexuality show to accomplish Religious Broadcasters' anti-homosexuality claim under the provision. Evangelicals had built a subscriber with their schools, ministries and other media to shield them from the wider culture. But, during the 1980s and '90s, they found the wider culture striking upon them with voices hostile to their own (Oldfield 1996: 67).

Crawford (1992) marks the beginning of the Christian Right with three incidents—the Dade County, Florida gay rights referendum, the Kanawha County, West Virginia school textbook controversy, and the conflict over the national Equal Rights Amendment. In 1979, Alice Moore, the wife of a minister, lobbied against the textbooks being used by the school system of Kanawha County, West Virginia. She was concerned that their texts were obscene, suspicious, and homophobic. In 1977, conservative and traditional Anita Bryant led a protest against a gay rights ordinance in Dade County, Florida. And, beginning in 1972, Phyllis Schlafly led an effort to stop the

enactment of the national Equal Rights Amendment. She argued that the amendment would require women to be drafted and institutionalize abortion rights. These events had at least two things in common—they were led by women and they were successful.

The third dimension of social movement theory—opportunity—came into play when the New Right reached out to the Christian Right to include it in its coalition. New Right activists mobilized the groups that would become the Christian Right. The New Right is a conservative movement that emerged in the early 1970s. These conservatives had grown frustrated with the Old Right's passive acceptance of the New Deal/Civil Society agenda that had come to dominate the Republican Party. The poverty was abated and less by the Old Right administrations of Roosevelt, Nixon, and Ford. Unlike the "old right," the New Right attacked the establishment and elites. They particularly did not like the Northeastern/Wall Street style of conservatism embodied by the Rockefellers. The New Right is also characterized by supply-side economics and an emphasis on social issues. The difference between the Old Right and the New Right were more a matter of style than substance. "All in all, what was new about the New Right was much less significant than what was old. In leadership, ideology, strategy, and even rhetoric was largely of a piece with those of the Old Right" (Westfall 1992, 82). In contrast to the Old Right, the New Right was assertive, confrontational, energetic, and zealous.

The architects of the New Right were Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips, John Terry Dilks, and Bruce Holmes. Other New Right figures include Jack Kong, Pat Buchanan, Phyllis Schlafly, Orren Hatch, and Phil Crane (Haworth 1990, 81). The New Right established or took over many new organizations, research foundations,

and campaign organizations, such as Heritage Foundation, Americans Legions, Heritage Council, Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Conservative Digest, and the National Conservative Political Action Committee, to aid its efforts to transform the conservative movement in America (Crawford 1980, Ch. 1).

In addition, the New Right was aided by Richard Viguerie's innovative and lucrative fundraising. Viguerie was the fundraising wizard of the New Right. He provided the needed funds for the New Right and New Right candidates. Secondly, it was the campaign finance reforms that were enacted in response to Richard Nixon's "dirty" politics that made Viguerie and the New Right powerful figures. The campaign finance reforms of the 1974 post-Watergate Congress put limits of \$1,000 on individual contributions. This worked as well to campaign sponsored by one or a few wealthy individuals. In the fundraising world, this meant power shifted from those who could raise a few large donations from wealthy individuals to those who could raise lots of small donations from middle-class and working families. This was Viguerie's vision. In the post-Watergate era, Viguerie was the first to take advantage of direct-mail fundraising from mailing lists. He had already perfected this technique in George Wallace's 1968 presidential campaign. Viguerie gave the New Right a huge advantage over their competitors because they were able to raise money in the post-Watergate era better than anyone else could (Crawford 1980, Ch. 2).

Paul Weyrich is credited with the idea of using evangelicals to add numerical strength to the New Right and eventually to take over control of the GOP (Crawford 1980, Haneschkin 1990, Byrnes 1990). Viguerie provided the funds while Weyrich provided the strategy. The Christian Right had already existed in strength by 1971, but

these in other party were not more than two thirds of them. "Most political leaders, on the whole, had not associated with them evangelicals, pentecostals, and fundamentalists before, and they were confused and perhaps even a little put off by them" (Byman 1991, 89). However, New Right leaders sensed the potential of the Christian Right and reached out to them to incorporate them into a new conservative coalition. Weyrauch and Howard Phillips met with Jerry Falwell to discuss their idea of building a broad coalition of social conservatives, Catholics, Jews and Protestants, which would form a "moral majority" of Americans (Byman 1991, 89, Martin 1996, 200).

Falwell's continued enthusiasm for political involvement would represent a fundamental change in opinion for Falwell. Falwell was among the long line of evangelicals who had no previous political involvement. He was particularly critical during the Civil Rights Movement when many religious leaders became involved on the side of Civil Rights. "Preachers are not called to be politicians but preachers," Falwell claimed in 1963 (quoted in Haneschius 1990, 118). This change of heart was indicative of a broader change taking place among evangelicals. The popular impulse was gaining ground on the religious impulse.

Duwood (1989) uses three sets of factors that led to the increase in evangelical political activism. First, there were socio-cultural factors. Along with the post-war economic expansion, evangelicals moved into the middle-class and became more mainstream. They were now living in suburbs and participating in large congregations rather than the more isolated rural areas and small churches. Also, the social movements of the 1960s provided a model of protest activism. Second, there were theological factors. Evangelicals endorsed a "right to theological principles" to support their

unholy alliance. Whereas the Separatist impulse emphasized conversion, purity, and the end times, the shift puts a renewed emphasis on "the doctrine of creation, redemption, liability, covenant, and history" (Bassett 1996, 127). These new doctrines declared God's involvement in all aspects of society and rejected notions of a disconnection between the sacred and the secular. Last, there were cultural factors. There was a growing sense that there were moral ills in America along the lines previously discussed. Evangelical's way of life was being threatened by society and government. These factors, taken together, help explain how evangelicals overcome their Separatist impulse.

In addition to Rev. Falwell, other televangelists became involved in the Christian Right as well, including Isaac Bolivar, Jim Baker, Henry Bergner, Jim Bakker, Paul Crouch, Oral Roberts, Jim Rummel, Kenneth Copeland, Ernest Angley, and Tim LaHaye. Notably absent was Billy Graham who, though privately expressed support for these efforts, declined to get involved publicly. After his previous political experience supporting Nixon, he apparently had a just view of political involvement (Motes 1994, 2002).

Recruiting televangelists was an important strategy for the New Right. They had an evangelical base that they had not before. Televangelists gave the movement legitimacy. Also, televangelists already had the attention of a wide audience. In 1980, viewership for the top four—Roberts, Bakker, Falwell, and Bergner—was estimated at 16 million, possibly as high as 20 million (Oliver 1989, 40-42). By 1985 Roberts took the lead with more than 18 million viewers and Falwell was not far behind at 16 million. These new political figures were seen as Christian Right representatives, with the help and expertise of the New Right. Of the major Christian Right

organizations, such was affiliated with a schismagolic, Falwell's Moral Majority, Balow's Religious Roundtable, and Robertson's Christian Voice.

Breaga and the Christian Right

The election of 1980 represented a hard fought victory for the Christian Right. Their candidate, Ronald Reagan, was in the White House, many liberal Democrats were defeated, and the Republicans gained control of the Senate. Even though Reagan never claimed much interest in organized religion or attended church regularly (Moor 1989, 51), he was a favorite of the Christian Right for several reasons. He gave the movement political legitimacy by giving them access to the White House, he met with them at their tail, such as when he spoke at the National Religious Broadcasters Association Meeting in 1980 (Jelen 1989, 50), and, he often voiced Christian Right concerns in his speeches. Reagan, however, did little else to actively promote the Christian Right agenda.

On the Christian Right's top agenda item, abortion, Reagan was a big disappointment. In his first opportunity to nominate the Supreme Court, he chose Judge Sandra Day O'Conor, a choice that the Christian Right believed lacked the pro-life credentials that it desired from a Supreme Court judge. While Reagan's choice did much of the Christian Right and pro-life community, Falwell kept silent on the issue after naming her, place well directly below Reagan (Moor 1989, 228). Whereas *conservativation* theory expects moderation over time, this example shows the opposite itself. As we shall see later, today's Christian Right would not have accepted a nominee from the current president. Falwell's "moderation" was probably more a result of survival rather than a shift in temperament. The Christian Right at this stage was forced to have a place at the table and decided to not make too much of a noise. As Moor

Alinsky's Ed DeBuse point, "I assumed that if you elected the right person, all your problems were solved, not realizing that one election is probably not going to make a long term difference in anything" (Marie 1993, 226). The Christian Right had no long term strategy at the stage. It had not thought past the next election.

The Christian Right's approach was also exemplified in other methods. It used a "thumper" approach to mobilization efforts. Rather than door to door patrols, it sent mass mailings to their voters asking for agency members to contact their congresspersons. Some of the members would grow weary contacting their congresspersons only to find that they were already on their side on the issue (Moore 1989, 194). Additionally, this was a waste of precious resources.

The Christian Right also had a tendency to be heavy handed with members of Congress. The Evangelical Republicans and moderate efforts at working with Congress were difficult. Melvin Edwards (R-OK) was with the Christian Right on most issues, but when he failed to sign a discharge petition that the Religious Rightists favored, it was also with standing his decision (Moore 1989, 112). The Christian Right also alienated potential supporters with its abrasive and insensitve rhetoric. God was on its side, therefore, opposing it was opposing God (Moore 1989, Ch. 10). This type of language left little room for the subtleties required of legislative maneuvering and compromise.

Nonetheless, a growing cadre of New Rightists joined the Christian Right. In the Senate, Jesse Helms was joined by newly elected Republicans John East, Steve Symms, Jim DeMint, Paul Prudhomme, and Dean Metcalf (Moore 1989, 59). In the House, there was a growing faction of conservative Republicans known as the "Young Turks." Vic Fazio, Dick Hargan, Bill DeLeon, and Newt Speaker, Newt Gingrich, led them.

Together, they formed the Conservative Opportunity Society (Moore 1988, 37-38). Throughout the 1980s, these organizations showed some success in keeping the Christian Right's social issues on the congressional agenda.

The relationship between the Christian Right and the New Right changed during the 1980s. Early in the movement, the Christian Right deferred to the New Right for leadership because of its lack of experience. As the Christian Right gained its own political expertise, however, it began to view itself from the New Right's (Moore 1988, Ch. 4). In addition, the Christian Right grew too large and too hot for the New Right to keep a handle on. The Christian Right had taken on a life of its own.

While actual policy outcomes presented by the Christian Right were few and mixed, the 1980s were a successful time for the Christian Right in other ways. The social issues of the Christian Right became agenda of the Congressional agenda. Even if they were not passed, time spent on these agenda items took away time that could have been spent on other items (Moore 1988, Ch. 5).

In the late 1980s, the Christian Right took some hits and was thought, by some, to be passing its best years. The Republicans lost the Senate in 1986, Pat Robertson's bid for the presidency failed in 1988, the Moral Majority was dissolved, and, there were conservative "warsaws" involving conservatives like Balow, Jimmy Swaggart, and Oral Roberts. Balow and Swaggart were continually pressuring the moderate faction (Brown 1988, DiAntonio 1990) or never abandoning (Fowler 1993, Matheson 1993) of the Religious Right. Lipei (1991) predicted that this coalition would soon leave the Republican Party and bring both "the end of the Republicans era." As we have seen, these predictions were not without historical precedent. Evangelical political activism has

tended to win and how to win has sometimes been described as a cyclical pattern (Wilson 1994). But the difficulties faced by the Christian Right in the late 1980s did not lead to the predicted retreat. The movement reevaluated itself and emerged once again as a significant force in American party politics and the Republican Party (Oliver 1992; Powell and Wilson 1996; Wilson 1996).

The Christian Coalition

While the Christian Right moved out of the spotlight for a time, it was busy building grassroots organizations much like fundamentalists after the Scopes trial, except these organizations had more political goals. The Christian Right returned to the political scene stronger than ever to help the Republicans take control of Congress in 1994. During this time, the most influential Christian Right organization to date emerged—the Christian Coalition. Moore (1996) describes this period as the third stage or “institutionalization phase” of the Christian Right.

Finally, the “institutional phase” ran from the rise of the Christian Right circa 1977 through the first term of President Reagan (1981), and it was marked by organizational expansion, doctrinal maturing, fundamentalist leaders, legislative agenda setting, and political influence. The first “institution phase” ran from 1945-1964, and it was characterized by organizational proliferation, reallocation of resources, and declining agenda setting abilities. The “deinstitutionalization phase” ran from 1967-1980. Its hallmark included Great Awakenings, grassroots activism, polarization of church and the nation, language using the rhetoric of rights and equality rather than morality, the inflation of evangelical and Protestant Christians in contemporary fundamentalism, and the rise of the Christian Coalition as the leading organization within the movement. Finally, the “reinstitutional phase,” which may be characterized because it is predicated on Republican Party control of the Congress, began with the start of the 104th Congress (1995-1996). It is marked by the same attributes as the “institutionalization phase,” with the additional precision that political authority must be recentered to the states and that conservatism is necessary and desirable on the social issues (Jones 1993a; Moore 1996).

More aspects, therefore, as conservative religious leaders prefer, that the Christian Right should have shown a greater willingness to compromise than the 1994 elections. As the research will later show, this has not always been the case.

The Christian Coalition was started from the start of Robertson's presidential campaign. It differed from earlier Christian Right groups in several ways: it emphasized grassroots organizing, it focused on elections, and it sought to work within the Republican Party (Oglethorpe 1995, 188-190). Also, it showed more political sophistication than the earlier groups. The Christian Coalition, through the leadership of Ralph Reed, attempted to "mainstream" the Christian Right:

Ross, a Republican activist who returned to his family's evangelical faith while in college, met Robertson after his failed presidential bid. Through his two mentors, Reed already had a lot of political experience. He had attended the Leadership Institute, a Free Right organization designed to train up young activists, and he was a protégé of George H.W. Bush, a conservative activist who more recently has tested to butt heads with the Christian Right. Reed had already shown a track for political mobilization as president of College Republicans. Though Reed supported Jack Kemp in the Republican primary, he and Robertson had a lot in common. They both had a vision of building a broad coalition of evangelicals and Catholics (Oglethorpe 1995, Ch. 12).

It was Reed who suggested to Robertson that the Christian Right needed to build a genuine grassroots organization from the bottom up. As president of Christian Coalition, Reed first organized chapters at the state and local levels and encouraged them to get involved first at the local level. They were presented with training manuals and videos giving practical advice on political organization (Maura 1995, Ch. 12). They also were

brought in not use religious language like the previous administration of the Christian Right. They were urged not to use "Christianity", and to "speak in the language of the people you're trying to communicate with. If you're in the public-policy area, which is not church, don't talk like you're in church" (Key Religious speech in Martin 1998, 368).

During the 1992 Republican convention, the Christian Right played a very visible role with fiery speeches by Pat Robertson and Pat Buchanan. After losing the Presidency in 1992, many in the party accused the Christian Right of turning away many voters. As a result, Reed agreed that the Christian Right should take a low visible role in the 1994 elections. The Christian Coalition was active in mobilizing its supporters, however, the Republican audience modified, the Contract with America, contained some of the social issue agenda items of the Christian Right. Reed was willing to compromise and play a low visible role in order to achieve the electoral goals of the party. He saw the success of the Republican takeover in 1994 as part of the process of rechristianizing the Christian Right. Reed wrote in 1996, "Now, nearly two decades after the first religious conservatives took the national political, not just part of the economy, a permanent fixture on the political landscape, treated with respect by our allies and grudging admiration by our foes" (Reed 1996, 7). Indeed, Reed received grudging admiration from an important foe. Democratic Presidential hopeful Howard Dean acknowledged that Reed, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, "created a real account for the right way" and his campaign looked to the Christian Coalition as a model for his presidential campaign (James 2000, Shepard 2005).

The Christian Coalition claimed much of the credit for the Republican victory in 1994. Reed believed the Christian Coalition was influential as more than half of the 12-

were passed in the House (Soper 1996, 115). He may have been right. White evangelicals represented 23 percent of the votes cast and they voted Republicans by more than three to one (Soper 1996, 115). The Christian Coalition was instrumental in mobilizing many of these voters. It distributed 20 million voter guides (Soper 1996, 118-19). A political scientist remarked that

in 1994 the Christian Right expanded the organization and level of its grassroots effort to mobilize voters on behalf of Republican candidates. The Christian right appears to have helped a number of Republicans win close races in the South and the West, and thus contributed to the GOP's takeover of Congress and state governments. (John Chafee, quoted in Wilson 1995, 14)

The Christian Right had become an important component within the Republican Party. Republican Party officials recognized that the Christian Right helped them to win elections and obtain power. The Christian Right, as one of these officials put it, "has considerable influence [because] they produce workers, voters, [and] grassroots support... That is where their influence comes from... they are a tremendous asset to the party" (quoted in Chafee 1994). They were able to fully bring power to the Republican Party through their elected officials, and, it was argued, deserved a share of that power.

With its success in the 1994 elections, the Christian Right quickly emerged the national spotlight. It was recognized as an important coalition partner in the Republican Party. Bush's decision to lay low for the 1996 election is consistent with conservative theory's predictions. It conformed to agenda. However, the Christian Right would not sit on its hands for long. It would soon take part in a costly effort to elect a strong president.

Clinton and Repridemocrat

For most of the 1990s, the Christian Right was fortunate to have a Republican Congress sympathetic to many of its issues. In the White House, however, it found a Democratic President who was willing to block many of their issues. The Christian Right considered President Bill Clinton to be an anti-traditional, anti-theistic to everything it held dear. For Clinton, the Christian Right was viewed as a collection of dangerous right-wing extremists, operating "without God" about him, and ready to turn back the clock on the liberal agenda that he held dear. As we shall later see, this situation is an overstatement. Clinton had never opposed to the Christian Right agenda than is often realized. In the triangulation of cultural conflict, however, differences are exaggerated while similarities are ignored by the conflict's participants and the media (Patterson 2001, Hause 1991, Lengyel et al. 1992).

The 1996 elections were largely seen as a referendum on the Clinton Presidency. Clinton was one of the main scapegoats used in Christian Right fund-raising and voter mobilization efforts. The Christian Right despised Clinton. Patten (1999) puts the Christian Right perspective well:

Clinton is part of the generation of the 1960s. He cooked marijuana as a student. He dodged the draft during the Vietnam War. He's an atheist. He's a Yale Law School dropout. He lacks gravitas; he even fails to show his audience an photo. He's a Hollywood-star-worshiper. He's "politically correct" and appears openly gay men and lesbians to high federal offices. His wife is a strong, assertive professional woman who makes him look weak. Now he bags it all off with "divorce" now on the White House office exemplifies and a example of how to cover it up. To the conservative Right he is a unpatriotic traitor, a propagandist, a Palace of Disaster, a value-free postmodernist—and such an accomplished socialist that the American people can't find it in their hearts to have him for his terrible sins. To ignore whose sense of morality and theocracy assumed to pervade from before 1960 and who thinks the nation has undergone a spiritual moral decline since then are not scandalous whatever their policies. (200)

By these means, Clinton made a perfect enemy for the Christian Right. The Christian Right could easily use Clinton's faults to motivate their supporters against him because his faults were easily recognizable and definable to the masses. Also, as Power points out, the Right was as good of an enemy as the left.

The Right used to have common sense to rally against. Conservatism, free market, and Clinton has assigned a number of traditional conservative issues with no original presentation, welfare reform, raised money, a balanced budget, constitutionalism, and more—a quick-on-the-trigger military posture.... All this means, in light of Clinton's flagrant appropriation of Republican policies, to [all the indispensable role of the enemy is—Clinton himself] (1991, 231).

As the catalyst of everything the Christian Right despised in America, Clinton provided a convenient target for the Christian Right.

When the allegations of Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, and his attempts to conceal the public about it, surfaced, the Christian Right felt they had the justification and the opportunity to remove Clinton from the presidency. It did not matter that Clinton would be succeeded by someone more liberal than he. For the Christian Right, impeachment was the right thing to do. Additionally, time spent by Clinton fighting against impeachment was time not spent on attacking the Christian Right constituents (Hanson).

The early stages of the impeachment originated in a New Right organization known as the Council for National Policy (CNP) (Clarkson 1994). The CNP is purported to play a role in developing strategy for Republicans (Clarkson 1998). Its members include many New Right and Christian Right figures, such as Senator Jim DeMint, Louie Gohmert, Don Nickles, Ted Stevens, Representative Dick Armey, Dan Balow, and Bill Drenthausen, Robert Wexler, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Oliver North, and Fred

Wright (Clarke 1998). Early support for impeachment was also provided by Citizens for Honest Government and the John Birch Society (a New Right organization that promoted the Goldwater campaign), who held an impeachment rally on March 14, 1998 (Clarke 1998). Among the speakers at the rally were Representative Bob Barr, the sponsor of the initial stage of impeachment, Howard Phillips, Gannetteyer, Raymonda Neira Closserth, and John McNamee, head of the John Birch Society (Clarke 1998).

Citizens for Honest Government is under the guns of Central Minuteman Inc., which also owns Journal Film (Clarke 1998). Journal Film, known for its右派右派 and Islam and UFO videos, produced *The Clinton Chronicle*, a video that accuses "Clinton of cocaine trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, murder [of Vince Foster], and sexual harassment [of Paula Jones]" (Clarke 1998). This film has been distributed by CMF and promoted by Gary Peltz on his website. One volume 150,000 copies were reportedly sold (Clarke 1998). Together, Christian Right and New Right organizations formed an important issue network for building support for impeachment (which prompted Hillary Clinton to point, not altogether accurately, that her husband was the target of a "right-wing conspiracy").

Opposition to impeachment could be heard again later that year in the Christian Coalition's annual "Road to Victory" narration. Bobbitt charged Clinton should be impeached because he "invaded, bypassed, lied to and lied" (AF 1998). Speakers also included Republican congressmen, such as Newt Gingrich, Trent Lott, Tom DeLay, Dick Armey, and presidential hopefuls, such as Gary Bauer, John Ashcroft and Steve Forbes, telling the members that they would support impeachment. Many argued

Clinton with the country's preserved moral status. Bass called the scandal "the equivalent of a cultural oil spill... it is not an event washing up on shore covered with gunk, it is our life". Robertson accused Clinton of "turning the White House into the 'playpen for the sexual deviance of the post-child of the 1980s'" (Gibson 1998), and Achornoff "described Clinton as the crowning product of the 1980s' culture" (Sawyer 1998).

Thirty years later, we know that that "Glove Theory" is a great tragedy... From the wells of the self-indulgent '80s, our culture has emerged the "Glove Society" - however, now who can't identify their fathers, daughters who are too young to be mothers, too-often raised by television, confirmed by drugs and accustomed to violence. My friends, no more. Their immigrant parents have faded, their immigrant values are bankrupt and their days are numbered. And, my friends, the sun is setting on the last sons of the '80s - Bill Clinton. (Achornoff quoted in Sawyer 1998)

Later that year, Majority Whip Delay, a布道家 of the Christian Right, took the lead in pushing impeachment through the House. Delay spoke over often and ready to keep the drive for impeachment going (Pawson and Mendel 1998). When it came to the actual vote on impeachment, however, there were no efforts at "whipping," or encouraging members to vote along party lines, from either side of the aisle (Pawson and Mendel 1998, Stone and Basson 1998). However, there was a tremendous effort from outside lobbyists, including the Christian Coalition, to influence congresspersons. The Christian Coalition solicited 200,000 signatures urging impeachment and mailed them to the congressional offices from which it was signed the week of impeachment (Stone and Basson 1998). "According to a Christian Coalition lobbyist, Delay's whip operation, which few other lobbys to the Christian Right, was kept absent of the petition effort" (Stone and Basson 1998). Some of the uninvited members were also warned by

Christian Right lobbyists that they could then file a *preemptive challenge* if they voted against impeachment.

For example, Paul Weyrich, the longtime head of the Free Congress Foundation, talked to Kirby Bedellhoff, a conservative GOP senator, about mounting a *preemptive challenge* to Rep. John Edward Porte, a moderate Illinois Republican, if he voted against impeachment. Bedellhoff wrote to Porte, warning him that she might challenge him. (Kane and Barnes 1998)

Weyrich also listed the names of undecided congresspersons on her television show and urged her viewers to contact them (Kane and Barnes 1998).

Clinton Supports

In other areas, the Christian Right found success despite having no Democrat in the White House. In 1993, Clinton supported, and gave strong editorial support for, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was lobbied for by many Christian Right groups. Also, in 1993, Clinton released federal guidelines regarding religious expression in the schools. While these guidelines did not go as far as some in the Christian Right may have liked, such as allowing school sponsored prayer, they were largely supported by the Christian Right. In 1997, Clinton released similar guidelines regarding religious freedom in the workplace. They would only apply to federal workers, though they were expected to be a model for the private sector. Clinton considered the views of a broad range of interest groups when crafting these guidelines, including the Christian Legal Society. The Clinton administration received praise from some Christian Right groups for this move (Maryland 1997). Also, in 1993, Clinton gave her "strong support" to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. After the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, this bill was designed to achieve much of the same while avoiding the Court's objections. The Christian

Coalition and the Family Research Council lobbied heavily for it. Many of their opponents, including People for the American Way and Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, also supported the bill (Gorenfeld and Ross 1999).

Clinton also found some common ground with the Christian Right on the issue of media violence. In 1993, Clinton came out in support of the "V-chip." This would require television manufacturers to put a computer chip in all televisions that would enable parents to block out programs that contained too much violence. In explaining his support for the V-chip, Clinton stated, "if we're going to change the American culture, we have to somehow change the media culture, and we have to do it without finger-pointing" (Clinton, quoted in Pastore 1993). Clinton avoided some of the core tenets of the Christian Right in suggesting that violence is a "cultural" problem.

Christian Right leaders had long been promoting the idea of a \$2000 per child tax credit for parents. While Clinton disagreed with certain bills containing a \$2000 per child tax credit, Clinton proposed a \$500 per child tax credit for middle-income families in his nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention in 1996. Also in that speech, he made several other proposals that had been championed by the Christian Right, such as tax-free education savings accounts, reducing out-of-wedlock teen births, tax-credits for parents who adopt children, and tougher enforcement of drug related laws. In addition, Clinton praised one of the most significant victories of the Christian Right in the 1990s—the Welfare Reform Bill of 1996, which he had signed a week earlier.

Believing welfare was one of the previous House Republicans' main sticking points in their "Contract with America," while Republicans agreed on the need to

values workers, there were many different ideas about how it should be reformed. These differences can be thought of in four different groups:

- those who emphasized "workfare" or the requirement to work or go through job training in order to receive benefits.
- those who believed welfare was the cause of many social ills and went to tighten eligibility requirements.
- those who wanted devolution to the states on the items of block grants.
- and those who wanted to cut welfare in order to save money to reduce the deficit (Heyner 1993, 152).

The eventual bill signed by Clinton in 1996 contained elements of all of these. The Christian Right was supportive of welfare reform for all four of these reasons, but mostly they focused on the second all aspect and "workfare" aspect of welfare reform.

House Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich, a favorite of the Christian Right, opened the debate on the welfare reform plan by claiming it is "based on the Judeo-Christian idea that people should help those in need but should not make them dependent on that help" (Heyner 1996). He continued to use Christian language by claiming, "It's a sin to continue to help people who need to turn to help themselves" (Heyner 1996).

Clinton vetoed the Welfare Reform Bill twice before signing it. Substitution, the final bill that passed in August 1996, held many of the ideas of the Christian Right. It ended welfare as an entitlement, limited benefits to five years, required work activities, gave states bonuses for reducing illegitimacy without increasing abortions, denied benefits to married couples not living with an adult and not attending school, gave states the option to deny benefits for uninsured children, included stronger enforcement of child support (Heyner 1997, 123-29), and made 170 million available for uninsured mothers (Patterson 1999).

George W. Bush

The election of 2000 was other important changes to the Christian Right. During the Republican primary, there was a split in Christian Right support. Gary Bauer, formerly head of the Family Research Council, emerged from the ranks of the Christian Right to run for president. He did not receive complete support from the Christian Right, however. Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell back of George W. Bush. There was further confusion when Bauer withdrew and backed John McCain.

McCain received much criticism from Christian Right circles for his campaign finance reform proposals, which, presumably, would limit the efforts of Christian Right related groups. Also, there were some heated exchanges between the Christian Right and pro-life groups, and the McCain campaign during the Michigan, South Carolina and Virginia primaries. McCain was accused of being soft on abortion and his campaign chairman, former Senator Warren Rudman, was accused of being a "moral leper" because he called some Christian conservatives "soft abortion people, would-be cannibals, homophobes, bigots and latter-day Elmer Gantry".¹ Later, during the Virginia primary, McCain called Robertson and Falwell "agents of intolerance" (Cain 2000). Lois Beagle, chairman of the Myrtle Beach Christian Coalition, resigned from her position because she disagreed with the tactics used against McCain during the South Carolina primary (Barber 2000). In the general election, however, the Christian Right gave full support to George W. Bush, who became the President most closely aligned with the Christian Right yet.

During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, his father, George W. Bush served as a liaison between the White House and the Christian Right. He developed close relationships with Christian Right leaders at the time and efforts to bring influence by

them. Unlike his father, George W. Bush is an evangelical Christian and speaks openly of his conversion experience, particularly in relation to his battles with alcoholism. He often uses language that evangelicals relate to. For example, when asked who has become political philosopher you during a primary debate he answered, "Jesus, because he changed my heart." For many evangelicals, who are accustomed to talking and listening in conversational terms, this was an answer that seemed natural and understandable. Also, George W. Bush's personal political ideology is closer to the Christian Right than his father's or Reagan's. Yet, the general impression of Bush's close alignment with the Christian Right can be overstated, much like Clinton's alignment with the Christian Right. As we will see, the Christian Right sometimes grew suspicious with Bush's lack of attention to its agenda. At other times, it opposed Bush's agenda.

This issue is unique to the history of the Christian Right. The Christian Right has evolved from an unorganized, anachronistic, and reactive social movement to a organized, politically sophisticated, and institutionalized organization with an insider presence in the White House and Congress. This combination of events has presented unique opportunities and challenges for the Christian Right. The behavior of the Christian Right during this time will be telling.

CHAPTER 3 THE BEHAVIOR OF CHRISTIAN RIGHT INFLUENT GROUPS

The behavior of Christian Right interest groups challenges theories of institutionalization and interest group behavior. While some of the expectations, presented in Table 3-1, entailed by these theories were confirmed, others were only conditionally or partly confirmed, while others raised serious doubts or were not confirmed by observing the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. This chapter will take a closer look at these hypotheses and decide whether they accurately predict the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. First, we will look at institutionalization theories. How Christian Right interest groups replace religious leadership with bureaucratic leadership? Have their original goals become more moderate? Do they avoid risky behavior? Next, we will look at interest group theory. Do Christian Right interest groups deal with the free-rider problem in the way that interest group theory predicts?

Institutionalization Theory

Bureaucratic and Charismatic Leadership

Institutionalization theory suggests that as organizations institutionalize, bureaucratic leadership will replace charismatic leadership. Weber defines charismatic leadership as "holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit, and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody" (Oerth and White 1977 [1946], 245). For Weber, this type of authority abhors the structure and discipline necessary for a

hierarchical organization, and they will not serve. Also, hierarchical leadership is expected to be mobilizing rather than recruiting. They seek to strengthen rather than expand their base. Rather than only on leaders who can mobilize followers through their position and communication skills, Christian Right leaders would be expected to have leaders who serve their base through discipline and organization, under this theory. Do Christian Right interest groups choose leaders who are mainly serving and will position followers through their public speaking skills, or do they prefer leaders who are skilled organizers, focused on mobilizing new supporters? Hypotheses one and two can be discounted if I find the former, evidenced of the latter.

Some of the Christian Right interest groups have not yet replaced their leadership. The charismatic figures who founded the organization remain at their helm. For others, however, the bureaucratic responsibilities have been handed over to others while the original leadership remains in a mostly figurehead capacity. For still others, leaders have been replaced entirely, and for some, more than once.¹¹

All the leaders of the Christian Right interest groups that are the focus of this study are hierarchical leaders at least one level. They lead a hierarchical organization and receive a salary from the organization. Some Christian Right leaders are neither of these. Jerry Falwell, for instance, has not led a Christian Right organization since the collapse of the Moral Majority, but is still looked to for guidance by at least some of the Christian Right's core constituency. Since the focus of this study was Christian Right organizations, this type of leader was not measured clearly for this study.

¹¹ See Table 1.1.

In other ways, however, the leaders of these Christian Right interest groups are charismatic. Beverly LaDuke, wife of evangelist and writer Tim LaDuke, started Concerned Women for America in 1979. She served as president until 1994. Since then, LaDuke has served as chairman of the Board of Directors while three presidents followed her—Caren Ross, Sandy Ross and Wendy Wright¹². With Ross, then, and Wright, CWA, three media savvy presidents. Political experience in corporations and service as CWA's Vice-president of Communications. After leaving CWA she became co-host of the radio talk show *Point of View*. Ross hosted a radio talk show in Chicago before joining CWA. She has a robust personality, quick wit, and the confidence in front of a microphone or television. She was an occasional guest host on the political news program *OnPoint* and the *Issues* a Fox News contributor after leaving CWA. Wright was chosen internally from CWA to succeed Ross. While not as experienced with the media as Ross, Wright gained experience by leaving CWA's nationally syndicated radio talk show, *Concerned Women Today*. She knows the public face of CWA, and has become adept at responding to questions on television news programs.

Family Research Council has replaced its leader three times. Most recently, Tony Perkins replaced Ken Cuccinelli in the role of top research. Both presidents came with political experience and both had run for political office. The lead members of Family Research Council have looked for, and found, leaders with public speaking and media skills that were helpful in attempts to mobilize conservative action.

The Christian Coalition, one of the younger groups, seems to have gone in the hypothesized direction. Pat Robertson started the organization from the ideas left off the

1992 presidential campaign and chose Ralph Reed, someone with political savvy and considerable personality to run the organization. Reed also came with broad political skills obtained from advocacy in New Right organizations. Reed presented a more moderate image than previous Christian Right leaders. Robertson and Reed seemed to make a good combination with Reed presenting the public face of the organization while Robertson monitored the activities. This was true the Christian Coalition through its most successful period. But after Reed left in 1997, it began facing difficulties.

To replace Reed, two political insiders were chosen, Don Blank, who served as President Reagan's Energy Secretary and Secretary of the Interior, and Randy Tate, who had served in the Washington State House of Representatives (1983-1994) and the US House of Representatives (1993-1997). Roberta Coombs, the current president, has led a reorienting of the organization. More, rather than trying to expand the base of the Christian Coalition beyond mostly conservative evangelicals, the Christian Coalition is focused on redefining that base of supporters. At the Christian Coalition's Road to Victory 2002 Conference, Coombs was introduced as the person who will put "the Christian back in Christian Coalition" (Bill McCormick, public speech, October 11, 2002). Also at the Conference, its "church-partners," partners who agreed to coalition with the Christian Coalition, were introduced.¹² It was pointed out that this new, restructured, Christian Coalition would work through these congregational leaders. In her closing speech, Coombs said she was excited at the changes taking place with the Christian Coalition, noting that this conference was the first time it had a "power and worship" service and

¹² Joseph Rose and Wendy Wright were both working a CBA during my field work.

¹³ Interestingly, while the Christian Right has an almost no ability to nominate their own as a large scale,

reported her close ties aviation more closely with church leaders (Christian Coalition Board to Cheney 2002 Conference, December 13, 2002). While Condit is not a polished public speaker like Reed, she has much experience in the nuts and bolts of voter mobilization. While Reed was well suited to expanding the base of the Christian Coalition, Condit is better suited to mobilizing the current base. So in this case, leadership has changed from articulating to mobilizing, as predicted by Walter-Melvin, but this repositioning has not been as successful under Condit. It has continued to have financial difficulties and may have to declare bankruptcy in the future.

Free Congress Foundation, Eagle Forum, and Prison Fellowship all have their aging founders, Paul Weyrich, Phyllis Schlafly, and Chuck Colson, respectively, still active in their organizations, but have handed most of the day-to-day operations of their organizations over to younger leaders. These three organizations in particular will face difficult challenges in replacing these founding leaders when it becomes necessary to do so. Their repositioning appears to be greatly influenced by the personalities and interests of these leaders.

Prison Fellowship, for instance, includes in [all] wings of Christian Right groups that are not directly linked to its primary mission regarding prisons. An interviewee in the organization acknowledged that the issues they address are whatever Colson has an interest in (Prison Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2007). Prison Fellowship has formed additional organizations under its umbrella to address areas of Colson's interests. WivesBible Forum, a division of Prison Fellowship, was designed to help Christian women in the world, including political issues, from a biblical perspective. The Council

¹about half of the power presentation slides in "short power" were blank.

for Bioethics Policy is a Worldwide Forum program that focuses on biotechnology issues, such as stem-cell research and human cloning. There are several possibilities for the future of Prison Fellowship after Colson is no longer actively guiding it. Since Prison Fellowship's broad issue agenda is tied to the success of its founder, it may become more narrowly focused on its ministry to prisoners and, in the political arena, prison reform issues.¹² Secondly, since organizations are being designed to address the broad range of issues, the broad issue agenda may continue through these institutional structures. Another possibility is that Prison Fellowship would split up its policy arm and prison ministry, thus becoming two separate organizations. Prison Fellowship staffers have already begun to struggle with what the future of the organization entails absent Colson (Prison Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2003).

The Other and Religious Liberty Committee (ORLC) and the American Association of Christian Schools (AACS) are the only institutional groups within the Christian Right network group. As such, they are the most likely to follow the instrumental leadership model. Yet, charismatic preachers lead both of these organizations. Dr. Richard Land, ORLC President, author, lecturer, and speaker frequently at public events and at a commission or panel in the media. As a Southern Baptist preacher with a by League education (J.D.A., magna cum laude), from Princeton and a Doctorate of Philosophy from Oxford, Dr. Land can comfortably give a rousing message to a crowd of evangelicals or thoughtfully answer pointed questions on a Sunday morning talk show.

¹² In this scenario, Prison Fellowship would no longer be considered a Christian Right network group, as I have defined it.

Carl Heydrick, former President of AACS, is the senior pastor of Tri-city Methodist on Independence, MO, a mega-church with an own private Christian school, Bible college and ministry. While not as publicly visible as Land, he, like Land, is politically active and well connected to some in positions of power (American Association of Christian Schools, personal interview, June 11, 2003). Dr. Keith White, senior pastor of Grace Gospel Church in Huntington, West Virginia, followed Heydrick.

In January 2005, White was a signatory on a letter to Paul Blustein-Dempsey asking it to stop supporting groups that promote homosexuality. This letter was also signed by representatives of Christian Right organizations, indicating that the recent change in leadership at AACS will not change its political activism or close ties to other Christian Right organizations.

Global Transformation

Internationalization theory also suggests that the original goals of Christian Right interest groups will become more moderate. Has the Christian Right lost sight of what the movement originally wanted to accomplish? Is it satisfied with small, mostly symbolic, victories? If this is the case, hypothesis three and four will be confirmed.

This may suggest that the focus will shift with the issue of abortion. The original goal of the movement was to make abortion illegal at all stages of the pregnancy and in all circumstances, except to save the life of the mother. With no focus on banning or regulating abortion through such things as a ban on partial-birth abortion, parental consent and waiting periods, the Christian Right would seem to have moderated its focus on abortion. At a closer look, however, even if the three effects are merely a natural shift rather than a shift in the goals of the movement, The Christian Right's concern about

the legal status of the unborn have also broadened to cover crimes to include other issues that impact the outcome of fetus.

The 107th and 108th Congresses saw a lot of action on what the Christian Right would broadly define as "life" issues. These issues stem from a belief that all human life begins at conception and ends at death, this life is created by God and is deserving of dignity. It is the role of government to protect the life from abuse and harm. The political agenda of Christian Right interest groups on this issue included the Born Alive Unborn Protection Act, the Abusive Non-communication Act, the Partial Birth Abortion Ban, the Child Custody Protection Act, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the Person's Right to Know Act, government funding of stem-cell research and the Human Cloning Ban. The Child Custody Protection Act would make it illegal for anyone besides a parent to transport a minor away from the mother for the purpose of circumventing state law. The Person's Right to Know Act of 2003 would prohibit federal funds for any family planning program that provides contraceptive drugs or devices to a minor without parental consent, parental notification with five days notice, or a court order.

The Abusive Non-communication Act would allow health care providers who object to abortion to refuse to perform an abortion. This bill was passed by the House during the 107th Congress, but never came up for a vote in the Senate. In the 108th Congress, the act was added to the amendment to a spending bill for the Health and Human Services department (HHS) and housing law. As a result, any government agency or program that receives funds from HHS may not discriminate against a health-care provider who refuses to perform, pay for, or provide coverage for an abortion.

The *Born-Alive Infants Protection Act*. One of the strategies within the Christian Right with regards to abortion policy has been to pass laws that help them to defend the fetus of abortion. In other words, the national debate created by the passing of these laws is as important as passing the law because it helps them to frame the debate within the American people in their favor. The *Born-Alive Infants Protection Act* (BAIPA) is a good example of using the passage of a bill to set the framing of the debate over abortion policy. BAIPA would make illegal the killing of any person, or fetus, that is born alive. The intent of the bill was to prevent the killing of a survivor of a "partial abortion," and make illegal the practice of "partial birth abortion." Testimony concerning the bill stressed cases where abortions were attempted but the fetus was accidentally separated from its mother during the operation. Testimony also revealed that One Hospital in Illinois was performing abortions by inducing birth, delivering the infant alive, and allowing them to die.

BAIPA also was supported by a series of court decisions favoring the infant born alive, but marked for abortion, but as rights under the law. In 1977 the question of whether the law is obligated to protect the life of a fetus that survives an abortion came before a US-district court in the case of *Floyd v. Andrus*. The judge in the case decided that the law does not protect a fetus that had intended to be aborted even if the fetus had remained alive after being separated from its body, because the mother had decided on abortion. "A state may not legislate for the protection and preservation of the life of such a fetus, or merely cause this the surgical removal of the fetus from the womb mother under state law" (*Floyd v. Andrus* 1977). In other words, the right to an abortion

more the right to an effective abortion. Though the case was thrown out, DADPA proponents broadened the legal meaning behind *Planned* among other patients. In the Supreme Court case of *Stanberg v. Cochran* (2000), Justice Ginsburg and Stevens wrote a concurring opinion claiming that the state has no right to regulate the types of procedures used in perform abortions. DADPA proponents felt that the opinions of these justices, the occurrence of botched abortions and the actions of Crisis Hospital provided sufficient reason to pass a law to protect a fetus born alive, though marked for abortion.

While these events provided the legal status for passing such a law, there were not the only reasons that DADPA proponents wanted to pass such a law. Christian Right interest groups were DADPA, in a way to advance their reproductive choices. By saying, for the protection of a fetus when an abortion “fails,” meaning the abortion failed to result in a dead fetus but rather resulted in live baby, separate them in number, Christian Right interest groups felt that they were moving the debate in their playing field. Rather than debating the question of “rights”, Christian Right interest groups angled the debate to focus on the question of life, when it begins and when it should be protected. The proponents of DADPA, including Christian Right interest groups, made their intentions clear. They were looking for a fight on this issue. When there was none, they were disappointed.

The idea for DADPA originated, not within a Christian Right Interest Group, but without students. Hadley Atkison, a political science Professor at Auburn College, first had the idea of passing a law that protects the life of an abortion service as when he called it “inside the box” with right to not abortion (Atkison 2002). Atkison had become concerned that politicians were avoiding the issue of abortion because it was so

restrictions. These politicians had been unwilling to engage the issue. Akin's "own suggestion [had] been to rephrase the question at the simplest point, with the most modest measure of all" (2002, 229). The point of BalDPA was to engage a conversation that would lead to the question of the legality of abortion. "The main statement of intent, or an objective, does not supply the means, and the main point behind the emphasis of responsibility is just launching the conversation and bringing back these issues" (Akin 2002, 229). Merely passing a law was not the goal, though the law was designed to incite. The goal was to create a platform for discussing the reasons for passing the law.

While most pro-life organizations supported the bill, the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) did not initially support it because they thought it was too modest and unnecessary (Akin 2002, 229). The pro-Choice Right groups used to see the utility of BalDPA earlier and used their influence to get it through Congress. While President Bush did little to support its passage, he had a public signing in which many leaders in the Choice Right and Akin were invited.

Akin became an official adviser to Family Research Council's Center for Human Life and Freedom in 2002 and has presented lectures at their meet at the Family Research Council. Ken Cuccin, President of Family Research Council, put Akin's strategy to use when he wrote an op-ed for *The Washington Times* on the 10th Anniversary of *Roe v. Wade*. He used N.R.A.'s opposition to BalDPA to further his argument.

N.R.A. even opposed the Born Alive Infants Protection Act, signed into law last year by President Bush, until it adopted the more mild of political expediency language. N.R.A. morally argued that the right to an abortion guaranteed a dead baby. Survivors were not welcome. (Cuccin 2002)

Christian Right leaders had hoped there would be more pro-choice members of Congress who would have opposed BAIPA as they could not a similar opponent in the next election.

The passage of BAIPA shows a Christian Right that is more politically sophisticated than its early days. The BAIPA strategy shows recognition of the importance of effective political choices and the use of long-term strategies. It is also a strategy whose end goal is to end all abortion, except to save the life of the mother. Therefore, the Christian Right's efforts in passing BAIPA should not be seen as moderation or good functioning, but simply a tactical maneuver.

Partial Birth Abortion Ban. Like BAIPA, the Partial Birth Abortion (PBA) Ban was used by Christian Right abortion groups as a way to further their argument. The PBA Ban would make illegal a particular method of abortion used in late term pregnancies. With this method, called intact dilation and extraction, i. D & X, D & E or D & X by the medical community, the physician would reduce both and extract the legs and upper torso of the fetus from the birth canal, puncture the back of the fetus' skull with a pair of forceps and extract the brain of the fetus through the punctured hole. After this, the remainder of the fetus is pulled from the birth canal.

The impetus for a ban on this procedure came after members of the pro-life community obtained a copy of a paper describing how to perform the procedure delivered by James Herdtle, M.D., a doctor who performs abortions, at a medical conference in 1982. The procedure sounded particularly gruesome when described in the technical language of a medical doctor and shocked many who read it. For instance, Herdtle wrote,

Class 2B) is accomplished by classifying the fetus with the status of a non-person and removing the fetus through an adequately dilated cervix.

However, most suggest that dismemberment at twenty weeks and beyond is the difficult due to the toughness of fetal tissue at this stage of development. Consequently, most late second trimester abortions are performed by an induction method...

Resuscitating proper placement of the closed suture by and with elevation of the cervix, the surgeon then forces the suture into the base of the skull or into the foramen magnum. Having safely entered the skull, he spreads the suture to enlarge the opening.

The surgeon removes the suture and introduces a moistened catheter into the field and insulates the skull surface. With the catheter still in place, he applies traction to the fetus, extracting it completely from the patient. (Blaustein 1992)

Pro-life groups correctly calculated that even if the public were not in favor of an all-out ban on abortion they may be convinced to ban a certain type of abortion procedure. Though a ban on D. & C. would not achieve the ultimate goal of banning abortion, it would keep the issue of abortion in the public spotlight, chip away at the legal grounds for abortion rights, and give supporters a partial success.

After the 1994 elections, the PBA, then had strong support in the Republican controlled House and Senate and was passed easily during the Clinton administration, but always failed to receive Clinton's veto in the Senate. Clinton argued that he would sign the ban only if it included an exception for the health of the mother. While the ban had no exception to save the life of the mother, there was no health exception because, supporters argued, the Supreme Court had defined "health" as broadly, "maternal stress" for instance, that such an exception would continually make the ban obsolete.

The Christian Right could have easily had a PBA ban, if it included the health exception. Though not preferable, it would have at least been working. There was a

not involved but by holding out for a stronger bill they may end up with nothing. The Christian Right preferred to hold out. They would wait until they could combine the needed votes in both houses of Congress with a President willing to sign the no health exception PBA bill.

It was not until after the 2002 election, when Republicans had regained control of the Senate while maintaining the House along with a President willing to sign the legislation, that pro-life forces had the wherewithal to pass the PBA bill. When the PBA bill was again addressed in the House, there were supporting bills over the health exception. The Christian Right pushed strongly for a no vote on the bill with the health exception and a yes vote on the bill with no health exception. The Christian Coalition warned House members that a no vote on the bill including the health exception on its usual language and a yes vote would be counted as a "negative" vote (Dennis, R., *Washington Weekly Review* [annual Universe], June 6, 2003).

In the Senate, an amendment was voted (with 53 votes) that modified the Senate's support for the *s. 1* PBA. The Christian Right opposed this amendment. When the competing bills were debated in conference, the amendment was removed, and both houses passed the final version, which did not include the option of a health exception.

When President Bush signed the PBA, known as *law* on November 5, 2003, several friends within the Christian Right were invited to attend the public event, including, the Christian Coalition legislative staff Pharr and Mrs. Ted Penley, Chairman William Wherry and the staff of the Religious Freedom Coalition, Jerry Falwell, and the Family Research Council staff. Additionally, Chuck Colson, Jim DeMint, Bob Hodel, Mike Farris, and Troy Polson sat with the President in the Oval Office before the signing and

acknowledged their influence in the signing. Their presence at the signing, and in the Oval Office before the signing, can be seen as an acknowledgement of their influence over the passage of the legislation. Accordingly, it was common for these leaders to mention their influence in messages to their supporters. This was a symbolic way of showing that their members support was having an impact. Additionally, after passing the FSA, Christian Right leaders assured their supporters that this was a victory that would not have been possible without their support.

The FSA bill was challenged in court the same day of the signing. So for the Christian Right, this battle would not be over but would always remain in the courts, with the anticipation that it would make its way to the Supreme Court. This anticipation would lend additional importance to future Supreme Court decisions. Plus, the Christian Right could possibly make the argument to its supporters that the battle was over and their emotional support is necessary to win.

Unborn Victims of Violence Act: The Christian Right found another opportunity to establish the idea that a fetus is a person with the same legal rights of all persons through the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. The Act would recognize any violence when someone is prosecuted under federal law for harming or killing a pregnant woman. Both sides recognized that the bill would threaten abortion rights by recognizing a legal status for a fetus for the first time. In the Senate, an alternative bill would have recognized only one voter but imposed the same penalties. Therefore, Senators had a choice between bills where only difference was that one recognized the fetus as a person and the other did not.

The measure passed in the Senate (51 to 49) on March 29, 2001, during the presidential campaign. That is, it had passed in the House but failed to be brought up in the Senate because of the efforts of pro-choice Democrats. Senator Kerry, busy campaigning for the presidency, made no serious opposition to vote for the alternative H.R. 101 against the Uniform Victims of Violence Act (Dover 2004).

Bush's Executive Order on Government Funding of Stem-cell Research

Early in Bush's first term, he started to make a decision over whether federal funds could be used for research on embryonic stem cells. These embryos would be taken from the stored embryos that were leftover after in-vitro fertilization, a medical procedure for women who face difficulties becoming pregnant. Researchers believe that this research could lead to cures for many terrible diseases. Bush was pressured by the pro-life community to not allow federal funds for this research. Since these embryos represent life that should be protected, or not that destroys life in order to save life is an unacceptable compromise. On the other hand, the potential medical breakthroughs of this research led some to argue that it would be unethical to not pursue the research. Peay was pressuring in Congress to pass a bill that funds stem-cell research as the President's main legislative prioritization of his administration.

In a televised speech on August 9, 2001, Bush announced that he would allow federal funds for research on the embryos that had already been destroyed and were being used for research on their stem cells, but no federal funds would be used for research on embryos that may be destroyed for their stem cells in the future.

While many in the conservative movement felt that Bush made a politically wise decision by finding a compromise on an issue that seemed to have no middle ground, many in the Christian Right were highly critical of Bush's decision. Bush's compromise position defused the contentious funding battle Congress had provided funding for stem-cell research. Bush won the political battle, at least for the time being. For the Christian Right, however, that was not a win but a loss because his decision undermined the principle it worked to uphold. Since the derivation of these embryos is equivalent to murder, it would be immoral to use them for scientific research.

Kate Conner, then president of Family Research Council, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post the day after Bush's speech. Entitled "Bush's Broken Promise," Conner claimed that Bush "made a break of faith in the service of an untenable compromise" (Conner 2001). Conner wanted to see Bush make a principled decision, rather than a decision that would win the political battle of the day. This principle, Conner argued, is "one of human beings being given the duty to benefit and merely become a means to further the life and health for others" (Conner 2001). Conner also argued that by not standing on principle, Bush undermined his ability to make principled decisions.

If 20 more stem cells are created in the private sector by killing human embryos in the next ten years, the federal government will not have been "involved" in their destruction. On what principle will the president refuse to authorizes use of those federal funds and? (Conner 2001)

By not remaining faithful to this conviction, Bush made it more difficult to apply this principle to the future. While Bush felt a necessary accommodation in order to win

desperately wanted and, perhaps, to gain a political victory, the Christian Right was not willing to compromise.

If the Christian Right had moderated its original goals, this should have been an issue where moderation was found. On at least where a host of pro-life public opinion, pro-life research, the Christian Right opposed the destruction of a person who is helped to live. If pro-life legislation more stringent, this should be where we would find a. Instead, the Christian Right stood by principle when there was no political advantage in doing so.

Human Cloning Ban Like abortion and stem-cell research, the debate over human cloning also is related to the issue of life beginning at conception. Bills to ban human cloning were introduced in both the 107th and 109th Congresses. While a ban on cloning with the intent to produce a grown human gained wide support, cloning to produce an embryo to either to harvest its stem cells for research purposes, also known as somatic cell nuclear transfer or therapeutic cloning, has been more controversial. Therapeutic cloning is believed by scientists to hold the potential to end or cure many medical problems.

The all-out ban on cloning easily passed in the House both times. In the Senate, however, there were competing bills. One was a ban on cloning while the other would permit therapeutic cloning while banning cloning intended to produce a fully grown human and place oversight on the hands of the National Institutes of Health. Unable to reach a compromise, the Senate did not pass the bill.

The Christian Right has been opposed to all forms of cloning. Connected with its belief that conception marks the beginning of life and deserves the same protection as they would have after birth, the Christian Right believes that therapeutic cloning is akin to killing a person before it can begin research on its existence. As with the stem-cell research issue, any compromise that abandons or gives up principles unacceptable.

Looking at the activities of the Christian Right on the "left issues" shows a movement that has not compromised its original goals. Additionally, in its three decades of influence on the issues used to achieve these goals, the sheer volume has not only moved the debate over abortion policy into their direction, but they have also ruled the survival of the organizations that carry the ideals of the Christian Right's total commitment today. As Ted and Julie Hilly have pointed out, the "visible" social movement organizations, or the one that is often known and there, is neither the one that has achieved total success or total failure, but the one that has had a steady stream of success without fully getting what it wants. The tactics employed by the Christian Right in abortion policy is part of the reason that Christian Right interest groups have achieved this stability. By taking incremental steps toward its ultimate goal, the Christian Right has achieved the steady stream of successes necessary to maintain the support that these groups need.

CARE Act Another issue that showed the Christian Right's willingness to maintain its original goals was the battle over the CARE Act. The Charity, Aid, Recovery and Empowerment (CARE) Act was one of the primary legislative priorities of President Bush's first term. CARE would be the vehicle through which Bush would implement the faith-based initiative programs that he campaigned on. Bush wanted to

allow more religious groups to compete for government funds appropriated to help the needy. Part of the "compassionate conservatism", faith-based groups would, with the help of government funds, provide services for the needy more efficiently and cheaper than government programs.

Proponents of faith-based initiatives generally presented two different types of arguments. One was, this is a good way to help people. Government, they contend, has not been very successful in its efforts to end problems such as poverty, drug addiction and out-of-wedlock births. Therefore, it should instead fund non-governmental groups that have proven results.

The second argument is grounded in a concern for religious freedom. It is based upon the idea of religious neutrality, or the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The establishment clause at this interpreted to mean that government will not show偏見 (bias) toward any religion, or non-religion. Therefore, religious groups should be able to compete equally with secular groups for government funds. Only allowing secular groups these funds would show favoritism towards non-religion.

Opponents to these initiatives, the Christian Right has not been authentic supporters of faith-based initiatives. Its primary concern with the proposal is that government entanglement with religion would corrupt religion. Religious groups that accepted government money would also be required to accept regulations. These regulations may interfere with the religious beliefs of the groups. Additionally, these groups may benefit in relation upon the government funds to the extent that the funds

become necessary for their survival. In this way, religious groups may become co-opted by the government.

Therefore, the Christian Right remained largely unconcerned by the first argument in favor of faith-based initiatives. It felt that religious groups can, and should, try to alleviate the problems of poverty, but they should do so with private, not public, funds. With the second argument, however, the Christian Right was more sympathetic. It had long emphasized that religious groups were being discriminated against in the public square. If religious groups are unable to compete equally with secular groups for government funds, this is further evidence of a bias against religion on the part of the government.

Hence, the Christian Right reluctantly came on board. During the debate over the CARE Act, Christian Right leaders were often heard contending that they would not apply the government funds themselves, thus separating their issues with the proposal, but it was only the fact that religious groups should have the right to compete for these funds. Additionally, because of their fear about government interference of religion, they would fight to make sure that religious groups would be free of government entanglement when accepting the funds. In the words of FBC president Tony Perkins:

One troubling block preventing many religious organizations from joining this effort is the fear from liberal activists and lawmakers to force these groups to be silent about their religious beliefs in order to secure any government money to support their charitable work. Any faith-based legislation passed by Congress should make sure that any faith, religious or otherwise, are protected - not the political agenda of non-religious activists. (2004)

The Christian Right would not support any bill that would restrict religious practice for groups that accepted government funds.

The CARE Act, as originally conceived, contained three primary components. It would allow taxpayers who do not itemize deductions to receive a tax credit for charitable donations, increase the Federal Services Blank Check, and allow religious groups to make hiring and firing decisions based upon religious beliefs and exempt them from anti-discrimination laws (Hagedorn 2002). This last provision would become the most controversial. It essentially meant that religious groups that accepted government money to provide social services would not be able to hire someone who shared their religion and would fire or refuse to hire a homosexual if in decline or opposed to homosexual behavior.

Having little vote in the Senate, the CARE Act needed to have much going for it. Faith-based initiatives received support from both presidential candidates in the 2000 election, represented the heart of Bush's "compassionate conservative" agenda, was passed easily in the House (231-174), and similar proposals had already passed in the previous administration under George W. Bush. However, the exemption for religious groups proved to be the bill's undoing. Those provisions were left out of the Senate version of the bill, but Senate Democrats argued that they could be reintroduced in conference committee. Therefore, they sought to add amendments that explicitly denied tax-exempt status for religious groups that refused to hire homosexuals. This effort effectively killed the bill as the CARE Act never came to a vote in the 107th Senate.

Since there was already some reluctance on the part of the Christian Right because of concerns about the "strays attacked" when religious groups used government funds, ensuring that there were as few restrictions as possible placed upon these religious groups

was a primary concern, and, if the resolution failed there was little chance to support the bill. Additionally, the "triggers" that were being placed in the bill by the Senate Democrats would severely affect religiously conservative Christians—the base of the Christian Right, namely, the provisions that would prohibit religious groups who are opposed to homosexuality from making hiring and firing decisions based upon sexual orientation. For the Democrats, on the other hand, for whom the gay-right lobby represents an important coalition, including employment protection for homosexuals was equally important. Any provision that excluded the provision that the Christian Right was most concerned about would quickly lose its support.

In the 116th Congress, with the Senate now under Republican control, the CARE Act was brought to a vote in both houses, without the controversial provisions. There would be no mention of religious groups, either to expand or restrict their hiring practices. Without these controversial measures, the bill passed with overwhelming support in the House (408-11) and Senate (95-1). However, the bill would not get passed due to some election year political maneuvering. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) used the CARE Act to bring media attention to his attempts to limit voter turnout for the minority party in mid-term elections. He prevented the act from passing by refusing to appoint minority party members to the conference committee. Failed to realize the difference between the House and Senate versions of the bill, Daschle's actions, like could be seen as an attempt to avoid giving a political victory to Bush prior to a presidential election year. Some in the Christian Right saw the conflict as divine favor.

He claims the past weeks more Democrats on the conference committee. The question is why? There is virtually nothing to negotiate. Regardless of what he does there will still be major Republicans on the conference committee than Democrats so there is no chance to change the final version anyway. It may simply be because the CARE Act is part of the President's Faith Based initiative Senator Durbin simply does not want changes to do what can be done by the government with your tax dollars. (Murphy, W., *Legislative Update* [email insert], November 7, 2003).

In 2004, another attempt was made to pass the CARE Act by attaching it to a corporate tax bill. This bill, however, was ultimately filibustered in the 108th Congress.

While the Christian Right's desire to reduce restrictions on religious groups that the government funds to provide social services were never implemented into law, President Bush implemented those same restrictions via executive order. This route was less preferable, however, because executive orders are more apt to be repealed by a judge or rescinded by a future president.

The Christian Right could have waited for a global victory with the CARE Act, but after the main principle in question defined had left the bill, no bill was preferable. It stuck to its goals. The Christian Right understood the relevance of the bill, when the bill was no longer what it looked like and how to define it at that time.

Bush Aversion

The humanistic leadership of extraterritorial theory suggests leadership that is unwilling to take political risks or make bold moves. Observing the behavior of Christian Right interest groups during the debate over bankruptcy bill and Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle's (MD) controversial remarks with Bush's constituents, suggests a willingness to make bold moves even when those moves may result in damage to its own political power.

Then Lieb stepped as Senate Majority Leader. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) stepped into more political hot water over those comments. In early in a speech at a celebration dinner for Senator Strom Thurmond's 100th birthday shortly after the Republicans retook control of both houses of Congress in the November, 2002 elections. He remarked, "I used to say this about my state. When Strom Thurmond ran for president, we voted for him. We're proud of it. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years, either." Strom Thurmond ran on a Dixiecrat platform opposed to the civil rights actions of the Truman administration, many wondered if the comments were intended to mean that the country would be better off if we had not had the civil rights actions of the 1960s and 1970s.

Reactions were varied. Among Democrats, Jim Jeffords, Al Sharpton, and Al Gore released statements arguing Lieb is step-down to Majority Leader or apologize for the comments. Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle said that he accepted Lieb's explanation that the comments were simply meant to honor the men whom life they were addressing and were not meant as an endorsement of segregation. Among the Christian Right, reactions were mixed as well.

Ken Cuccinelli, then President of Family Research Council, came out the earliest and strongest in his criticism of Lieb:

Sen. Lieb needs to have little appreciation for how such comments as these are received among Black Americans. The damage he's done is considerable. Black voters are extremely volatile when voting American. We only President Bush received only five percent of the African American vote in his home state of Texas and only 10 percent nationally, despite his efforts efforts to reach out to Black voters. — Republicans ought to make themselves of they really care their

party to succeed in being represented by Trent Lott, or should the GOP look to a new Senate leader who is not considered by the constituency "biggest"? (Casper, K., Washington Update, [e-mail message], December 14, 2002)

While others in the Christian Right were not as harsh in condemning Lott's remarks, there was a shared concern about what impact this event might have on their agenda. A Majority Leader who has been damaged by a scandal would be less effective in getting things accomplished. Also, as Casper alluded to, it limits the GOP's ability to mobilize black voters. The Christian Right has shown more of an interest in attracting black voters than the rest of the GOP. This is due to the fact that the issues on which the GOP has an opportunity to mobilize these voters are the social issues, such as abortion and homosexuality. Blacks tend to have a high religiosity and are more conservative than the Democratic Party on these issues. As while the rest of the GOP may be less concerned about black voters, Lott's blunder was of particular concern to the Christian Right.

Some in the Christian Right may have seen Lott's remarks as an opportunity as well. There were some reasons that Lott was too pacificatory to the Democrats. The Christian Right preferred someone who would be more willing to put up a fight for its issues, especially the issue of judicial nominations, as Senate Majority Leader. So in the end, when Lott was replaced by Bill Frist, a fellow evangelical who did not back down from the judicial nominations fight, the most conservative tier of the Christian Right, involved in the debate over the filibustering of judicial nominees and the firing of Trent Lott, showed a Christian Right that is able to consider all aspects of the policy making process and how the different parts of the process influence their agenda. It also showed a willingness to take risks in order to achieve its goals. I asked Casper about his press release regarding Lott's remarks shortly after Lott stepped down. He said

involvement in the debate over the filibustering of judicial nominees and the firing of Trent Lott showed a Christian Right that is able to consider all aspects of the policy making process and how the different parts of the process influence their agenda. It also showed a willingness to take risks in order to achieve its goals. I asked Casper about his press release regarding Lott's remarks shortly after Lott stepped down. He said

that Lot's staffers had called him asking "Is this a joke?" Lot was enraged that FRC had condemned his remarks rather than calling them dubious. FRC was aware that when it repeated its remarks it would be "out of line", meaning that FRC would no longer have access to the Majority Leader's office. So, by a simple of omission, FRC was worried that this action would severely harm its effectiveness. As Congressman, "if you attack the King, you better take off his head!" In retrospect, the more focused effort by the right move politically for FRC, but at the time it was only possible with unpredictable ramifications.

Bankruptcy Bill: Action of the nation's bankruptcy laws had been a major part of the Republican agenda even before George W. Bush became President. Republicans felt that these laws allowed debtors to avoid debt repayment too easily. Their efforts were strongly supported by the banking industry. The Christian Right's support with the bill survived an amendment to the bill authored by Democrat Charles Schumer (NY). The amendment would make it more difficult for abattoir operators who incurred heavy legal fees and judgments to declare bankruptcy.

With strong bipartisan support for the bill, the battle was also presented as one between the business interests and the social conservatives in the Republican Party. This intra-institutionalism. The Christian Right supported the bankruptcy bill, but they did not support the Schumer amendment. In defense of pro-life protection language changed in concern for the bankruptcy laws. The business interests within the party were more progressive and willing to accept the Schumer language if it meant passing the bill, but would have been just as happy to pass the bill without the amendment. No more surprisingly, the bill became

a battle between pro-life and pro-choice members. Since the Christian Right was the primary interest working to defeat the Schumer amendment,¹⁷ it is a good measure of the influence of the Christian Right in Congress.

Republican leaders had tried to pass the bankruptcy legislation in September 2003. The Christian Right was not able to defeat the Schumer amendment in the Democratic controlled Senate, or as the conference committee merged to reconcile the House and Senate bills. It was, however, able to drum up enough support to defeat the entire bill after it emerged from the conference committee for a final vote in the House. There was, apparently, a cost incurred on the legislation supporting the Christian Right. Business interests withdrew their financial support of these legislators (Bobo and Kaylor 2005). The bankruptcy bill eventually passed in March, 2005, after the Republicans had a 23 seat majority in the Senate and enough votes to defeat the Schumer amendment and pass the bill.

While this battle clearly showed the Christian Right's ability to successfully maneuver in political arenas, one must be careful not to overstate the case. While Congress's multiple access points, legislation is easier to defeat than pass. The Christian Right was able to defeat the bill with the support of approximately 20 to 30 Republicans in the House. In this case, Congress essentially worked as intended. Congress was designed to represent many interests.

It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the suppression of its rulers, but to guard the part of the society against the injustice of

¹⁷ The Christian Right had given financial support to the Christian Right's 104 Christian members in defeat the rights of abortion providers.

the other part... In a free government, the security for civil rights... consists in... the multiplicity of interests... (Adams [1770] 2004, 573-74)

The Schiener amendment singled out a particular interest, abortion providers, for penalty. These interests, though a minority, were able prevent legislation intended to harm them. Through this power, the Christian Right's show of force would have been more important if unopposed in a government with a more centralized power structure.

Nonetheless, the way of the Bladensburg Bill shows the influence of the Christian Right in the Republican Party. It also shows its willingness to use the initiative. The Christian Right is no longer fearful of taking the heat. Its willingness to hold the party captive over the Bladensburg Bill was a bold and risky move.

Interest Group Theory

My research found, contrary to interest group theory expectations, that all of the Christian Right interest groups have a broad base agenda, use a broad range of tactics and put a greater emphasis on perceived benefits rather than material or military benefits to recruit their members. The level of financial resources, age and whether the interest group represented people or institutions did not make a difference in this outcome.

Among the Christian Right interest groups, two organizations are well funded—Family Research Council and Concerned Women for America—which the two have relatively similar budgets. Yet, I found that all these groups address approximately the same set of issues with the exception:

The peripheral groups, on the other hand, did not follow this pattern. Some addressed a broad range of issues by design, such as the Association of Christians in International, the Center for Religious Freedom, Human Rights Legal Defense

Association, the National Law Center for Children and Families, and the National Right to Life Committee. These groups were formed to address a single issue and they do not seek to broaden their agenda beyond their original purpose. The Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute address a broad range of issues and, as expected, they are also well financed. Others, such as, the Center for Public Justice, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, the Institute on Religion and Democracy and the National Association of Evangelicals are less well financed and address a more narrow range of issues.

Also, older interest groups are expected to only more consider factors than younger interest groups. However, I found no pattern of this among the Christian Right interest groups. The younger groups—Christian Coalition, American Values, and Religious Freedom Coalition—used the older groups both use a mixture of insider and outsider factors.

Two of the Christian Right interest groups—the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission and the American Association of Christian Schools—represent institutions, while the remaining membership groups—Despite these differences, the membership groups, like the institutional groups, have a broad issue agenda and place much emphasis on reflecting across issues. There was a difference, however, between the Christian Right interest groups and the pluralist groups. I asked them I interviewed to rank a series of benefits they provide in order of importance to their members on a scale of one to six, with one being the most important and six the least.¹² The mean ranking among the

¹² See Appendix B.

Christian Right interest groups was 5.60 while the mean among the peripheral groups was 4.16.

All told, interest group theory has done a poor job of explaining the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. With only mixed success from constitutionalization theories, we are left with the task of devising a suitable alternative.

Table 5-1
Hypotheses

Leadership Success Theory

- H1: Summarizing leadership will replace charismatic leadership.
- H2: Articulating leadership will be replaced with enabling leadership.
- H3: Original goals will be replaced with more attainable goals.
- H4: Member goals will become less of a concern.
- H5: Complexity will increase.

Interest Group Theory

- H6: Institutional groups will have wider issue domains than membership groups.
- H7: Institutional groups will be more focused on institutional maintenance issues than membership groups.
- H8: Institutional groups will be more likely than membership groups to provide collective action benefits.
- H9: Older interest groups are more likely to use moderation than younger interest groups.
- H10: Interest groups with more resources will have a wider issue domain and issue domains.
- H11: Interest groups with more resources will be more likely to place greater emphasis on material and purposive benefits and be less likely to place greater emphasis on polyadic benefits.

Table 3-2
Christian Right Leadership

Organization	Leader	Title and Date of Service
American Values	Greg Stuver	President
American Association of Christian Schools	Dr. Carl Webster Dr. Keith Weller	President 1990-2005 President 2005-Present
Concerned Women for America	Dorothy Lakin Sarah Rose Wendy Wright	Chairwoman/President President 2001-2004 President 2004-Present
Christian Coalition	Rev. Pat Robertson Ralph Reed Don Wilder Randy Toti Robertson-Dowd	President President/Director 1985-1997 President 1997-2000 Chairman/Director 1991-1994 President 2001-Present
Family Research Council	Larrye Parker Gary Bauer Ken Connor Daryl Pritchett	President 1982-1991 President 1994-2000 President 2000-2003 President 2003-Present
First Congress Foundation	Paul Weyrich	Chairman
Right Focus	Phillip Schaffly Loyd Weber	President/Director Executive Director
The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission	Dr. Robert Land	President 1948-Present
Traditional Values Coalition	Rev. Louis Sheldon Andrea Lafferty	Chairwoman/President Executive Director
Principled Fellowship	Chuck Colson Mark Farley	President President (2002-Present)

CHAPTER 4 SOCIAL INFLUENCE THEORY

Many factors conspire to disrupt the expectations of Christian Right interest groups provided by interest group and institutionalization theory. Social movement theory will provide a useful account to analyze and discuss these factors. The identity, resources and political opportunity of the Christian Right interest movement all influenced Christian Right interest groups such that they believe differently than what interest group theory and institutionalization theory predicts.

Gold and Gold (1994) have shown that the anti-institutionalism of organizations formed from social movements can be influenced by the movements of the social movement, the degree of success or failure of the social movement, characteristics of the leadership and the relationship of the leaders to the members, and the relationships to other organizations within the social movement. Similarly, I will show that the anti-institutionalism of a social movement, the Christian Right, is conditioned by the unique properties of social movements, namely their identity, resources, and opportunity. These factors will help us understand why Christian Right interest groups do not believe like other interest groups and why the institutionalization of the Christian Right has taken a different form than some theorists would prefer. The Christian Right continues to support policies focusing on material or welfare assistance and a low key organizational form while increasing its authority and sophistication.

Monday

The Christian Right social movement has an identity that is at the center of the movement together. It draws heavily upon the evangelical Christian salvation for its identity. Reflecting this influence, the Christian Right has as just a few goals the changing of individuals as well as public policy. As Zald and Ash (1990) noted, groups that share this motivation are more likely to maintain their original goals.

Political figures that are successful in political goals to a cause system are able to tap into a powerful conserving flow. Religious beliefs can address issues that represent how we understand the world around us. "Why were we created? What is our purpose? Is there an after-life and what is its nature?" The Christian faith, like all world religions and indeed all cultural systems (Widmer 1987), addresses all of these questions. A person who accepts a political agenda based upon these core beliefs will likely be more determined than one based upon other common political elements, such as macroeconomic status, gender or ethnicity.

Hollingshead (1995, 120), in his study of religious lobbyists in Washington, finds that religious lobbyists are different from secular lobbyists in several ways:

They advocate on an exceedingly broad agenda, they have less interest in detail, they employ fewer staff with Washington experience. They seem to seek success on their own terms. They seek and proclaim the need for radical transformation.

While this claim goes too far—as we saw above, the Christian Right does not draw directly or only wholly upon Washington outsiders—it recognizes the "prophetic outlook" of religious lobbyists. This outlook is provided by the independent power base that religion provides. Because events outside the state, religious can challenge the state in an independent voice. Since this prophetic voice seeks fundamental change, rather than

modification to the current system, as agenda is very broad. The religious lobbyists Hoffmeyer studied measure success in terms of whether they succeeded in their task, rather than woning a political victory, such as winning an election or passing legislation.

Wentura (1988), studying similar religious lobbies in the previous decade, also finds that these lobbyists brings something substantively different to the political scene:

Religious groups, across the political spectrum, also bring to American representation a language of moral concern and, at their best, an articulation of competing visions of "the living community," which are often largely distinct from the idea of "interest" as commonly understood. Thus, for example, these diverse groups have an aversion to an explicit connection with the moral content of public policies. (Hoffmeyer 1988, 207)

With their focus on morality, religious oriented groups are different than the other interest groups that are focused on representing their narrow, individual interests.¹⁷ While this morality does prompt religious lobbies to address marginalized concerns, it also means they will be advocating policies that affect more people. This has the potential to also move people who are opposed to these policies.

Hoffmeyer (1988) found that three Christian Right groups (Christian Coalition, Concerned Women for America, and Family Research Council) represented an exception to how religious lobbyists measure success. They "functioned as a kind of compromise with a religious form of lobbying" (Hoffmeyer 1988, 211). While I did not ask how they measured success, one Christian Right interviewee offered an account that typified of what Hoffmeyer (1988) found among religious lobbyists. "My job is being bold. Holding back the gates of hell one day at a time. You have to recognize that God is interested. The reason you are doing this is His Kingdom" (Prison Fellowship, personal

¹⁷ Though there are some media groups that also share a broad view of the public good.

Interview, April 18, 2002)

Some of the Christian Right groups that I interviewed reflected a degree of pragmatism. They believed that the small, incremental steps advanced through compromise were important:

- "I've become more realistic in accepting that you can't have it all in one fell swoop. I've become more pragmatic." (Faith Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2002)
- "We understand that it takes small steps, the incremental approach, to accomplish goals." (Concerned Women for America, personal interview, October 2, 2002)
- "I'm pragmatic. I believe in movement... More pragmatic people get involved in the law arena." (Religious Freedom Coalition, May 6, 2002)

However, this pragmatism was always tied to unwillingness to compromise on principles.

This is the most consistent answer I received among the Christian Right groups:

- "We don't compromise. I don't believe in it. It makes no sense for us, as advocacy group, to compromise because we are here to stand up for what we believe in. Compromise is what the legislators have to do." (Family Research Council personal interview, October 17, 2002)
- "I don't like the compromise. I was most disturbed "moderate work" because of my unwillingness to compromise." (Christian Coalition, personal interview, April 18, 2002)
- "We are working for a particular goal. It is not our job to compromise. That is the legislators job." (Eagle Forum, personal interview, October 18, 2002)
- "We look at every question at this point. We believe we have reason of this country both moral and moral. This every question is evaluated on the basis of this. Does it take our position, does it split their position and are we stronger for being taught the battle, even if we lose." (First Congress Foundation, personal email, February 6, 2003)
- "We don't have to compromise. We are willing to give up support for a bill if it compromises our principles. We encourage compromise to do the same, such as with the bankruptcy bill." (Concerned Women for America, personal interview, October 2, 2002)
- "We do not compromise on doctrine." (Puritan Association of Christian Schools, June 11, 2002)

One interviewee offered this and more for not compromising over that in spite their more radical positions: "We take off activists when we need a letter supporting a compromise!"

(Christian Coalition, personal interview, April 16, 2003). Another, however, suggested that supporters understood the necessity of compromise: "If you explain to them what you are doing, they don't have a problem with that" (Religious Freedom Coalition, personal interview, May 6, 2003).

One area of clear difference between the Christian Right groups I found and Hetherington's (1999) description of religious lobbies is their willingness to hire staff with Washington experience. Many of the groups I visited had good staff with Washington experience, usually ex-congressional staffers. Additionally, they worked to help their young apprentices obtain staff positions on Capitol Hill, thus creating a larger pool for future staffers with Washington experience. These differences may simply reflect the changes that have taken place since Hetherington undertook his fieldwork.

On the other hand, Hetherington's (1999) description of religious lobbies having a broad agenda fits my findings well. The identity of the Christian Right often is based upon the world. Christian Right leaders are able to draw upon this shared set of core beliefs to address a broad range of issues. Because of this, Christian Right morale groups can expand upon the broader set of issues they address without losing support. Even Christian Right morale groups that represent moderation can address issues unrelated to traditional conservatism because of the shared understanding of these the central issues are employable.

After the signing of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, Chuck Colson, in his daily radio commentary, requested a conversation he had with Bush in the Oval Office. He described to his listeners how the President "talked freely about his faith and how committed he is to the cause of advancing human life" (Colson, C., [radio broadcast],

November 6, 2000). Additionally, he lent this access to other nominees under the Bush presidency.

I commented to the press that the past Bush administration is simply part of a pattern that we've seen under his leadership. First, there was the legislation to stop anti-torturing, then the Prison Rape Elimination Act, then his efforts to stop slavery and genocide of Christians in the Sudan, . . . and then, of course, the campaign to help AIDS victims in Africa and to prevent malaria, and the defunding of international agencies that prevent malaria. We talked about how all of these things spring from a faith centered in a Christian worldview: the dignity and value of every human being. (Orbison, C., [audio broadcast], November 6, 2003.)

This diverse set of public policies was brought together under a single rubric, described by Orbison as the "Christian worldview." Our estimate of the important role that identity has played in how the Christian Right understands and engages in a political debate was the State battle over Bush's judicial appointments.

Judicial Appointments. Many in the Christian Right have recognized the importance of the judiciary in advancing their agenda. From the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade (1973) decision that legalized abortion, to the Lawrence v. Texas (2003) decision that declared a constitutional right to homosexual behavior, and the state courts that legal and homosexual marriage, the Christian Right's agenda has been opposed by judicial rulings. For this reason, Christian Right interest groups have placed much emphasis on ensuring the placement of judicial nominees that they support. Likewise, some groups opposed to the Christian Right, namely, People for the American Way, Alliance for Justice, National Organization for Women, and the National Abortion Rights Action League, have also recognized the importance of the judiciary in deciding social policy, and then, work to oppose these same nominees. Hence, the important role that the judiciary has played with Christian Right issues has the potential for a showdown as

the presidential election and the Senate chamber. As Justice Breyer put it in one of his statements,

It is my perspective as a non-lawyer, just a lawyer not born, that all of the issues that I care about, from the sanctity of marriage and the importance of the family and the preservation of the family and the children should and embrace non-religious research and cloning and all the great moral issues, are all dependent upon the whims of the Supreme Court, and then because of them, the other lower courts. And we simply have to get a handle on that and in order to do that we have to get a handle on our Senators, probably. (Press on the Family, [radio broadcast], April 11, 2005)

While President Bush nominated notable candidates, their confirmations still needed confirmation by the Senate. The showdown took place regarding six nominees, Miguel Estrada, Judge Carolyn Kuhl, Charles Pickering, Priscilla Owen, Justice Rogers-Brown, and Alabama Attorney General William Pryor. These nominees were strongly supported by the Christian Right and were being filibustered by the Senate Democrats.

Pryor's confirmation was one of the most contentious of the nominees and illustrative of the type of debate that surrounded these nominations. Pryor has many strongly held conservative views that are consistent with those of the Christian Right. Also, since he was an Attorney General for the state of Alabama, rather than a judge, he has a record of legal opinions that are more ideologized in nature than are found in any judicial opinions. He also has a record of public speaking to conservative audiences, such as the Federation Society. Among the issues brought up during the hearing were his views on abortion, homosexuality and religious freedom.

In his opening remarks during Pryor's hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 11, 2005, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) expressed concern that

Pryor would not be able to distinguish between his "very, very deeply held views" and his duty as a judge to interpret the law:

But I will say this, and I would caution my colleagues: It's just not enough to say "I will follow the law." Every person says this. And then we find when they get to the bench, they have many different ways of following the law, and what I worry about — it starts because even too far left or too far right, because ideologues tend to want to make law, and do what the floating ideologues and judges should do, interpret the law. And in General Pryor's case, his beliefs are so well-known, so deeply held that it's very hard to believe, very hard to believe that they're not going to deeply influence the way he makes about saying "I will follow the law." And that would be true of anybody who had very, very deeply held views.

"So a person is more than. There's a degree of subjectivity, especially in these cases and controversies on his-bench issues. And it's hard to believe that the incredibly strong ideology of this person will interpret how he rules it confirmed. (J. B. Congress 2009)

Senator Schumer's concern about Pryor's "deeply held" "personal beliefs" would be cited often by Christian Right interest groups as evidence that the Democratic filibuster was being used to a discriminatory purpose against those who have strongly held religious beliefs, though Schumer expressed similar concerns about ideologues on the left. Senator Schumer also expressed concern that, since Pryor has expressed strong opposition to *Roe v. Wade* in the past, he would wish to overturn *Roe* as a federal judge:

Literally, before that a judge can be pro-life yet be fair, balanced and uphold a woman's right to choose. But for a judge to set aside his or her personal views, the commitment to the rule of law must clearly supersede his or her personal opinions.

That's something none-one will do; but not everybody can. ... But based on the comments Attorney General Pryor has made on this subject, I've got some real concerns that he really because he thinks these views are deeply and passionately

Mr. Pryor has described the Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* as the "stolen quote" — the most used liberal interest group quote, that is from General Pryor. He said it. Quoted. "Roe v. Wade is the precedent" — quote — "and all this is off of a constitutional right to choose an abortion child." He has said that he, quote, "will never forget January 22nd, 1973, the day seven members of our highest

court upheld up the Constitution.”¹⁰

Mr. Pryor has said he opposes abortion even in the case of rape or incest, and would limit the right to choose to narrow circumstances where a woman’s life is at stake. He has described Roe v. Wade as, again, “the most abominable act in the history of constitutional law.” “Worse than *Plessy v. Ferguson*? Worse than *Dred Scott*? Worse than *Dred Scott*? Worse than *Dred Scott*? ”

It’s a remarkable comment by a senator, and I have to say I do respect you, Mr. Attorney-General, the speaking your mind. But I’m deeply concerned that any woman who comes before you seeking to exercise her right to constitutional rights, as defined by the Supreme Court, will have a tough time finding agreement with Bob Pryor. (U.S. Congress 2003)

Later in the hearing, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), a pro-choice Republican on the committee pressed him further on his description of Roe v. Wade as “the most abominable act in the history of constitutional law.” When asked if he stand by the comment, he replied, “yes.” Then Senator Specter asked him to explain why. Pryor responded, “Well, I believe that not only is the case unsupported by the text and structure of the Constitution, but it has led to a greatly wrong result. It has led to the slaughter of millions of innocent unborn children. That is my personal belief” (U.S. Congress 2003). Pryor would become complicitated and aligned by the Christian Right for psychologizing the question and slowly making his pro-life beliefs. Likewise, political issues which were believed to be pro-life but did provide (Brown would) find disappointment by the Christian Right.

The question of his beliefs about homosexuality was brought up by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA). Among Senator Harkin’s concerns was a belief that Pryor lied on the pending Supreme Court case of Lawrence v. Texas regarding “proven, reasonable sexual activity between homosexuals to prostitution, adultery, necrophilia, bestiality, incest and

pedophilia,¹² and now, asserts that he avoided interacting with his children at Disney World during out-of-state “gay days” (U.S. Congress 2003). In his defense, Pryor argued,

I think my friend an attorney general claims that I will uphold and enforce the law in the Lawrence case, the first that you mentioned, I was upholding and saying the Supreme Court is making an decision of I hold in *Saints versus Hartnett* which is the law of the land. And the argument in which you referred, the slippery slope argument, was taken from Justice Whalen majority opinion for the Supreme Court of the United States.

As the [re] my family situation is concerned, my wife and I had two daughters who at the time of that marriage were six and four, and we made a value judgment. And that was our personal decision. (U.S. Congress 2003)

Pryor's views on homosexuality are expressed through his belief that a general constitutional right to homosexual acts would lead to rights to prostitution, adultery,incestuality and bestiality, and his dissatisfaction to take his children in “gay days” at Disney World, more closely connects to Foucault:

Senator Diana Feinstein (D-Ca) took up the issue of Pryor's views on church and state. She brought up a speech that he made to a Catholic high school on which he remarked,

The American experiment is not a theocracy and does not establish an official religion. But the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are rooted in a Christian perspective of the nature of government and the nature of man. The challenge of the next millennium will be to preserve the American experiment by restoring an Christian perspective. (U.S. Congress 2003)

Senator Feinstein questioned the appropriateness of such views in a pluralistic society: “What I am asking is that, if that statement is to have any weight, something that is responsive to this plural society, and then is an absolute separation of church and state.”¹³ (U.S. Congress 2003). As part of his defense of the statement, Pryor responded, “I do

believe that we derive our rights from God and – as stated in the Declaration. And that's what I was referring to in that speech." (R/S Cooper 2009)

To the Christian Right, Poyer embodied someone who was one of them. Like Poyer, Christian Right activists believe that legalised abortion is an abomination, homosexuality is bad, our should be a constitutional right, "gay days" at Disney World is an inappropriate place to bring young children, and our government was designed from a Christian perspective. When Poyer was attacked for holding these views, it was not attack on their own views. When he was charged with being unfit for service as a Judge, it was taken as a personal affront because, to them, that meant that anyone like them was unfit for the type of public service. It was also to deny them access to the judicial branch of government.

Reflecting on Poyer's testimony, Clark Colton remarked on his make-breakfast, "The last of several points on obvious questions: Poyer's position on abortion clearly reflects Catholic teaching. And this is the officer [So, are my faithful Catholic to be confirmed to the federal bench?]" (Colton, C., Brookpoint, [Email from Clark], August 6, 2009). Virginia Armstrong, Chairman of Right Forum, told supporters in an e-mail urging them to call their Senators in support of Poyer, "He is a good-faith Catholic who, despite his demonstrated commitment to existing law, is being pilloried by Democrats for possibly views obviously related to his religion ("Catholics need not apply" for a federal judgeship!) (Armstrong, V., "Help get Bill Poyer...," [e-mail from me], July 28, 2009). Priests Research Council also sent an e-mail to its supporters describing the events of the hearing, and also described Senator Barbara's line of questions as opposing people of strongly held religious beliefs for judgeships: "Sen. Barbara evidently perceives that line of

questioning with Institutes who are known to be active, believing Christians. Mr. Pryor is a devout Roman Catholic. Rev. Schaefer seems to suggest that people of faith should be disqualified from service on the Federal bench" (Conrad, K., Washington Update, [j-legal Issues], June 11, 2002). Gary Bauer expressed outrage at Senator Feingold's questions in reference to Pryor's avoidance of "ten days":

Pryor was asked over the radio by Rev. Feingold, the Senator from Wisconsin - yes, Senator from Wisconsin - when he admitted that a few years ago he and his wife canceled the day of their family vacation at Disney World. They made the change after they had discovered that "Day Disney" was scheduled at the same time as their family vacation. Pryor declared that he did not want to have to explain to his two children, ages three & six, the reason they would be exposed to millions of thousands of homosexual couples at the park. But of this disqualification from being a Federal judge, most American parents would never be confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee - well, you get the point ("Pryor's 'Bash'", [j-legal Issues], June 12, 2002).

The press criticism of Pryor's nomination by the Christian Right was repeated from the opposite side of the culture wars. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (A.U.) called for the Judiciary Committee to reject Pryor's nomination in a report they published and released at a press conference on the day of the hearing. AU Executive Director, Rev. Freda Lynn, announced that "Pryor's political career has clearly been a strand to 'Christian' America through government offices" (Conrad, B., "Americans United Report details 'P'", [j-legal Issues], June 11, 2002). Among the evidence cited in the report, Pryor claimed in a speech to the Fraternal Society that the First Amendment does not require a "total separation of church and state." He claimed that the Constitution is rooted in a Christian perspective and he spoke of a "firm the 'Commandments'" rally in support of Judge Ray Moore and claimed his argument in religious terms by saying "God has chosen, through his Word and Christ, the

tion, this place for all Christians – Presbyterians, Catholics and Orthodox – to serve our country and save our souls" (Corbin, B., "American United Report details...," [e-mail message], April 11, 2000). The Jewish Alliance also expressed many of the same concerns in a letter to supporters. Additionally, it cited Poyer's relationship with Jay Schubert of the American Center for Law and Justice as a reason to oppose his nomination.

In his official capacity as Attorney General, he has even gone so far as to hire Jay Schubert of the Christian Center's extremist American Center for Law and Justice as the primary litigator against school prayer displays that did not honor the Bill of Rights. Worse yet, Poyer has referred to Schubert – a man who has built his career attacking the proper separation of religion and government as "the best religious liberty lawyer in the nation." (Jewish Alliance, "TIA Expresses...," [e-mail message], July 3, 2001.)

Those opposed to the Christian Right were opposed to Poyer's nomination because his ideological beliefs were similar to those of the Christian Right, and the reason is clear, simply having a working relationship with members of the Christian Right is cause for concern about their qualifications to serve in the federal judiciary.

Later, however, it would fall upon Poyer to prosecute a case against Moore's religious display and to remove it from the courthouse. The Christian Right did not miss the irony. While some criticized Poyer for carrying out the order, others saw it as an opportunity to point out that the Democrats were wrong when they suggested that since Poyer holds his beliefs so strongly he would be incapable of separating those beliefs from his duties as a public official. In this instance, Poyer did strongly that displaying the Ten Commandments on the Alabama courthouse was unconstitutional, yet as the Attorney General for Alabama, he felt he was required to carry out the court's order to remove the display.

The judicial nomination process came to a head after the 2004 election as Majority Leader Bill Frist considered using the "nuclear option" to end the filibustering of judicial nominees. The "nuclear option" would not be feasible procedure to change Senate rules to not allow the filibustering of judicial nominees. This method of changing the rules would only require 51 votes, instead of the 60 needed to end a filibuster.

The nuclear option was widely supported by the Christian Right. The Christian Right used many methods at their disposal to inform their supporters about their support: unscripted press conferences and the need to use the nuclear option. This effort culminated in a much publicized broadcast titled "Justice Sunday: Stop Filibustering People of Faith" on April 16, 2005. The broadcast was delivered via satellite and over the Internet and was shown in churches across the country. It was hosted by Focus on the Family, Family Research Council, and Highview Baptist Church in Louisville, Kentucky, where it was broadcast:

FRC had used this method of informing their supporters before, but never had gotten the considerable media attention of this one. Democrats in the Senate brought the broadcast to the attention of the media when they demanded Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist be participating. The broadcast was using religion as a divisive manner and was therefore an inappropriate venue for a Senate majority leader, according to the Democrats.

The stage for the Justice Sunday broadcast had large photos of Bush, Philpoter, Chene, Pryor, and Brown in the background. These judges were referred to in the broadcast in the cases that were being filibustered because of their religious views. Philpoter was present and opened the event by leading the congregation in a recitation of

the Pledge of Allegiance. FRC President Terry Perkins opened the event while Fred and Chuck Colson spoke via pre-recorded video. Other speakers were James Dobson, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary President Al Mohler, Bishop Harry Jackson, a Black evangelical, and Dr. Bill Donahue, President of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights.

Among the evidence cited in defense of their argument that the Senate Democrats are discriminating their judges because of their religious beliefs, Senator Schatz's response about Poyer's "deeply held personal beliefs" was cited often. Dobson and the other wrote many "Tools for deeply held religious beliefs" (FRC Action and Focus on the Family Action, "Justice Sunday: Stop Discriminating People of Faith," [unbksd], April 24, 2003). Also, it was cited that Poyer, a church that the Bible should be "interpreted as the ultimate authority by which all conduct of man is judged" to a group of fellow Baptists, and suggested to a church deacon that participating in a Prison Fellowship program would be a good idea, was used against him by the Democrats as evidence that he would be incapable of sound judicial reasoning (FRC Action and Focus on the Family Action, "Justice Sunday: Stop Discriminating People of Faith," [unbksd], April 24, 2003). Here again, the Christian Right is pointing out that someone is considered unqualified for a judgeship for holding views that are their own. In this case, the certitude believed that the Bible is absolutely authoritative, an orthodox position among Christians, especially evangelicals and, he supported Prison Fellowship and found no conflict between disengaging prisoners to speak out in services and his role as a judge— an act strongly supported by the Christian Right.

At the progress level it looked as though the nuclear, or unconstitutional, option was inevitable. The Democrats and Republicans could not agree to an agreement over these judicial nominations and the use of the filibuster. Then on the eve of the showdown, seven Republicans and seven Democrats, now known as the "group of 14," worked out a compromise that would prevent the use of the nuclear option and allow six of the 12 filibustered nominees to have a floor vote.

While the floor managers that the Christian Right was concerned about and involved in the appointment process would agree to a floor vote as a result of the compromise—Brown, Orrin and Pryor, many Christian Right interest groups expressed dismay over the deal. The deal had not only become one of getting their preferred nominees appointed, it had also become about an inappropriate and unconstitutional use of Senate procedure. So, my interpretation that did not allow all of Bush's nominees to come to vote on the floor of the Senate Bill 101 there.

Dobson called the deal, "a complete failure and betrayal by a cabal of Republicans and a great victory for most Democrats" (West 2009). Podesta again raised the issue of the constitutionality of judicial filibusters in his reaction to the news for NBC's "Meet the Press,"

In the year 1790 the original 13 colonies ratified the U.S. Constitution, over the objection from 14 U.S. Senators — agreed to a "Compromise" on judicial nominations that effectively legitimated assuming the presidential power to appoint judges with only the "advice and consent" of the Senate. The seven Republicans who participated in the deal need to explain what Republicans gained in this "Compromise" that they did not already have—other than the full confirmation of the mainstream nominees. (Podesta, T., "An Ignored Federal Compromise," *Washington Update*, [email listserve], May 24, 2009)

So, the Christian Right has come to not only be concerned about getting the types of judges they prefer appointed to these positions, but about the process by which these judges are selected.

Judicial appointments are a difficult issue for Christian Right interest groups to get involved in. The process by which these appointments are made tends to require more explanation as to why to allow their members. Add to the usual process a filibuster with its long and complicated history, and it becomes exponentially more difficult for the Right to understand. But the Christian Right has recognized the importance of this issue and is willing to spend the additional resources that are necessary in order to mobilize their members on this issue.

Resources

The Christian Right legal movement has a number of powers that it has been able to draw upon over the years, including, colleges and universities, radio and television stations, conference rooms, periodicals, and wealthy donors. Another resource that has been particularly utilized for the Christian Right interest groups involved in this study is social networks. The *cooperation and coalition* types of interaction discussed by Zald and Ash (1990) were both found present at the Christian Right. Regular meetings are used by the Right to Washington community to debate, plan and implement their strategies and further common goals. These meetings insure that they are giving timely information and that everyone is on the same page when pursuing their goals. These networks of interaction also help newcomers become accustomed to Washington politics, thus spreading the learning curve of neophyte politicians. Also, feedback from the meetings has been used to punish members whose decisions have been judged

appropriateness and damaging to the Christian Right social movement community.

Therefore, the social networks of the Christian Right social movement community in Washington provide an important resource to explain the behavior of Christian Right interest groups.

Social Networks. There are many types of social networks that the Christian Right interest groups form with, and to some of the peripheral groups, in Washington, DC. Most of these groups commonly hold events, such as symposiums and conferences. While these are mostly held for the benefit of the group, it is common for staffers from other groups to attend such other events, as well as congressional staffers and outside interest. They also gather for most of the year meetings and a Fourth of July party. The most important source of social networks, however, is the weekly meetings attended by these groups.

There are five weekly meetings—VAT House, VAT Senate, Family Forum, Marquette, and Weyrich. The Denver Marquette meeting becomes an important source, not the usual source that most concern the Christian Right. The Christian Right groups generally attend this meeting along with a broader spectrum of conservative organizations. However, there seemed to be a boycott of this meeting by Christian Right groups for a time. Concerns were raised that Marquette, in his attempt to encourage the Republican Party to reach out to liberal organizations, was building ties to conservative-linked organizations. The Weyrich meeting on Wednesday and the Family Forum meeting on Tuesday meeting have been more of a focus on legal issues. The Family Forum

meeting used to be the most popular and well-attended of these meetings, and the Values Action Team (VAT) meetings started.

The VAT meetings sprung from a concern in the Christian Right that the Republican Party was ignoring its agenda.¹² Christian Right members felt that they had worked hard, and deserved more credit for helping the Republican Party to power in Congress, yet they had little to show for it. In 1994, House Delegates initially expressed the frustration of the Christian Right by suggesting that conservative Christians should leave the party. It was not until Republican congressional leaders tried to resolve these differences that VAT was born (Voter communication between members of Congress and the Christian Right (Concerned Women for America, personal interview, October 14, 2003). House Integrity Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX) and Rep. Jim Price (R-PA) took the initiative to establish the VAT meeting for the purpose. Price became the Chair of the meeting in the House. A VAT meeting was later established in the Senate chaired by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA).

The VAT meetings do several things for the Christian Right. For one, they allow the Christian Right and the Republican Party to air their differences in private. When VAT was formed, there were many public criticisms of the Republican Party by Christian Right leaders presented in the media. These displays could serve to hurt the interests of both parties. Private discussions avoid this danger. Since the VAT meeting was started, these public savings have become rare.

¹² Table 4.1 lists the groups that are members of VAT.

Secondly, the VAT meetings allow the Christian Right to coordinate strategy. When all the Christian Right groups are working on the same agenda at the same time, while coordinating with House or Senate members who are bringing a bill to floor at the same time, they multiply their strength. Before the VAT, the Christian Right did not do this well. The groups would individually work on their own specific issues, regardless of what the others were doing, or what stage a relevant bill would be in Congress (Price Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2009). The Christian Right has learned, through the VAT, that political timing is important. It had learned this lesson well by the time I was observing them. I repeatedly witnessed firsthand how these Christian Right groups would simultaneously visit press offices, hold press conferences, and send letters and emails to their members of the right time to build support for a bill that was coming to a vote in the House or Senate.

Thirdly, the VAT meetings help the Christian Right understand the political process in Congress. There have been many occasions since the VAT meetings when a bill advanced by the Christian Right did not pass. Whereas before the VAT have been a source of frustration, now there is more of an understanding. As long as the Republican leadership is giving an equal a the hearing, the Christian Right has no reason to become alienated with them. Rather its frustration can be directed towards the Democrats—or the recalcitrant Republicans.

Finally, the VAT meetings help entrepreneurs quickly become acquainted to the political arena. This process is complicated and can be difficult to navigate without some guidance. When entrepreneurs bring their ideas to DC, there can be a long learning

term. If a new lobbyist is introduced to NAY, however, the learning curve is greatly shortened. These meetings can efficiently provide a wealth of information. Plus, one can get assistance from fellow, more experienced, lobbyists and staffers. A lobbyist observed with glee how he was very confused about the whole process in DC, but, after discussing NAY, he quickly learned how the process works (Association of Christian Schools International, personal interview, Part 2, 2004).

Thirdly, the NAY membership can be an enforcer for enforcing proper behavior among its members. With such close ties between Christian Right interest groups, any public attack by one of these groups reflects poorly on the rest. Therefore, it is in the interest of all the groups to keep these events to a minimum. Despite all the public disavowals, there is little that these groups can do to endorse good behavior among each other, except to drop membership in the NAY. This occurred when Pata received the Traditional Values Coalition's membership for a year after it publicly地denounced a drug re-importation bill at increasing the availability of the abortion drug RU-486. It turned out that other Christian Right groups were offered large sums of money from a pharmaceutical lobby in order to make the same claim, but, TVC was, apparently, the only group to take the money (Patterson 2000a). In Pata's letter to TVC, he said, "your recent conduct has alienated the pro-life community in Washington... your attack shows a lack of regard for the truth" (Kaplan 2000b). Additionally, he said that the importance of membership is based upon "team action" and "personal reputation" (Patterson 2000a). Other public condemnations came from FRC and CWA. Michael Schwartz of CWA remarked, "I am ashamed to be in the same business with these people [Dobson and

Edwards): "It is *very* important to the grassroots by people whose beliefs are majority centered in the states, not in profits, to tell [sic]" (Dolan 2007).

These social networks do not only bring together Christian Right interest groups. They also bring together Christian Right sympathizers in Congress and other conservative interest groups. In Congress there is a social network of conservative evangelical Congressional staffers. This network is facilitated in part by the numerous prayer groups and Bible studies. Additionally, Prison Fellowship hosts two letter series, one for members of Congress and one for their staff. It brings in speakers such as Michael Novak and Rev. Richard J. Neuhaus to "teach them intellectual tools" (Prison Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2002).

Many of the peripheral groups have staffers with Christian Right sympathies. At the Heritage Foundation several policy-experts specialize in issues important to the Christian Right. Joseph Lacobitz was the William E. Simon Fellow in Religion and a Free Society. Beccarie Marshall (Institute of Economic Policy Studies) had previously worked at Family Research Council. Patrick Regan studies issues related to families and religions, and Robert Kotter and Kirk Johnson are experts on welfare. Michael Newmark is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, his importance in crafting the Prison Rape Bill will be noted later. The American Enterprise Institute has scholars Michael Novak, Leon Kass, and Christian Hoff Sommers. Novak, a Catholic, studies the intersection of religion and public policy. Kass, a philosopher, is an expert on bioethics and Director of the President's Council on Bioethics. And Sommers specializes in studies on feminism.

In her book, *Who Stole Palestine?* she argues that the Zionist movement has been inspired by extreme leftists.

In addition to the peripheral groups, the Christian Right works with sympathetic mainstreamers. We have already seen the important role that Dr. Harley Aiken played in the Bush-AlLEN Indian Protection Act. In addition to Aiken, Professor Robert P. George and J. Eulogio Arellano have been influential. George, a Catholic, is the McConnell Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University and heads an Human Madison Program in American Ideas and Institutions. He is on the board of Faculty Research Council and has served them with strenuous career work. Arellano is a political science professor at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a confidante of Chuck Colson and has been interviewed on the Radio on the Faculty radio program. This is a notable change from the Christian Right of the 1980s. Mass (1989, 197) found only one reference to a scholar that provided assistance to the Christian Right during the 1980s. University of Texas Law Professor Carter Ross helped draft a school-prayer amendment. Yet another reason for maintaining social controls is government appointments within the executive branch.

Government appointments. The Christian Right has three basic means of influencing government decision making through getting its own members or those sympathetic to the movement into governmental positions. After Reagan was elected, he would keep his promise to add evangelicals to his administration in numbers proportionate to the population. There were not enough qualified evangelicals to take these posts. The Christian Right had to settle for Peter Wiss as Interior Secretary, Robert B. King (a special) nominated to the Secretary of Education, Jerry Bruguer as Director of the

Office of Families, and C. Everett Koop as Surgeon General (Molin, 1996, 221-22, 239).

After more than twenty years of political service, the Christian Right had a much easier path for the new president to draw upon than in their early days:

The most visible Christian Right appointment was Attorney General John Ashcroft, who served during George W. Bush's first term. But there were many other lower profile positions that were also of importance to the Christian Right, including Ray Cole James, Michael Gerson, Dr. Wade Horn, Tim Gaglione, Dr. David Hayes, and Jerry Thacker.

Ray Cole James was appointed the Director of the Office of Financial Management in 2001 and served in that capacity until 2005. She had previously worked with Family Research Council, Regent University, and the Heritage Foundation. She also has written books on marriage and family that are sold in Christian bookstores and has been a guest on the *Focus on the Family* radio show and has served on its board (<http://www.focusonthefamily.org/>).

One of Bush's most influential speechwriters was Michael Gerson, an evangelical and Wharton College graduate. He was often credited with the many Biblical allusions and religious language in Bush's speeches. His position at the White House went beyond writing speeches, however, to include policy formation. Gerson's policy interests tended to focus on caring for the poor. He was once referred to as the "second-in-command" of the White House by Bush for his advocacy of spending for AIDS in Africa.

Dr. Wade Horn, a clinical child psychologist, was appointed Assistant Secretary for Children and Families for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). He

was formerly President of the National Fatherhood Institute. This non-profit organization's mission is to improve the involvement of fathers in the lives of their children. Here again much of the Bush administration's agenda that the Christian Right was most concerned about, including child-care, welfare, adoption, and human trafficking. Here was also attention to implementing the "Healthy Marriage Initiative," a program to encourage marriage among welfare recipients using the money saved in welfare programs after implementation of the 1996 Welfare Reform Bill. The Christian Right actively promoted this program. While Assistant Secretary, Hens participated in lectures and press conferences on abstinence programs, the state of marriage, and the "Healthy Marriage Initiative" funded by Family Research Council. After Tasseym Thompson stepped down as HHS Secretary in 2005, Family Research Council suggested that Hens would make a good replacement.

Tim Doggett's official role at White House: Asst. Hsgt. Gen. At least as unimportant to the Christian Right, as known to the Christian Right. He meets regularly with and attends many functions of Christian Right interest groups. The presence of this position requires the experience of the Christian Right to President Bush.

In December of 2002, Bush appointed Dr. David Heger, an obstetrician and gynecologist, as the Food and Drug Administration's Reproductive Health Advisory Committee. The 11 member panel was of particular importance to the Christian Right because of its recommendation to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding the approval of RU-486, otherwise known as the "morning-after pill" or "abortion pill." The pill would cause a fetus to abort within 24 hours after conception. Heger had previously started Concerned Women for America with information on the adverse

health effects of RU-486 for then Clinton's Process to the FDA, regarding the drug in August of that same year. Opponents of Regan's nomination argued that his evangelical Christian beliefs were too influential in his understanding of women's health issues. They pointed to his opposition to abortion and RU-486, refusal to prescribe contraceptives to unmarried women and his recommendations to pray and read the Bible to a book on women's health (Regan 2002). For the Christian Right, the opponent's charges were another example of an attempt to drag the issue of the table. To deny someone a government position because they look to their religion behind the guidance on policy issues, and are opposed to abortion and RU-486, is equivalent to saying that anyone in the Christian Right is unqualified for these posts.

While these opponents received the backing of the Bush administration, another stated reason between Bush and the Christian Right, Jerry Thaddeus was initially appointed to the 15 member Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS. An evangelical Christian and employee of Bob Jones University, Thaddeus contracted AIDS after his wife caught the disease from a blood transfusion. He is president and founder of the Thaddeus Institute, a nonprofit organization designed to educate people on the dangers of AIDS. In this capacity he has made public speeches to mostly evangelical audiences and written a book about his family's personal experience with the disease. Thaddeus' appointment was part of an effort to bring more diversity to the panel by appointing more minorities and evangelical Christians. His appointment became problematic when a Washington Post story revealed that he had referred to AIDS as a "gay plague" on his website and believed that homosexuality is a disease and a genetic characteristic (Chronicle 2001a). The quote, it turns out, was taken out of context. The original

Thacker said, "Well, I think Jerry Thacker was probably a lot like you. He had a beautiful family, a good church and a wonderful ministry. He knew vaguely about the gay plague known as AIDS, but it seemed a distant threat" (Perry 2001). Since "gay plague" is an epithet, the sentence is attributing the term to what others were calling it. Also, since the sentence is making reference to the fact that AIDS does not only affect homosexuals, it is clearly emphasizing that AIDS is not a "gay plague." On the other hand, the Thacker believes homosexuality is not and not something one is born with, for a clearly guilty, and in agreement with the Christian Right.

Shortly after the story broke, the White House was asked about it during the daily press briefing. The President disassociated himself from the appositive: "The President has a totally opposite view; that remark [AIDS is a "gay plague"] is far removed from what the President believes," said White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer (Cronnelly 2000a). While the Christian Right was disappointed in the *Washington Post* story, it was not surprised. The *Washington Post*, a left-leaning newspaper, already had a history of carrying stories sympathetic to the Christian Right. But when the President came out against the names, rather than nothing in his defense, the Christian Right was outraged. Concerned Women for America issued a press release calling for an apology from Fleischer:

"With whom of Mr. Thacker's coworkers does the president disagree?" [CWA President] Fassbender. "Does he not believe that homosexual behavior is sinful and dangerous? Does he not know that homosexuals themselves are at risk for AIDS: the gay plague during the 1980s? Does he think a man with the AIDS virus and whose wife and child have the AIDS virus lacks compassion for AIDS patients?"

"Thacker's comments were what you might expect from the character conscious and religious bigots of the far left, not from a spokesman for President Bush."

[Concerned Women for America, "CWA's Best Call...," [press release], January 24, 2007])

Many in the Christian Right felt that the President would be quickly distance himself from them once they overthrew one of their own within, apparently, then checking the Washington Post story. In truth, the Christian Right clearly wanted more than a President that would sign, or not veto, no preferred legislation and veto, or overturn a vetoed, undesirable legislation. Christian Right leaders wanted someone who would publicly stand by them and defend them. "Walking the talk" is as important as "walking the walk."¹¹²

Federal Marriage Amendment. The push for a *Federal Marriage Amendment* (FMA) is a good example of how the social networks of the Christian Right were used to build cohesion among its groups. While there was initially much debate within the Christian Right over the best course of action over the issue of homosexual marriage, all of the groups eventually came out together in support of amending the US Constitution to define marriage to the union of one man with one woman.

While support for an FMA can be found within the primary legal arena after the Supreme Court's decision in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), the court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a Texas law that made homosexual marriage a crime. While there were disagreements within the Christian Right about whether this was a good law or not, there was a shared view of the scope of the decision. The court not only struck down the law, but found that there is a constitutional right to homosexual acts based upon

¹¹² I once had a conversation with George K.W. Bush, from the Christian Right's point of view, in which he "walked the walk" but didn't "talk the talk", implying that he supported their policies but

a right to privacy. The Christian Right had urged the court not to go that far in their appeal. It's unclear how that a constitutional right to homosexuality would lead to a right to homosexual marriage.

One fallout of the disagreements over the best tactics to combat homosexual marriage was the resignation of Ken Connor as president of the Family Research Council.¹⁰ Connor believed that amending the Constitution was not the best course of action. The gathering split with FRC's Board of Directors, chaired by James Dobson. FRC had not clearly defined who would have authority in the event of the sort of disagreement and Connor stepped down in order to resolve the dispute.

The Anti-Marriage Group, named for the city across the Potomac where its meetings were first held, is a coalition formed to fight for a marriage amendment. Christian Right organizations and moral conservatives from across the country form this group. The biggest push of protection within the group is over the wording of the amendment. Would the amendment allow states to ban civil unions? This conflict is a good example of the classic progressive versus fiscal debate. On the progressive side, an amendment that allowed civil unions would be able to gather more congressional votes and would have a better chance of passing. On the fiscal side, and states give their two couples the same privilege to marriage, but simply call it something else.¹¹ Since they wish to privilege the institution of marriage, not simply the name "marriage," no amendment would be preferable to an amendment that allows civil unions. For the parties, defeat is preferable

¹⁰ See an analysis of Connor from *Newsweek* politics.

¹¹ Family that may have originated from CBA in the new paper, but the word not be confirmed.

¹² In reality, which partners would be allowed to civil unions would depend on how the law might be written. With regards to going to federal court for same marriage laws, what others are potential. Christian couples could not file jointly for federal taxes, therefore there would be no change in their taxes.

to, what they would consider, a hollow victory. Men Duggins, president of the Alliance for Marriage, favored the proposed legislation. He left, or was invited from, the Atherton Group to represent the panel members (Cooperman 2002).

Regardless, the Federal Marriage Amendment did not garner the two-thirds vote required in either body of Congress in 2004 or 2006 (a panel after my fieldwork). The Christian Right knew there were not enough votes but needed all the members of Congress on the record so they could use their vote in the pending election. The Christian Right clearly sees this as a long-term fight. It will continue to try to build support among the grassroots and policy-makers as well as try to help supporters win elections. The recall committee built for this purpose will likely continue to play its supportive role in these elections.

Another important consequence of the social networks is they have helped facilitate the expansion of the base ideology of the Christian Right. When a single group takes on a new issue, it brings the issue into the rest of the Christian Right groups for their support. These new issues are ones from the core groups or peripheral groups. This happened for the Solidus Peace Act and the AIDS in Africa initiative. Another good example of this process involves the Prison Hope Bill.

Prison Hope Bill. Recognizing the influence of the Christian Right, there are times when peripheral groups will reach out to the Christian Right to gain its support for their goals. The Prison Hope Elimination Act of 2003, commonly referred to as the Prison Hope Bill, was one such instance. The original impetus for the bill came from Michael Howard, of the Hudson Institute. The idea for the bill was suggested to

However, during a lunch conversation with Linda Chavez, a conservative activist and former nominee for Labor secretary under George W. Bush (Kapfer 2003a), Homan sought to build a broad coalition for support. Prison Fellowship, with its network in prison chapels, was a natural agent through which to reach the Christian Right with this proposal.

The Prison Rape Bill authorized an annual survey of sexual assault in prisons, set up a National Prison Rape Elimination Commission to analyze the results of the survey, established grants for victim programs, and would provide federal funds for prisons that did not show improvements. The bill, sponsored by Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy and Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, had broad support, including the NAACP, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and National Council of La Raza (Kapfer 2000a, Thacker 2002).

Prison Fellowship brought the bill to the attention of the Christian Right and became the “lead” group for the bill. Through the coordination, Christian Right groups brought the bill to the attention of their supporters during key votes in the House and Senate, asking them to notify their congressional representatives and signifying their support. When the bill was signed into law, they congratulated their supporters for contributing to its passage. The Prison Rape Bill would continue to be listed as one of the Bush administration’s accomplishments. Through the bill had strong bipartisan support and faced objections from none in the White House (Kapfer 2003a), Bush would receive particular praise for passage. During his radio commentary on the day the bill was signed, Cutright stated,

"Why does Bush care so much about prisoners? Most politicians look the other way. Well, the president is a Christian. He reads his Bible. He knows that men behind bars are the ones Jesus called 'the least of these my brothers.' And this president doesn't stop with reading the Bible—he acts."

Bush's support was tied to the Bush (old) connection with Falwell's influence. At the same time, Bush's actions were described as a positive model of Christian behavior.

Prison Fellowship would continue to be involved in supporting the creation of the legislation. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appointed Pat Noller, president of Justice Fellowship, an arm of Prison Fellowship, to the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission.

Opportunity

The opportunity structure, or changes that have taken place outside of the movement, also has had influence on the nature of Christian Right interest groups. Changes in technology have lowered the costs of interest group activities. The availability of email and internet websites has meant that interest groups can keep in touch with a large number of members on a very small budget. In addition, the advent of C-SPAN, a non-profit cable network that covers political events, has helped create a larger audience for the activities of Christian Right interest groups. Together, these changes mean that interest groups are better able to have a ready mass and action domain with maximal resources.

Another factor in the political opportunity structure of the Christian Right social movement is the degree to which the policies and goals of the Christian Right social movement have been accepted and implemented by the larger society. The Christian Right social movement bears Jim Zaidi and Paul's description of the visible WHO in that

regard (1998, 330). It has had a steady stream of successes while never fully achieving its goals, thus giving the movement stability. This has helped the Christian Right to maintain its original goals.

Another influence on the Christian Right's opportunity structure is its relationship to the Republican Party. Republicans need the Christian Right to stay in power and the Christian Right needs the Republican Party to enact its policy agenda (O'Donnell 1998; Russell and Wilson 1998). As we have seen, this situation can sometimes make for an uneasy alliance. Republicans who do not share the agenda of the Christian Right would still like to maintain its support. The Christian Right, on the other hand, may at one point influence officials as leverage to influence moderate Republican officials.

The Christian Right's close working relationship with the Republican Party has influenced its cause and action domains as well. As a condition in the Republican Party the Christian Right becomes exposed to causes of concern of other Republicans. This exposure has brought more issues to their attention than otherwise. And because it is an integral part of the Party, any Christian Right interest group will be using similar tactics regardless of the size of the group.

Table 4-1
Values Action Team Members

American Family Association
Coalition for Working Families
Christian Action Network
Association of Christian Schools International
Christian Coalition
Coalition for America
Concerned Women for America
Council for Moral Policy
Eagle Forum
Family America
Family Research Council
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission
Focus on the Family
Free Congress Foundation
Home School Legal Defense Association
National Law Center for Children and Families
Praxis, People Advance Christian Education
National Right to Life Committee
Religious Freedom Coalition
Pro-Family
Reproductive Harm Committee
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Traditional Family and Property, Inc.
Traditional Values Coalition
Women America

CHAPTER 5

2004-2009

I set out to understand the effects of institutionalization on the Christian Right. I found that the Christian Right has become more homologable and visible in democratic politics. It has moved from an outsider to an insider status. It has built coalitions to carry its ideals forward. It has become a part of the political scene. And despite its institutionalization, the Christian Right, amazingly, has not lost its original sense of purpose. It has not, as some have suggested, become "captured" by the Republican Party, changing its demands while modifying nothing in return, or become more concerned with maintaining its positions than the original goals of the movement. The Christian Right has shown a willingness to stand by the principles it holds dear and use its leverage to move the Republican Party in its desired direction. This was shown through my participant observation and depth interviews with Christian Right interest groups.

This section is organized by, I have argued, the Christian Right's ability to maintain its status as a social movement. Terry (1994) suggests that an outsider status is a necessary component for a social movement. This study suggests a need to re-think this requirement. The Christian Right, a social movement, has achieved a degree of political power, or insider status. Christian Right interest groups are able to draw upon the identity resources and opportunities provided by the Christian Right social movement for strength beyond what its numbers and flavortype would normally result. Its identity, rooted in evangelical Christianity, provides a more coherent vision and helps it to address

a broad range of issues without being rapport. Social networks govern the movement with a sense through which to strategize, think together, and divvy up the workload. And, the Republican Party continues to permit the opportunity structure that gives the movement access to governmental power. As this study shows, social movement theory does not need to be limited to studies of the beginnings of social movements, or political contention. It can be useful for studying social movements in a more advanced stage, when they have obtained political power, and for understanding why they endure.

This study also highlights the importance of distinguishing between groups that are part of a broad movement from other activist groups. In fact, part of our expectation differences between membership and institutional groups (Tilly 1980) and between these groups that principally rely on insider versus insider techniques (Kohlberg 1983), this study suggests that we may need to develop broader interventions for groups attached to broad movements and other types of activist groups. Christian Right activist groups clearly behave differently than other types of activist groups. While other activist groups often appear to moderate goals and emphasize organizational maintenance above all else, the activist groups associated with the Christian Right appear to remain loyal to the values that first brought the movement together. As I have argued, the strong identity of the Christian Right, rooted in the moral movement, and the divergence between the insider and outsider elements explain, in part, this difference. I would expect to find a similar pattern among activist groups with ties to other social movements. For example, much of the agenda of the Gay Rights Movement is driven not by central organizations but by local gay activists who put issues in the national agenda, as the gay marriage debate illustrates. Similarly, Greenpeace appears to have maintained the same balance between insider and

similar policies that we have seen in the Christian Right. In particular, the "uniting" of the various groups within the larger movement provides a defense against fracturing or fundamental revision of objectives. To better assess this positive facet, large-scale studies of interest groups should include a social movement variable. A collective study of many social movement linked groups compared with many other types of interest groups would help to understand whether the study of this study is generalizable to other social movement interest groups.

The inadequacies of institutionalization theories are also clarified by this study. These theories were developed over the last decades to explain the need for movement. Scholars continue to describe social movements as institutionalizing, yet the theories they have to draw upon are inadequate to adequately measure the institutionalization. Reasonable measures of social movement institutionalization would help scholars compare the levels of institutionalization between social movements and the relative degree of institutionalization of a single social movement over time. For instance, if we were to compare the institutionalization of two different social movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement and the City Rights Movement, what measures would we use to decide which is the more institutionalized? Or, if we wanted to know which period of time the Civil Rights Movement underwent the most rapid rate of institutionalization, what measure would we use?

This study begs many questions that it is unable to answer. Since I only observed one behavior, no important sets of research, the interaction between subjects and others, were largely unexplored. While some of the theories I discussed suggested possible patterns, I was unable to look for these patterns empirically. For instance,

- Are movement leaders more radical than their followers, or vice versa?
- Do movement leaders represent the views of their members?
- Are movement activists more or less pragmatic than their leaders?

Future research in this area could help enlighten some of my findings. A study of this type would depend on the generosity of the groups I studied. However, it would seem to require access to the mailing lists of these groups. Some of the organizations I have had happen that past group would be unwilling to share this information. This in turn would highlight the importance of political scientists maintaining their relationships and regularly exploring the importance of their work. Our investigations will influence our future ability to serve our institutions.

The Powers of the Christian Right

Since much of the Christian Right's success has come from an ability to influence the Republican Party much of its future success will depend on this relationship as well. As long as it continues to be effective at mobilizing votes for Republican candidates on election day, the Republican Party will continue to seek its support by working on behalf of its agenda. If the Republican Party were to become "in the majority," the Christian Right would still be effective at preventing legislation it opposes from passing. But since the Christian Right has had its success to the success of the Republican Party, it needs Republicans to continue to win elections, and provide it with access to the government, in order to actually implement its agenda, a much more difficult prospect. Since the Christian Right has its political opposition in powerful governmental jurisdictions and its agenda is highly ambiguous and complex, it needs the Republican Party in order to achieve success (Bartovics and McGaugh 1997). As Bartovics and McGaugh's (1997) study suggests, a return from its present status as an important coalition within the Republican Party is a

form a third party for the sake of party, for instance), would run the movement's policy goals. This can be a difficult tightrope to walk, especially on the parts of its agenda that lack public support. If the Christian Right places overly contentious demands on the Republican Party, it runs the risk of alienating the Party's chances of winning elections.

Recent events also suggest on how the Christian Right can suffer in the face of Republican Party setbacks. The lobbying scandal associated with Dick Cheney has taken a toll on the Republican's public approval of the Party has dropped. Ralph Reed's association with Abramoff, and perceived fundraising overreach, has damaged his public image, as his recent desire to run for party's nomination for Lieutenant Governor of Georgia indicates. Even if Christian Right figures were not directly involved, simply its association with the Republican Party could damage the movement. Religious that receive the support of repressive governments often lose support because they are held guilty by association. Likewise, Republican Party members may further diminish the public image of the Christian Right.

The Christian Right's greatest resistance is its poor public image. Consider that we have already noted the movement has difficulty winning elections. This will continue to be a hindrance to the movement. Repairing this image could be a significant benefit to the future. This repair may come at a cost to its adherents, however. In order to repair its image, Christian Right leaders would need to find a way to push or disassociate themselves from other members who act in ways that are damaging to the lobby. Some in the Christian Right have shown more willingness recently to do this, such as Sheldon's disaffection regarding the drug re-enforcement bill and when Pat Robertson said that

British Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's saying was God's punishment for giving many Israeli tanks to the Palestinians. These incidents are possible the other way, however.

The Christian Right will be with us well into the foreseeable future. Structures are in place to help it continue as a entity. A change in political line takes place along the lines of the Christian Right—evangelical Protestant. They no longer seek to isolate themselves from the world, but to engage the world. And, the Christian Right thinks about and plans for its future. It develops its young members with programs in school and tries them and then to find them opportunities for service. The survival of the movement, history has shown, is not tied to the survival of any particular organization or the fortunes of any particular political party or positioned candidate.

The Christian Right of today bears little resemblance to the early Christian Right. It was once a movement mostly built around fundamentalist Christians with little representation in the government, mostly focused on a couple of key issues—abortion and homosexuality, and with little understanding of the political system. Today it has broadened its base, created a vast network of organizations working at the local, state and national levels, expanded its concerns to a broad range of policy issues, and increased its political sophistication. What remains to be seen is what the future of the Christian Right will look like.

Politics makes friends of enemies and enemies of friends. The Christian Right has found itself in contentious battles with organizations who share many theological convictions yet have different political convictions, such as Jim Wallis, Tony Campolo and the Rev. Jim Wall. On the other hand, a has also built bridges between groups with a history of conflict. The Christian Right has not only brought together many groups of

Protestants—mainstream, fundamentalist Evangelicals, neo-Calvinists, charismatics, Calvinists, and Arminians (Corynster 1997; Menden 1993, 1995, 1996; Noll 1992; Moloughlin 1998)—it has also brought these Protestants together with Catholics, Mormons and Jews.¹¹

The mounting diversity of the Christian Right, while a source of strength, can also present challenges for the Christian Right. I have placed much emphasis on the identity of the Christian Right as relevant to its success. What will happen to the identity as the Christian Right becomes more diverse? Much will depend on the Christian Right's ability to find common ground among its disparate theological orientations. While the other three I interviewed may see the importance of this effort, increasing their level of cooperation may be a difficult challenge. In our interview I was told that the, mostly Baptist, pastor who supported her organization had expressed concern that she was working with Catholics (Associate Association of Christian Schools, personal interview, June 11, 2000). An effort to find coherence among its various member groups may change the Christian Right and determine its future trajectory. Keeping its coalition together by emphasizing the commonality of its different groups will find the Christian Right in a strong position into the future. Another possibility is that the Christian Right will become less bold in its policies together and will splinter into different factions.

A generational change is taking place within the Christian Right. The direction of tomorrow's Christian Right will be determined by this new generation. Since this new generation will likely be introduced to the political sphere at a younger age than many of

¹¹ The reader should remember that of Catholics, Mormons and Jews have been supporters of the Christian Right. Since my study there have been ruptures with the movement.

their predecessors, I expect changes in style from the next generation. In a more moderate tone, they will be better able to speak about their concern in a broader range of the public and private sectors, much like Ralph Nader. Substantively, the generation that became politically aware during the Persian Gulf war, the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the AIDS crisis in Africa, will, like their peers, be concerned about areas outside our borders. They are unlikely to change their views on most of the social issues that the Christian Right is most known for, but they will likely become more accepting of the compromises necessary for a political system. But the success of this generation will ultimately rest upon its ability to substantively address the problems and concerns of their fellow citizens without deviating from the core values that called the movement into being.

APPENDIX A GROUP DESCRIPTIONS

Core Groups

Family Research Council

Maintained by staff now, Family Research Council (FRC) is the largest Christian Right issues group in Washington, DC. It has 60 full-time staff housed in their own 6-story office building centrally located near the MCI center in Northwest DC. Rich DeMuro and Roger Price funded construction of the building. The annual budget of FRC is about \$1 million per year (Family Research Council, personal interview, October 13, 2002).

FRC was founded in 1983 by Dennis Dalton, who originated the idea in 1980 at the White House Conference on Families (<http://www.frc.org/subject/frc-FOODFORALL-WHCONF.htm>). Since its founding, four people have headed the organization as President—Gerry Ringer (1981-1993), Gary Bauer (1994-2000), Ken Cuccinelli (2000-2007), and Tony Perkins (2007-Present).

FRC's tax status is 501(c), but they have a sister organization, American Response, that is 501(c)(4). Donations to a 501(c) are tax-deductible but those organizations are restricted from election activities, such as endorsing or helping to elect a candidate. A 501(c)(4) can engage in election activities, but donations to these organizations are not tax-deductible. Two protest actions were taken under the leadership of Ken Cuccinelli: the Cause of Human Life and Bioethics and the Cause the Marriage and Family Studies. In

addition, FRC has Student Academic Fellowship program for college students called The Whittemore Fellowship.

FRC has the core principles:

1. God-given and inerrant moral absolutes. Uncreated human beings in His image. Human life is, therefore, sacred and the right to life is the most fundamental of political rights.
2. Life and love are inseparably linked and find their natural expression in the institution of marriage and the family.
3. Government has a duty to promote and protect marriage and family in law and public policy.
4. The American system of law and justice was founded on the Judeo-Christian ethic.
5. American democracy depends upon a vibrant civil society composed of families, churches, schools, and voluntary associations.

<http://www.frc.org/what-we-believe-about-jclc>

At approximately \$1 million, FRC has by far the largest budget of any of the Christian Right groups for which data is available.

Concerned Women for America

Concerned Women for America (CWA) is the second largest Christian Right interest group with a staff size of 40 and about 800,000 members (Concerned Women for America, [personal interview], October 2, 2002). Their offices occupy a floor of a high-rise office building a few blocks from the White House in Washington, DC. Beverly LaHaye founded CWA in 1979 in order to present a conservative alternative to the more liberal women's group, the National Organization for Women (NOW).

The majority of support for CWA comes from individual donations. There are approximately 500,000 members and you must donate any amount of money within a 2 year period to be considered a member (Concerned Women for America, [personal interview], October 2, 2002). Other sources of financial support include a CWA Visa

credit card, for which a percentage of every purchase goes to CWA, and Pre-Lite Communications, which offers cellular phone service, land phone service, long-distance phone service and internet service with all profits going to CWA. These services may signify an important attempt to bring some financial stability to the organization. If successful, it may become a model for future fundraising. For currently, there is no subscription that represents a significant source of income. Additionally, CWA sells books and receives at their conferences and on their website.

CWA has many advocacy initiatives including the CWA Legislative Action Committee and a Political Action Committee—CWA PAC. Also, the Poverty LawNet Institute tends to follow the best law model by litigating or research and publications.

Christian Coalition

Christian Coalition (CC) was started in 1989 from the church list of Pat Robertson's *Christianity Today* magazine. Currently, CC has 14 staff members and they have 2 million members, which include partner regions as well as church.

In an interview with CC in 2000, the primary issues addressed are child pornography, judicial nominations, same-sex dating, the pledge of allegiance in schools, internet gambling, abortion, land and tax relief (Christian Coalition, [personal interview], April 16, 2001). One of the primary issues worked on at the time was the *Billions of Words of Worship Speech Protection Act*. After Robert Coates became President, there was a new emphasis on issues related to land (Christian Coalition, [personal interview], April 16, 2001). This caused concern among some supporters, but most supporters appreciated it (Christian Coalition, [personal interview], April 16, 2001).

Free Congress Foundation

Paul Weyrich founded the Congress Foundation after he left the Heritage Foundation. Weyrich is considered by many to be the conservative movement's "father" of the "values" of the movement. He helped the New Right to get off the ground in its early years. Today, he hosts a meeting every Wednesday that is attended by conservatives, including Christian Right leaders. FCF gets most of its support from foundations, followed by individuals and corporations, respectively. It has a budget of \$1 million. (Free Congress Foundation, [e-mail communication], February 6, 2000).

Like Eagle Forum, FCF is a New Right organization, addressing a number of New Right issues, such as privacy and opposing political correctness, as well as the core Christian Right issues. FCF has also been involved in other transportation issues. FCF considers its closest allies to be the Traditional Values Coalition, Tradition, Family and Property, Religious Freedom Coalition, Family Research Council, Eagle Forum, Concerned Women for America, American Values, American Family Association, American Conservative Union, and American Cross (Free Congress Foundation, [e-mail communication], February 6, 2000). Moreover, it is involved in a 500 group coalition to fight judicial activism and an 800 group coalition to deal with privacy issues (Free Congress Foundation, [e-mail communication], February 6, 2000).

Eagle Forum

Phyllis Schlafly founded eagle Forum in 1972. Schlafly had gained notoriety in the 1968 Republican primary for her self-published book *A Choice Not an Echo*, which contributed to the revolt against establishment Republicans that led to the nomination of Barry Goldwater.

Eagle Forum's first major tactic was fighting for the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Belknap argued that ERA would ensure that women can be excluded from a military draft. To defeat ERA, Belknap mobilized her supporters to write and visit their legislative representatives.

Eagle Forum's headquarters are in Cedar, IL, with an "Education Center" in St. Louis, MO. It has a small media office in Washington, DC located a few blocks from the Capitol. The office space contains a couple of offices, what looks like a storage or wait room, and a small conference room. The furniture looks old, worn-out, and possibly second-hand. There were lots of bookshelves with publications, and books.

The DC office is staffed by Lynn Waters, the executive director, who is primarily responsible for the legislative actions of Eagle Forum. While only Ms. Waters and a secretary staff the DC office, Eagle Forum has approximately 15 staff divided between their DC, St. Louis, and Cedar offices.

Eagle Forum consists of a 30405, a 304 04, and a PAC. The annual budgets for these are approximately \$1 million, \$1 million and \$123-300, respectively. It has about 30,000 members and a 10% membership is required to become a member. Some affiliates are located in 29 states.

Unlike most of the other new groups, Eagle Forum, along with Free Congress Foundation is a significant part of the New Right. This difference is reflected in the types of issues that Eagle Forum tackles. While Eagle Forum addresses the issues of the Christian Right, it also takes on a host of New Right issues, such as, reproductive reform and privacy from government and businesses.

The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission

The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission is the public policy arm of the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant body in the United States. As such, it is only one of two core groups that is an institutional group. Most of the other large denominations in the United States are also represented by lobbying organizations in Washington, DC. But the ERBC is the only one that can be classified as Christian Right.

The current President, Dr. Richard Land, has been in this position since 1983. In his statement is, "An American society that affirms and protects Judeo-Christian values rooted in Biblical authority." His mission statement is, "To witness, inform, encourage, equip, and motivate Christians to be the catalyst for the biblically-based transformation of their families, churches, communities, and the nation" (www.erlc.com)

The ERLC broadcasts weekly radio broadcast hosted by Land. Its audience reaches 1.5 million weekly listeners at 600 radio stations. The show can also be heard on XM satellite radio or via Internet broadcast from its website.

Traditional Values Coalition

Rev. Louis Sheldon, who currently serves as its Chairman, founded the Traditional Values Coalition (TVC) in 1990. The Executive Director is Sheldon's daughter, Andrea Lafferty. Lafferty formerly worked for the Reagan administration. TVC has offices in DC and Anaheim, CA, where Sheldon resides. The membership of TVC is composed of 40,000 churches. TVC is non-denominational and member churches are from 12 different denominations. TVC focuses upon the issues of "religion,

homosexual advocacy, family law reform, pornography, the right to life and religious freedom" (Engerding 2002).

American Values

American Values, the newest Christian Right group, was started by Gary Bauer after he ran for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000. Bauer was formerly Domestic Policy Advisor under Reagan and President of Family Research Council. He has worked closely with James Dobson and formerly co-authored a book with him in 1992—*Children at Risk: The Basis for the Heart and Mind of Our Kids*—which discussed some of the aspects, largely negative, that public policy was having on children. Bauer also chair a political action committee—Campaign for Working Families. American Values highlights the same areas on its website—human life, marriage and the family, culture and religion, education, national security, and international affairs. <http://www.americanvalues.org/home.aspx>

Prison Fellowship

Chuck Colson founded Prison Fellowship in 1976 to ministry to prisoners. Colson had formerly worked as the White House under President Nixon. Known as a strong and militant political operative, Colson was nicknamed the "butcher boy". Though he once was dedicated to Watergate, Colson was sent to prison as a result of the Watergate investigation. During the ordeal, Colson was "born again."¹²

Since founding Prison Fellowship, Colson has become an important figure among evangelicals. He has written several books that reached the top of the Christian

¹² How does it fit in the role of Colson as a leading political voice of the religious conservative movement?

Reagan era and he has become a popular speaker. His fundamental radio show is heard on more than 1,000 Christian radio stations across the country.

Most of the resources of Price Fellowship are devoted to press ministry. In recent years, however, some resources have been given to the political advocacy. Price Fellowship also includes The Wilberforce Forum, which includes Peace Fellowship, Benignity, and the Council for Biotechnology Policy.

American Association of Christian Schools

American Association of Christian Schools (AACS) was founded in the early 1970s to represent the interests of Christian schools. Unlike the Association of Christian Schools International, AACS tends to represent more conservative, and mostly Baptist, Christian schools. Their website notes that members are not allowed to be members of "the World Council of Churches, the National Council of Churches, the Modern Churchman Movement or the Ecumenical Movement."

The main office of AACS is located in Chattanooga, Tennessee, but it has a small office in Washington, DC that carries out its advocacy efforts. This office is located in a two-story brick building from the 1930s office buildings. Two full-time staff and two summer interns occupy this office. Less than 10% of the overall budget of AACS is devoted to its DC office (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2002).

Religious tax credits have been the primary focus of AACS' advocacy efforts for the past three to four years (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2002). While AACS does not oppose school choice, it prefers religious tax credits because the money goes to the parents rather than the schools. Also,

AACS members are concerned about the additional requirements ("strings attached") that might come with school choice proposals (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2009).

While AACS is concerned with issues directly related to private Christian education, it is also concerned more broadly with many of the same Christian Right issues, notably, the "family issues" and religious freedom (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2009).

AACS does some lobbying, but most of their advocacy efforts are devoted to grassroots lobbying. The DC staffers themselves act as coaches through which information about what is going on at the federal level is transmitted to their members. AACS has 18 regional legislative directors. If Congress is acting on legislation that concerns AACS, the Washington office will contact the regional directors who will, in turn, contact members in their region who have local districts. These members will urge others in their district to contact their representative regarding the legislation. In addition, members can establish annual conference in Washington where they can listen to speakers discuss political items of the day and meet with their representatives (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2009).

The AACS Washington office also works directly with the students of the member schools through a summer camp called the "Youth Legislative Training Conference". Students learn more about the political process by listening to speakers, attending committee hearings and taking tours of the Capitol. The students are encouraged through this experience to get more involved with the political process.

Peripheral Groups

Association of Christian Schools International

Many of the AACI schools also are members of the Association of Christian Schools International (ACSI). Like AACI, ACSI represents private and K-12 Christian schools. Most ACSI schools are evangelical, but they represent a broader spectrum of the evangelical community than AACI. Some Mennonite and Presbyterian schools are represented by ACSI, for instance.

ACSI is headquartered in Colorado Springs, CO and has 11 regional offices. It represents over 8,000 schools in 105 countries. The Washington office (not a regional office) consists of a lobbyist and a secretary.

The Conservative Caucus

Howard Phillips founded the Conservative Caucus (TCC) in 1979. In general, according to Phillips, it is best the federal government be given the powers explicitly given to it by the Constitution. Phillips disagrees with the majority Supreme Court decision in *McCulloch v. Maryland* (1819) that Congress has "implied" powers beyond those explicitly given to it in Article I, Section 8. Phillips was a leader of the New Right. As such, he maintains to have a close relationship to Paul Weyrich, "a hero of the movement," and Phyllis Schlafly, "the greatest woman in American history" (The Conservative Caucus, [personal interview], March 13, 2003).

Phillips is accountable to a board of directors and a list of contributors is used to determine TCC's priorities. His methods include a weekly TV show, hosted by Phillips, publications, including a bimonthly newsletter, newsletters, advertisements, and grassroots mobilization. He no longer lobbies Congress. TCC also hosts "pre-

"strategic issues" of different parts of the world for its members. It has 12 full-time staff and its budget comes mostly from approximately 15,000 small donors (The Conservative Caucus, [personal interview], March 15, 2000).

Ethics and Public Policy Center

Though originally designed to 100% to address foreign policy issues, the Ethics and Public Policy Center now mostly addresses issues concerning religion and public life (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2000). EPPC generally does not take positions on these issues, but sees its role as fostering public debate on these types of issues (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2000). To do this, the EPPC publishes books, newsletters, and op-eds, hosts lectures, seminars and conferences (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2000). Whatever of the events they host are open to the public, they also host some private events. At some of these private conferences, for instance, they may invite experts to talk to scholars and experts discuss the role of religion and politics in an specialized topics (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2000). In this way, they are helping those who expert information in this topic to become better informed.

Most of EPPC's approximately 12 million budget comes from foundations such as Pew Forum, the Bradley Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation. It has a few individual donors and would like to have more. But has found that making the case for monies to individual donors is challenging (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal

interview), January 14, 2003). It has no official membership but a mailing list of about 3,000. A \$20 donation is asked for, but not required, to be on the mailing list.

EPIC has 31 programs. The most relevant to the Christian Right is the Evangelicals in Civil Life program. Its director is Michael Cromartie. The program emphasizes the role of evangelicals in public life and puts more attention to the role of the Christian Right. It published a book about the Christian Right, *The Longer Stride: The Religious Right in American Politics*, in 1992. Christian Right leaders often attend EPIC events and vice-versa. The EPIC does not qualify as a Christian Right interest group because its policy goals are not the same, and it does not have a strong focus on changing public policy.

The Institute on Religion and Democracy

The Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD) seeks to bring a conservative voice within mainline Protestant denominations. Its primary religious base is the United Methodist, Presbyterians (USA) and Episcopalian denominations. About half of its approximately \$1 million budget goes toward the United Methodist area. Small denominations make up about half of its overall resources, with the other half coming from foundations and large donations. The budget supports eight full time and four part time staff. There is no official membership, but the mailing list numbers about 200,000 (Interview on Religion and Democracy, [personal interview], March 4, 2003).

The formation of IRD, in 1988, was a reaction to the liberal theological changes, and increased liberal political activism, of the leaders of these denominations. It was formed by a group of clergy and laymen that included Robert J. Sirklaw, older

early supporters included the IFPC's George Nwagwu and ARI's Michael Nwok. Both are current board members. (Author on Religion and Democracy, [personal interview], March 4, 2009).

Most of IBD's work involves monitoring the activities, especially political, of smaller Pentecostal denominations and reporting this information to its supporters within these denominations. By bringing together these supporters, they can work together in their own congregations or at denominational meetings to bring about desired changes or oppose unwanted change. Noteworthy, IBD has not been involved in lobbying government authorities. One exception was the Sudden Price Act. IBD was the "lead" group in the Sudden Price Act within the WLF. IBD's contribution in the Sudden Price Act fully aligned with those in other political spheres.

APPENDIX B BENEFITS SURVEY

For each of the following factors, please indicate on the scale provided your best estimate of the importance of that factor for attracting members to this association.

1 = The benefit most provided;

2 =

3 =

4 =

5 =

6 = One of the most important benefits or activities provided

networks	—
professional contacts	—
events	—
advocacy	—
representation before government	—
participation in public affairs	—
lobbying	—
impulses	—
research	—
dissemination of consumer goods	—
publications	—
coordination among representatives	—
research	—
legal help	—
seminars	—
email alerts or updates	—

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Nappy-Nakamura was born July 12, 1959 in Jacksonville, Florida. Along with his younger sister, Nyla, Nappy spent his early childhood years growing up in Gainesville, Florida, and Monroe Park, Georgia and Valdosta, Georgia. At age 13, Nappy moved to Orlando, Florida, where he graduated from Boone High School in 1977. He earned his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Florida (UF) in 1981. Prior to starting a Master's program at The University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida in 1981, Nappy spent a year in Houston, Texas as a youth worker at Covenant House Texas.

Upon successfully defending his Master's Thesis, "The Effects of Segregational Freedman's Colonies on Negro Barred and Christian Church Relations in the United States," Nappy earned his M.A. from the University of Central Florida in 1989. Once graduating with his M.A. in Political Science, Nappy entered the graduate program of UF's Political Science Department to pursue his Ph.D. Nappy's primary areas of focus are American Politics and Religious and Politics. The dissertation topic (*Christian Right* interest groups) afforded Nappy the opportunity to conduct more than two years of research in Washington, D.C.

Currently, Nappy lives at Cypress Creek, Texas where he is a visiting professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University - Cypress Creek. Nappy and his wife, Angela, have been married for seven years. They have a ten-year-old daughter named Nyla.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Richard D. Wolff

Distinguished Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Lawrence C. Dodd

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

David G. Hadden
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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political
Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted
as having satisfied all the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

January 2006

Dean, Graduate School